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Preface
The four earlier technical studies in this series were devoted to 
analytical techniques appropriate in a variety of problems that a busi­
ness manager must face in running his business. This study covers 
another important decision—the decision to sell a business or to buy 
someone else’s.
As with all other management services technical studies, this one 
focuses on the role of the CPA as an analyst and advisor to his client. 
While the types of business problems covered thus far constitute only 
a part of the management services activities of most CPAs, they do 
represent a significant portion of the management services practice. 
This is particularly true for the small and medium-sized businesses 
typically served by local and regional CPA firms; the CPA serving such 
clients needs a large kit of analytical tools. The purpose of this study 
is to describe and illustrate some of the analytical techniques that are 
appropriate in purchase and sale decisions. Many of the analytical 
techniques described in the earlier studies are also relevant in a pur­
chase or sale analysis. To avoid repetition, however, these techniques 
are not described in detail here. This study is based on the assumption 
that the reader already has a thorough knowledge of those techniques 
described earlier.
Scope of This Bulletin
Because of the importance of this topic, a large and excellent body 
of literature already exists; several recent books concerned with 
mergers and acquisitions are listed in a bibliography at the end of this 
chapter. Three of those works were written from the point of view of 
a corporate financial executive, a lawyer, and a CPA, and were the 
subject of a comparative review in a recent magazine article.1 Most
1 Wakefield, B. R., “Keeping Inform ed: Mergers and Acquisitions,” Har­
vard Business Review, September-October 1965.
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practitioners will wish to have all three volumes in their library be­
cause they cover many important aspects of the topic not dealt with 
in this study. This bulletin seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature 
by devoting itself exclusively to the analytical role of the CPA advisor 
to small businesses. This emphasis results in two important limitations 
on the scope of this study:
1. Small business. The “purchase and sale” title is intended to imply 
that this bulletin is dealing with a somewhat different phenomenon 
than the widely discussed “merger and acquisition” activities of large 
corporations. Although there are many similarities in terms of the 
problems to be faced by both large and small businesses, there are also 
significant differences other than in the dollar magnitude of the transac­
tion. For example, organizational planning and the administrative 
integration of two corporations into a new efficient economic unit is 
an important aspect of large mergers. For small businesses, however, 
this problem is frequently one of little consequence; only a limited 
number of people are involved and during the negotiations they will 
have ample opportunity to “size up” each other and decide whether 
or not they will be able to work together after the transaction is con­
summated. Personality conflicts may cause a breakdown in negotia­
tions, but this occurs as an almost automatic byproduct of the nego­
tiating process rather than as a separate problem to be explicitly dealt 
with. The net effect is that the purchase or sale of a small business 
is frequently a much cleaner problem, from an administrative point of 
view, than the merger or acquisition of a large business.
Another important characteristic of small business transactions is 
that they usually do not require involvement with or approval of fed­
eral regulatory agencies. The relatively small size of these transactions 
usually precludes any consideration of the anti-trust laws, particularly 
in cases where one small business is buying another. Nevertheless, the 
CPA should have sufficient familiarity with anti-trust legislation in 
order to be able to advise his client concerning the need for expert 
legal opinion on the subject. If a small business is being sold to a 
larger enterprise, the buyer may be exposed to anti-trust involvement, 
and the CPA advisor to the small business seller should raise a question 
early in the negotiations. Usually, however, the seller can rely on the 
advice of counsel for the buyer who is experienced in these matters 
and who will seek to protect his client from potential anti-trust liti­
gation.
In a similar manner, most small business transactions do not require 
SEC registration or compliance with other regulations of that agency.
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Most small businesses are owned by one individual or by a very small 
group of stockholders. Usually, the owners are intimately familiar with 
the operations of the business, thus eliminating the need for careful 
and complete disclosure to investor-stockholders who must approve a 
purchase or sale transaction. Both anti-trust and SEC considerations 
are important factors in large mergers or acquisitions, but they are not 
dealt with in this study.
2. Analytical role of the CPA. There are at least three phases to a 
purchase or sale engagement, and the CPA’s role will depend upon 
how many of these the client wishes him to undertake and to what 
extent he is to go.
The first phase is concerned with conducting a limited audit of the 
financial statements prior to an acquisition. The second phase is de­
voted to the income tax consequences of the alternative ways in which 
an acquisition might be consummated.
Finally, there is a third phase which is concerned with preparing an 
analysis of the economic consequences of the transaction in order to 
assist the client in arriving at a reasonable price, and to provide the 
client with summaries of quantitative data for his use in the negotiating 
process.
The latter phase is the subject of this study.
This is the fifth in a series of five technical studies prepared under 
the general supervision of Professor Richard F. Vancil, D.B.A., CPA, 
Harvard Business School and Henry DeVos, CPA, manager, manage­
ment services. Assistance in field research and case writing was pro­
vided by Dr. James S. Hekimian, Dr. Charles J. Christenson, Dr. David 
Hawkins, Dr. Robert C. Deming, Dr. Robert C. Hill, and L. Paul 
Berman.
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Analysis for Purchase or 
Sale of a Business
This chapter is devoted to a general discussion of the analytical role 
played by a CPA in the purchase or sale of a small business. First, 
consideration is given to the motivating factors which lead the buyer 
and the seller to consider the transaction in the first place; the CPA 
can perform his job competently only if he thoroughly understands 
what the parties to the transaction are trying to achieve. Then, through 
the use of illustrative examples, the remainder of the chapter is devoted 
to the analysis that the CPA might perform for the seller, his role in 
the initial negotiating session, the analysis that he might perform for 
the buyer, and finally, the part he might play in the resolution of con­
flicts in the final negotiations. The study then presents four actual case 
studies in which a CPA and his client were involved in the purchase 
or sale of a small business.
MOTIVATIONS FOR THE TRANSACTIONS
Considering all the problems that must be resolved and the inherent 
conflict of interest between buyer and seller, it is amazing that so 
many purchase and sale transactions are consummated every day. The 
starting point for any understanding of the mystical process by which 
buyer and seller reach agreement is the realization that there will be 
no transaction unless both parties believe that it serves their own best 
interests. In almost all cases, the financial aspect of the transaction is 
only one of a host of considerations which motivate both the buyer and 
the seller to arrive at some mutually agreeable arrangement. One of 
the greatest contributions the CPA can make to a client entering 
negotiations as either buyer or seller is to prepare a concise, dispassion­
1
ate and objective statement of the motivations of both parties. In 
particular, a clear understanding of the other party’s nonmonetary 
motivations will permit the CPA’s client to emphasize the advantages 
that would accrue to the other party through achieving these goals, 
thus helping to steer negotiations toward the more favorable end of the 
range of possible prices.
There are probably dozens of factors that motivate the purchase or 
sale of a small business, but some of the more common ones are listed 
in Exhibit 1, below. Most transactions involve varying combinations 
of several of these factors, a point that will be illustrated in the case 
studies that follow. Here it is sufficient to comment briefly on some 
of the more important motivations.
Seller’s Motives
Most small businesses are not for sale. This simple, rather obvious 
fact is all too frequently ignored by an aggressive buyer. It is also 
true, and obvious, that almost any small business can be purchased at 
a sufficiently high price, but if price is the only factor motivating the 
seller, that price will frequently be too high to be attractive to the 
buyer.
What motivates the small businessman to run his own business in 
the first place? A composite answer from a cross section of such men 
would include such things as the desire to be his own boss, the satis-
Exhibit 1
COMMON MOTIVES
FOR PURCHASE OR SALE TRANSACTIONS
Factors Motivating the Seller
• Impending Retirement of Owner
• Resolution of Existing or Potential Estate Problems
• Source of Capital for Expansion
• Access to Better Management and Administration
• Desire to Be Part of a Larger Organization
Factors Motivating the Buyer
• Attractive Investment Opportunity
• Desire to Achieve Economies of Scale: Integration Cost Savings
• Alternative or Supplement to Internal Growth
• Source of Additional Management Talent
2
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faction of creating something, and an honest belief in the spirit of free 
enterprise. Such a man rarely sells his business solely for money; the 
personal dislocation is too great. In addition, as the owner grows older, 
two nonmonetary factors become increasingly important. The first 
is a natural desire to perpetuate the business rather than let it die ( as 
most small businesses do) when the owner retires. Many small busi­
nessmen, in effect, “sell” their business by bringing in a younger man 
and training him to take over when the owner retires. The second 
factor, related to the problems of estate valuation in the settlement 
of estate taxes, occurs only if the business is sizable. In such a circum­
stance, turning the business over to a younger man is less feasible and 
may motivate the owner to seek an outside buyer.
Most small businessmen are not aggressively seeking to expand the 
scope of their operations. The personable owner-operator of a single 
unit in a distribution or service industry may earn a very good living 
even though he lacks the capital, management talent, and personal 
aspirations to expand into a multi-unit chain. Where he does have such 
aspirations however, the other two requirements—capital and man­
agement—may lead him to seek a buyer for part or even all of his 
business. The price, in terms of dilution of the owner’s equity, to be 
paid for new resources is a critical factor in such a transaction, but the 
recognized need for the new resources may lead the owner to be more 
realistic in terms of his selling price than he would be if he were not 
motivated by the desire to expand.
Finally, some quite successful small businessmen find that their 
personal goals and ambitions change over a period of time and they 
conclude that they might be happier as part of a larger organization. 
The motivation to sell in this instance is quite intangible, reflecting 
some combination of a desire to share the responsibility for running 
the business, a desire to reduce a demanding personal workload, and/or 
a desire to reduce the financial risk of having a major portion of his 
personal assets committed to one operation. Despite the personal nature 
of these considerations, a buyer dealing with such a seller is well ad­
vised to recognize the importance of these factors to the seller and to 
stress them in the negotiations, thus de-emphasizing the importance of 
the purchase price itself.
Buyer’s Motives
In contrast to the seller’s motives, the buyer’s motives are usually less 
personal and emotional. He has more options. His business is usually
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healthy and expanding. The possibility of purchasing a particular small 
business must make sense, on a dollar and cents basis, when compared 
with the alternatives of purchasing other similar businesses or starting 
a competitive business from scratch. If he has had prior experience 
with acquisitions, the buyer is usually well aware of the problems and 
risks of purchasing someone else’s business, and he tries to insist on a 
purchase price that will be low enough to compensate him for assum­
ing those risks.
Nevertheless, just as in the case of the seller, there are frequently 
some more subtle considerations that motivate the buyer, and the 
seller who recognizes these factors will improve his own negotiating 
position. For example, the amalgamation of two businesses that are in 
related activities may produce a new economic unit which is more 
profitable than the sum of the two independent units. This synergy 
is the most common rationale for business combinations. Usually, it is 
the buyer who is in a better position to estimate the advantages and 
cost savings from integration, but the seller should not overlook these 
advantages. It may, in fact, be true that the seller’s business is worth 
more to the buyer than it is to the seller. The seller who recognizes 
this fact may be able to negotiate a higher price.
If the buyer is committed to a program of expansion for his own 
business, the purchase of a related enterprise that is compatible with 
his objectives may be quite attractive. The advantages of such a 
purchase—savings of both time and money—are powerful motivating 
factors. Starting a new business, or another unit in a chain operation, 
involves not only startup losses during the early months but also 
carries a significant administrative cost. Acquiring an existing business 
that has already incurred these costs and losses also avoids the two- or 
three-year time lapse that is frequently required to bring the unit to an 
efficient and profitable level. Unless the seller has a truly unique loca­
tion, a franchise, or an unusual degree of management skill, he is not 
really offering to sell the buyer anything that the buyer could not pur­
chase piecemeal in the creation of a new unit of his own. But the 
“goodwill” of an established operation does offer tangible values to the 
buyer which the seller should attempt to recoup in the negotiations.
Finally, almost any business, and particularly an expanding one, can 
use additional managerial talent. If the seller has demonstrated his 
executive abilities through building a business which is attractive to 
the buyer, one of the most important assets to be sold may be the seller 
himself. The continued employment of the owner-manager and other 
members of his organization is a matter to be discussed early in the 
negotiations with a potential buyer. If the employment contracts for
4
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key executives are to be a part of the transaction, the salaries and other 
terms of these agreements become an almost inseparable part of the 
purchase price negotiations.
Summary
If the purchase or sale of a small business were simply a matter of the 
transaction price, the most efficient means of arriving at that price 
would be an auction. But price is only one aspect of the transaction, a 
counterweight to be put on the scale by the buyer to balance off a host 
of other considerations which are also involved in the transaction. The 
CPA acting as an advisor to either a buyer or a seller must make a con­
scious effort to explicitly identify these other factors and bring them 
into the negotiations. When such an approach is followed, the net re­
sult will usually be more fruitful discussions and a more satisfactory 
mutual agreement between the parties.
ANALYSIS FOR THE SELLER
The CPA’s role as an advisor to the client who is selling a small busi­
ness may take many forms. In order to make a discussion of this role 
more tangible and to illustrate some of the analytical techniques in­
volved, an actual case history will be used. While the case discussed 
here will not touch on all of the CPA’s activities, the additional case 
studies which follow this chapter will illustrate other variations of his 
role. The Hastings-Robinson, Inc. case has been chosen for discussion 
here because both the buyer and the seller engaged a CPA to assist 
them in the transaction. The discussion will proceed chronologically, 
covering a six-month period from March through September 1966, be­
ginning with the seller’s decision to engage a management services 
consultant and concluding with the sale of the business to a larger 
company.
Hastings-Robinson, Inc.
In September 1954, Charles Hastings and James Robinson incorpo­
rated a new enterprise under the name of Hastings-Robinson, Inc. 
Both men, then in their mid-thirties, had grown up in the Cleveland, 
Ohio area, and they believed that there was a substantial business 
opportunity in renting equipment and small tools to construction con­
tractors in that area. Many of the construction contractors operated as
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sole proprietorships, bidding on jobs as prime or subcontractors and 
hiring workmen as required. They frequently were undercapitalized, 
and their ability to support a heavy investment in equipment was there­
by limited. Their need for special types of equipment tended to be 
sporadic. The two men thought that they could provide a real service 
to those contractors by making expensive and special purpose equip­
ment available for rental on an hourly, daily, weekly or monthly basis.
The economic feasibility of such a rental operation had already been 
proven on the West Coast; several rental yards had been started during 
the late forties in California. The inherent advantage of a rental yard 
was that it reduced the amount of time that a piece of equipment 
would remain idle. For example, a single contractor might require the 
use of a heavy-duty air compressor for only five days per month and, 
if he owned it, he would have to spread the full cost of ownership over 
the time that the compressor was utilized. The same piece of equip­
ment in a rental yard might be utilized 10 to 15 days per month, thus 
permitting the ownership costs to be spread over a broader time span, 
yet permitting a return for the operator of the rental yard. Contractors 
found that the rental service was not only less costly for certain types of 
equipment but also more convenient. The equipment cost behavior, 
rather than being fixed, became variable and therefore easier to calcu­
late in preparing a bid for a specific contract. Further, equipment cost 
became an avoidable expense if the contract was not awarded.
Starting with an initial capitalization of only $50,000, and a limited 
inventory of equipment, Hastings-Robinson opened their first rental 
yard in Cleveland in early 1955: Over the next eleven years the busi­
ness grew steadily and profitably. The first branch was opened in 
Akron during 1957, followed by branches in Mansfield in 1959, Toledo 
in 1961, and Pittsburgh in 1965. Because of the seasonal nature of the 
construction business, Hastings-Robinson changed its fiscal date from 
August 31 to January 31 in 1960; the two owners had decided that the 
best time to open a new rental yard was in March or April, and a 
January 31 closing date permitted them to absorb start-up costs of a 
new yard in the same fiscal period as its first year of operation. Con­
densed financial statements for the fiscal years 1963 through 1966 are 
presented in Exhibits 2 and 3 (pages 7 and 8).
Because of the nature of the business, its expansion required sub­
stantial amounts of new capital. In the fall of 1960, a package of sub­
ordinated debentures and common stock was sold. Part of these se­
curities were purchased by Messrs. Hastings and Robinson, and the 
balance by five individual investors in the Cleveland area. The effect 
of this transaction was to reduce the percentage of common stock held
6
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by the two men to just under 80 per cent. By 1964, the progress of the 
company was sufficient to qualify it for a long-term loan from an in­
surance company, and $400,000 was raised in this manner. While the 
loan agreement contained restrictive covenants, it did not substantially 
hamper the continued expansion of the company. By the spring of 
1966, however, Hastings-Robinson was again beginning to feel the 
pinch of funds to finance further expansion and Mr. Hastings, the 
president, decided to seek outside assistance.
Beginning with its 1960 fiscal year, Hastings-Robinson, Inc. had re­
quested a local CPA firm to prepare all of its financial statements. In 
March 1966, Mr. Franklin, the partner in charge of the audit, was work­
ing in Hastings-Robinson’s offices completing the working papers for
Exhibit 2
HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC. 
Comparative Income Statements 
For the Years Ended January 31, 1963-1966 
(All Amounts in Thousands)
Years Ended 
January 31
1963 1964 1965 1966
Sales and rental income ............................ $1,825 $2,109 $2,332 $3,099
Cost of sales ............................................. 1,201 1,356 1,462 1,912
Gross profit on sales .......................... $ 624 $ 753 $ 870 $1,187
Expenses:
Selling and administration $ 515 $ 594 $ 679 $ 868
Interest ........................................................ 28 24 47 59
O ther items (net) ..................................... 7 (4) (6) (6)
Total expenses $ 550 $ 614 $ 720 $ 921
Operating income before taxes $ 74 $ 139 $ 150 $ 266
Provisions for taxes ................................. 36 62 58 84
Net operating income $ 38 $ 77 $ 92 $ 182
Retained earnings Feb. 1 109 147 224 316
Special item :
Gain on sale of undeveloped real estate
(net of taxes) ....................................... — — — 55
Retained earnings January 31 $ 147 $ 224 $ 316 $ 553
Number of shares outstanding .................. 221 221 221 221
Earnings per share $ .17 $ .35 $ .42 $ .82
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Exhibit 3
HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC. 
Comparative Balance Sheets 
January 31, 1963-1966 
(All Amounts in Thousands)
Current Assets:
1963
ASSETS
January 31 
1964 1965 1966
Cash ................................... ...........  $ 24 $ 26 $ 89 $ 299
Accounts receivable ....... 209 169 322 429
Inventory .......................... 484 435 560 388
Other current a s se ts ........ ..........  14 18 17 27
Total current assets ................ $731 $ 648 $ 988 $1,143
Rental Equipm ent:
Heavy duty ................................... $242 $ 365 $ 376 $ 722
Small tool ..................................... — 251 299 485
Total ........................................... $242 $ 616 $ 675 $1,207
Less accumulated depreciation 124 268 284 341
Net book value:
Heavy duty ............................... $118 $ 225 $ 228 $ 545
Small tool ................................. — 123 163 321
Total $118 $ 348 $ 391 $ 866
Other Assets ..................................... $ 76 $ 71 $ 225 $ 118
Total assets ................................... $925 $1,067 $1,604 $2,127
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY
Current Liabilities:
Accounts payable and accruals 
Equipm ent notes ........................
Total current liabilities
Long Term Notes Payable
Total senior liabilities ...........
$ 186 
241
$ 209 
250
$ 277 
201
$ 431 
354
$427 $ 459 $ 478 
400
$ 785 
400
$427 $ 459 $ 878 $1,185
Deferred Taxes ............................... $ - $ 33 $ 59 $ 84
Subordinated D ebt ........................ 258 258 258 212
Stockholders Equity:
Paid-in capital ............................ 93 93 93 93
Retained earnings ...................... 147 224 316 553
Total stockholders equity $240 $ 317 $ 409 $ 646
Total liabilities and stockhold­
ers equity ............................ $925 $1 ,067 $1 ,604 $2,127
8
ANALYSIS FOR PURCHASE OR SALE OF A BUSINESS
Ratios:
Senior debt % of total capital . 
Common stock: Shares at year
end ..............
Book value per 
share ...........
Return on average equity
Exhibit 3, continued
January 31
1963 1964 1965 1966
46% 43% 55% 56%
221 221 221 221
$1.09
17%
$ 1.43 
28%
$ 1.85 
25%
$ 2.92 
35%
the year end. While chatting with him one afternoon, Mr. Hastings 
asked if Mr. Franklin could recommend anyone as an advisor to the 
company on its financial problems. Mr. Franklin replied that many 
CPA firms did “management services” work of that sort, but that his 
own firm concentrated almost exclusively on audit and tax work. He 
went on to say that he was well acquainted with another local CPA, 
Mr. Richard Nelson, whose practice was concentrated mainly in the 
fields of management services and income tax planning. He and Mr. 
Nelson had frequently referred clients to each other and Franklin’s 
clients appeared to have been satisfied with the work performed by the 
other CPA. At Hastings’ request, Franklin agreed to notify Nelson that 
he might expect a call; subsequently, Hastings telephoned Nelson and 
invited him to visit Hastings-Robinson, Inc. so that the problem could 
be explained to him.
Opportunities for Growth
A few days later, Hastings and Nelson met, and Hastings gave him 
a brief history of the company. He then went on, “As I see it, the rental 
of construction equipment is an industry that has just reached adoles­
cence, but is going to mature very rapidly from this point on. Prac­
tically anything can be rented these days, and we’ve got to define our 
segm ent of the business quite carefully. If we exclude the ren tal oper­
ations that handle party furniture and sickroom equipment, and those 
that deal primarily in small tools for the do-it-yourself market, there are 
only a few dozen rental yards in the whole country that really con­
centrate on construction equipment. More than half of those are 
low-volume operators that will never be more than single-location
9
operations. We have no trouble competing against such yards because 
we carry a much larger inventory, can afford sales promotions, and, in 
general, run our yards in an efficient manner. At the other end of the 
spectrum, we also compete with equipment distributors whose main 
line of business is the sale of new and used equipment, but who also 
offer short-term rentals on some of the used equipment that they have 
in inventory. Rental of equipment and sale of equipment are comple­
mentary lines of business. The real question is which side of the busi­
ness gets the emphasis. We concentrate on the rental side, and there­
fore carry a wider range of equipment for rental than most equipment 
distributors even though they may be several times our size.
“So that really only leaves a couple dozen of us,” Mr. Hastings went 
on, “that are large enough and ambitious enough to recognize the 
growth potential in our business. We’ve had a virgin field these last 
few years, and our growth has been most satisfying. But we won’t 
have the field to ourselves forever. I’ve heard that several large com­
panies are beginning to look hard at this type of business; just a few 
weeks ago, Gotham Equipment Corporation, one of the most im­
portant manufacturers of air compressors, back-hoes, and other equip­
ment, purchased a small chain of rental yards on the West Coast. 
Apparently, they see the potential in this business and they may be 
planning to put together a nationwide chain.
“Well, I want to continue expanding too,” he continued, “but I 
realize that we’ve got to move pretty fast if we are to establish our­
selves in some of the cities that are not yet adequately served. I’d say 
that the next three years are the critical ones; after that, the major 
expansion phase of this industry will be over and it will be increasingly 
difficult to find profitable new locations. On the other hand, it takes 
from a quarter to a half million dollars to open a new branch with a 
well-rounded inventory so an expansion program really takes a lot of 
cash. Our company is already borrowing about as much money as the 
banks are comfortable with, so we’re in the ‘box’ of having expansion 
ideas that are much too big for our ‘financial britches.’ We’ve got the 
know-how to run a chain of yards, a good young management team 
coming along, and the desire to expand; the question is where and how 
do we get the money?”
Nelson was interested in the problem posed by Hastings, and 
thought that he could be helpful because he had had similar experi­
ences with rapidly growing companies in other industries. The two 
men spent a couple of hours discussing various aspects of the job to be 
done, and as he left, Nelson said that he would get in touch with
10
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Hastings within a few days to present him with a specific proposal as 
to how he might proceed.
Terms of the Engagement
When Nelson returned a few days later, he spoke from rough notes 
on which he had jotted down the essential features of his proposal. 
Subsequently, these notes provided the basis for an engagement letter 
between Hastings-Robinson, Inc. and Mr. Nelson. The five steps in 
the proposal are summarized briefly below:
1. Determination of the constraints, other than financial, that would 
limit the amount of expansion possible during the next three years. 
How many attractive new locations can be found and acquired? How 
rapidly can managerial talent be developed within the organization?
2. Determination of the amount of new financing required to sup­
port the maximum level of expansion possible in step 1. How much 
cash will be available for reinvestment in the existing yards? What is 
the pattern of cash outflows and subsequent inflows that may be ex­
pected for each new yard that is started? What portion of these finan­
cial requirements may be met with normal forms of senior debt such as 
bank loans and equipment notes?
3. Calculation of the effect of dilution on the existing stockholders 
for several alternative rates of growth. Money can usually be found to 
finance profitable investments, but the existing stockholders may have 
to give up too large a share of the equity if they attempt to finance the 
maximum growth rate determined in step 1. From the point of view of 
the existing stockholders, what would be the effect on their equity in 
the business if a somewhat slower rate of growth were planned?
4. Selection of a growth rate and a financial plan to implement it. 
This decision is to be made by management. However, management 
will be in a much better position to make a rational selection after 
having an opportunity to review the analyses prepared in the first 
three steps.
5. Initiation of a search for new sources of funds. Once manage­
ment has made the strategy decisions in step 4, Mr. Nelson will prepare 
a final report which would describe the company’s expansion plans and 
project its financial requirements. This report could then be used in 
the opening negotiations with a variety of lenders and investors.
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The two men discussed this proposal at some length, clarifying what 
was to be done. In particular, Nelson stressed that his role in step 5 
was not to actually locate the necessary sources of funds for Hastings- 
Robinson, Inc. He would offer some suggestions as to sources, when 
that point was reached, but his main role was to help the owners to 
find what their financial needs were and to select a reasonable program 
for meeting those needs.
As a final point in their discussion, Hastings raised the question of 
professional fees. Nelson explained that he worked on a per diem basis, 
that about six weeks of his time would be required over a period of 
three months, that he would bill for time spent each month, and that 
his fee would be approximately $6,000 plus any direct expenses in­
curred. By early April, the agreement between the two men had been 
reduced to writing and Nelson was ready to begin his task.
Projections of Financial Requirements
As a starting point, Mr. Nelson first spent several days in a detailed 
examination of the operating performance of each of Hastings-Robin­
son, Inc.’s five rental yards. His purpose was threefold:
1. By distilling the experiences of the five yards, he was eventually 
able to prepare a statement of the fixed and variable expenses con­
nected with a typical rental yard. These operating ratios were care­
fully reviewed with Messrs. Hastings and Robinson, and were subse­
quently used in the preparation of projected operating statements for 
both existing and new yards.
2. Four of the existing yards had been in existence for more than 
four years and, in Mr. Hastings’ opinion, had “matured.” Mr. Nelson 
studied the pattern of developing volume in each of these yards, con­
centrating on the relationship between the inventory of equipment 
available and income attribu tab le to tha t equipm ent. He then applied 
the growth pattern to the Pittsburgh yard that had been open only for 
the last year, and projected what its mature volume might be. This set 
of assumptions was then carefully reviewed with the owners.
3. Finally, by reviewing the equipment inventory records for the 
various classes of equipment in each yard, Mr. Nelson was able to pre­
pare estimates of the capital expenditures that would be required to 
replace the equipment inventory as it wore out. With this final set of
12
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estimates, he was then able to prepare a complete set of projected 
operating and cash flow statements for the five existing rental yards.
Reviewing his work at this stage with the owners, Nelson pointed 
out that profits from the existing operations could be expected to level- 
off at a point somewhat higher than the profits achieved for fiscal year 
1966, and that these yards would produce a steady flow of cash which 
would be available to provide part of the investment in new yards. 
“That’s the next step,” he said. “If you had unlimited financial re­
sources, how many new rental yards could you open during the next 
three years?”
Constraints on Expansion
As Mr. Nelson put it, “An expansion program in this industry will 
require three things: markets, management, and money. Let’s forget 
about the last one for a while and concentrate on the availability of the 
first two.”
During the ensuing discussion, Nelson became convinced that 
Messrs. Hastings and Robinson understood the marketing side of their 
business quite thoroughly. In the owners’ opinion, their smallest 
branch in Mansfield was successful even though the population in that 
metropolitan area was less than 100,000 people. The population in the 
cities served by the other four branches ranged from a little over a 
quarter of a million in Akron to over a million in Cleveland. With the 
exception of the new branch in Pittsburgh, the other three larger 
branches each had equipment inventories of $400,000 to $500,000, in 
terms of original cost. Mr. Hastings said that a half million dollar in­
ventory was the most efficient size; large enough to be quite profitable, 
but still not unwieldly. The critical factor in the success of a new 
branch, according to Mr. Robinson, was its location. Both he and Mr. 
Hastings were proud of their “knack” for picking locations.
Summing up the discussion of market opportunities, Mr. Hastings 
said, “It really depends on the level of construction activity, but my 
guess is that any industrial city with a metropolitan population of a 
quarter of a million or more can support a large rental yard; large 
cities like Cleveland and Pittsburgh can easily support four or more. 
So you don’t have to do much analysis to see that with only a couple 
of dozen yards of that size in the United States today there are an 
unlimited number of opportunities. We’ve already begun to look at real 
estate in Columbus and Cincinnati and we are beginning to think in
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terms of Indiana and Illinois. It takes three or four months to find the 
right location in a given city, but I’m convinced that for the next two 
or three years the availability of good market opportunities will not be 
a limiting factor in our growth.”
“Management, on the other hand, is quite another matter,” Mr. 
Hastings went on. “The success of a rental yard is vitally dependent 
on the abilities of the manager, and it takes at least a year to train 
someone to the point where he is able to make it on his own.” After 
discussing this problem for a while, Mr. Nelson suggested that the two 
owners spend some time over the next few days carefully inventorying 
their personnel and evaluating the potential of each man for greater 
responsibilities. During the next few days, all three men worked to­
gether on this problem and finally decided that the availability of man­
agerial personnel both in the field and at headquarters was indeed the 
critical factor limiting the expansion plans for the company. At the end 
of these discussions, the consensus seemed to be that Hastings-Robin­
son, Inc. could open and staff three new branches in the spring of 1967 
(fiscal year 1968), four more the following year, and six in the spring 
of 1969. “And that’s probably as far as we’ll get,” Hastings concluded, 
“because then we’ll have a lot more competition and it’s hard to predict 
whether expansion will still be desirable.”
Financial Model of a New Branch
While the discussions described above were in progress, Mr. Nelson 
was working on another aspect of the problem. “In effect,” he told the 
owners, “I’m building a simple model of the financial aspects of open­
ing and operating a typical new branch. A typical branch first starts 
to spend money sometime in the fall, prior to the opening, when it 
acquires real estate and has a manager assigned to it. Then it begins 
to buy equipment, hires other personnel, opens its doors, and continues 
to build its inventory in response to the local market during the next 
year and a half. Headquarters administrative costs also go up some­
what with each new branch added; all these things have to be con­
sidered.”
Most of the assumptions necessary to describe the start-up and oper­
ation of a new branch were drawn from Mr. Nelson’s earlier analysis of 
the five existing branches. Once again, however, he reviewed all of his 
assumptions concerning the fixed costs and variable operating ratios 
with the owners to make sure that they also found them reasonable. 
Finally, he constructed a complete set of financial and cash flow state­
ments for a hypothetical new branch for the first eight years of its oper­
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ation. “After eight years,” he said, “the mix in our equipment inventory 
stabilizes and depreciation equals the cost of replacing old equipment. 
Then the branch becomes fairly stable.”
A Program for Growth
With this preliminary work out of the way, Mr. Nelson was ready to 
begin pulling everything together into a forecast of the new financing 
that would be required to support the expansion program. His final 
report, issued during the third week in July, was entitled, “Hastings- 
Robinson, Inc.: A Program for Growth,” and the exhibits discussed 
below are excerpts from that report. The transmittal letter, bound 
into the front of the report, required two and a half pages to list all 
the assumptions used in preparing the pro forma financial statements. 
The opening paragraph of the transmittal concluded with the state­
ment that, “The projected financial statements presented herein are 
based upon several assumptions and estimates of operating efficiencies, 
as detailed below, which were provided to us by the management of 
the company. Where possible, we have tested the reasonableness of 
these estimates against historical operating performance. However, 
because of the prospective nature of these forecasts, particularly the 
number and timing of new outlets to be established, we are unable to 
vouch for the accuracy of the pro forma results.”
Much of the work in preparing the forecasts was merely a straight­
forward computation, and was done by a staff man working under Nel­
son’s supervision. The assistant first prepared projected cash flow state­
ments, operating statements, and balance sheets for the five fiscal years 
1968 through 1972. These projections included both the operations of 
the five existing yards and the time-phased start-up of 13 new yards 
during the next three fiscal years. The projected income statements 
are shown in Exhibit 4, page 16.
As may be noted from Exhibit 4, one of the unusual aspects of these 
projections was that they were calculated before taking into account 
the source or amount of new financing required. As Mr. Nelson ex­
plained it to the owners, “It’s the financing that we are really interested 
in, so we calculated everything except the financing in order to permit 
us to test the effects of a variety of financing programs. Our cash flow 
projections show that it will take four million dollars of new funds to 
finance the 13 new branches, with the peak need occurring on July 31, 
1969. The question is, what’s the best way to raise that money?”
Mr. Nelson’s analysis of three alternative financial plans is presented 
in Exhibits 5, 6, and 7. In Exhibit 5, page 18, for example, Mr. Nelson
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examined the effects of financing the entire expansion program through 
various forms of senior debt. Using Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s operating 
budget for the current fiscal year, he first prepared a pro forma balance 
sheet as of January 31, 1967. Only the liability side of the balance 
sheet is shown in Exhibit 5 because the composition of the assets was 
not influenced by the type of financing used. From the cash flow pro­
jections, Mr. Nelson knew that $880,000 of new financing would be re­
quired during fiscal year 1968, and he programmed those funds from a
Exhibit 4
HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Pro Forma Income Statements
For Fiscal Years Ended Jan. 31, 1967 Through 1972 
(All Amounts in Thousands)
Fiscal Years 
Ended January 31
Rental income .................................
Gross profit of sales departm ent
Total income
Direct expenses:
Labor and maintenance 
Depreciation of rental equip­
ment ...........................................
Other direct expenses ................
Total direct expenses
Indirect expenses:
Salaries and office overhead 
Property taxes and insurance
Total indirect expenses
Total expenses
Profits before interest, bonus and 
taxes ................................................
Employee bonuses
Profits before interest and taxes 
Federal and state income taxes 
Profits before interest expense
1968
$1,790
1969
$2,782
1970
$4,366
1971
$5,614
1972
$5,974
405 405 405 405 405
$2,195 $3,187 $4,771 $6,019 $6,379
$ 713 $1,033 $1,549 $1,917 $2,037
384 605 948 1,170 1,224
208 285 406 460 478
$1,305 $1,923 $2,903 $3,547 $3,739
$ 280 $ 360 $ 480 $ 480 $ 480
65 108 170 200 200
$ 345 $ 468 $ 650 $ 680 $ 680
$1,650 $2,391 $3,553 $4,227 $4,419
$ 545 $ 796 $1,218 $1,792 $1,960
105 123 153 197 209
$ 440 $ 673 $1,065 $1,595 $1,751
168 245 400 793 926
$ 272 $ 428 $ 665 $ 802 $ 825
(The accompanying list of assumptions, as provided by management, is an integral 
part of this statement.)
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combination of bank loans, equipment notes and long-term senior debt. 
Profits before financing costs were then adjusted for interest expense on 
both existing and new debt to arrive at a forecasted net profit on equity. 
This same set of calculations was applied successively to each future 
year. The same format was used in Exhibits 6 and 7 but with different 
sources of financing. Exhibit 6 (page 20) programmed the sale of sub­
ordinated debentures with warrants during fiscal year 1968, and Exhibit 
7 (page 22) programmed the sale of common stock during that year. 
Discussing these calculations with the owners, Mr. Nelson said, “The 
real purpose of these calculations is to permit you to do a comparative 
evaluation of the alternatives. For this purpose, the picture is sum­
marized pretty well in the ratios at the bottom of each page. You’ll 
want to look at both the debt ratio and the earnings per share figures; 
the first is some measure of the risk to which the equity is subjected, 
while the second measures the profit earned on the equity for exposing 
itself to that risk. Naturally, the greater the risk, the greater the return 
on your equity and vice versa.
“Another important consideration,” Mr. Nelson continued, “is the 
availability of senior debt. Even if you wanted to follow the ‘all senior 
debt’ program, it might not be possible to find the money. Your debt 
ratio is now running around 55 per cent, but it would go to 63 per cent 
by the end of fiscal year 1970, and would actually be somewhat higher 
than that at the peak point during the middle of that fiscal year. With 
the proven earnings record that you would have at that point, it might 
be possible to raise that much senior debt, but you would clearly be 
getting close to the limit.
“Selling subordinated debt or equity would reduce the senior debt 
required. Subordinated debt is probably the most attractive because 
it could be sweetened with warrants on stock and sold at a higher 
price than you could probably sell the common stock for during 1967. 
The subordinated debt plan would reduce the maximum senior debt 
requirements to 55 per cent, but would only cut earnings per share 
during fiscal year 1972 by about 4 per cent. In the common stock pro­
gram (Exhibit 7, page 22), we’ve calculated the sale of only enough 
shares to keep the senior debt ratio below 60 per cent. Even so, earn­
ings per share decrease by about 12 per cent in 1972.”
In addition to his analysis of the “maximum growth” alternative, Mr. 
Nelson also prepared a rough set of figures projecting the financial re­
quirements and earnings performance at slower rates of growth. A 
brief discussion of these projections with the owners quickly led to their 
rejection of any program leading toward a more modest growth. As
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Mr. Hastings put it, “The profit opportunities in new rental yards are 
so great that I’d rather build a big chain even if I have to give up some 
of the ownership.”
As these discussions were proceeding during the latter part of June, 
the three men decided that they should also begin making initial con­
tacts with possible sources of new financing. It was already clear that 
a substantial amount of funds would be required, regardless of the 
financing program chosen, and Hastings in particular was anxious to 
get started with the search.
The Search for Buyers
Up to this point, the analysis prepared by Mr. Nelson in the Hastings- 
Robinson engagement is illustrative of the type of analysis that might 
be made in any major expansion program involving new financing, two 
topics which have been dealt with at greater length in earlier technical 
studies within this series.1 Normally, in such an engagement, the subse­
quent steps would have involved establishing contact with a variety of 
alternative sources of funds and the negotiation of mutually acceptable 
financial arrangements. In this case, however, the nature of the en­
gagement changed abruptly before this step was under way. In late 
June 1966, Mr. Hastings was contacted by Mr. Carl Spatz, a vice presi­
dent of Gotham Equipment Corporation of New York City and general 
manager of that company’s equipment rental division; he and Hastings 
had first met a few months earlier at a convention of the American 
Rental Association. Spatz now explained that, as Hastings knew, 
Gotham was planning to expand its activities in the construction 
equipment rental field. To accelerate that expansion it intended to 
acquire several existing companies in various parts of the country, and 
Spatz was calling to find out if Hastings would be interested in dis­
cussing the possibility of selling his business to Gotham. Subsequently, 
the two men arranged to have a meeting in New York City in early July 
at which Robinson and Nelson would also be present. The negotiations 
at that meeting, and subsequent events, are discussed in the following 
sections.
Under other circumstances, it is not uncommon for the CPA to play
1See “Analysis for Expansion or Contraction of a Business,” AICPA M an­
agement Services Technical Study No. 3, and “Analysis for Purchasing and 
Financing Productive Equipm ent,” AICPA M anagement Services Technical 
Study No. 4.
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a somewhat more active role in helping to find a buyer for a client who 
wishes to sell his business. There are several reasons why a CPA’s 
services may be particularly valuable during the search phase. First, 
the CPA has an intimate knowledge of his client’s business and should 
have a good understanding of the motivations which led the client to 
consider selling it. Second, the fact that a business is for sale is a matter 
to be treated confidentially; if potential buyers believe that the busi­
ness must be sold for some reason, their offering prices may be lower. 
The CPA’s reputation and experience in handling confidential data 
makes him one of the few persons with whom the client can discuss a 
possible sale with assured privacy. Finally, most CPAs not only have 
wide business contacts that might be potential buyers, but they also 
can be objective enough about the transaction to do an independent 
analysis of the types of potential buyers that might be interested in 
purchasing the business. Such an analysis can pinpoint potential buy­
ers which he can then contact on behalf of his client without disclosing 
the name of the business that is available for sale.
The distinguishing characteristic of the CPA’s work is his analytical 
approach to the job. What is there about this business that would make 
it appealing to certain types of buyers on terms other than the direct 
price? Who, specifically, are the buyers who might be interested in 
these non-price advantages? Being aware of the advantages of the 
proposed transaction from the point of view of each party is of great 
value in finally negotiating an agreeable price, and the CPA can greatly 
assist his client by assuring that all prospective buyers who might have 
important non-price motivations have been contacted in the early 
phases of the search.
Recognizing the importance of this type of analysis, Nelson initiated 
two new lines of inquiry when he learned from Hastings of the pro­
posed meeting with Gotham Equipment Corporation. First, he was 
surprised to learn that the owners would even consider selling the 
entire business, and he spent a couple of hours with each man discuss­
ing the pros and cons of selling out. The two owners had obviously 
spent a great deal of time discussing the matter between themselves, 
and a composite of their views was that they felt an obligation both to 
their families and to themselves to at least listen to the offer that 
Gotham might make. Neither man had substantial assets other than 
his ownership in the business, and both felt that some diversification of 
investments would be desirable. Further, they recognized that the re­
cent rapid growth in their business was due, to some extent at least, to 
the boom in the construction industry that was then in its fourth year, 
and they knew that the rental of construction equipment was highly
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vulnerable to fluctuations in construction expenditures. As Mr. Hast­
ings put it, “If we are ever going to sell out, 1966 might well turn out 
to be the peak year.” Finally, the owners also knew from the prelimi­
nary figures that were emerging from Nelson’s analysis of the financing 
required for expansion that substantial additional funds would be re­
quired during the years immediately ahead and that their proposed 
expansion program would also increase the risk to which their equity 
was exposed. Again it was Hastings who summarized their feelings by 
saying, “We’ve got to open the new yards, but we might sleep a little 
better if we did it with someone else’s money.” At this point, neither 
man was committed to selling the business, but they agreed that they 
would be willing to do so if the price were attractive.
The other line of inquiry which Mr. Nelson pursued was an attempt 
to catalog the reasons why Gotham was interested in acquiring Hast­
ings-Robinson, Inc. He knew that Gotham was an aggressive, rapidly 
expanding company with a reputation for good management. In addi­
tion to its primary line of construction equipment, it had acquired 
several other equipment manufacturers during the last few years, and 
its 1965 annual report mentioned the success of its continuing diversifi­
cation program. The company’s stock was traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange and in June 1966 was selling at a multiple of 18 times 
the 1965 earnings per share.
Discussing Gotham’s possible motivations with management, Nelson 
learned that Mr. Spatz had mentioned two major reasons for his inter­
est in Hastings-Robinson, Inc.: (1) Spatz had agreed with Hastings’ 
analysis that the construction equipment rental industry would mature 
rapidly during the next few years, and as he put it, “If we’re going to 
have operations in Ohio and the Midwest, it would be a lot quicker to 
build on the Hastings-Robinson base than to start from scratch,” and 
(2) he had made it clear that Gotham was not interested in acquir­
ing Hastings-Robinson unless the owners were willing to remain active 
in the business and manage an expansion of it throughout the Midwest. 
Hastings-Robinson’s own analysis had shown that management person­
nel was the primary constraint on expansion, and apparently Gotham 
too believed that acquiring a well-managed small company would per­
mit it to expand more rapidly in the field than if it had to train all of 
its own management personnel. Summarizing this discussion with the 
owners, Mr. Nelson said, “It looks like Gotham is a legitimate buyer. 
They’ve already acquired one outfit on the West Coast, but they’re so 
new to the rental business, and such a small factor in it, that there 
shouldn’t be any problem with the FTC due to a lessening of competi­
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tion. The real test now is to see just how attractive they are willing to 
make it for you.”
Summary
As the discussion above illustrates, the CPA’s analysis on behalf of 
a client who may sell his business includes many tasks. One way to 
regroup these various activities is in terms of purpose. Three broad 
categories of purposes may be identified, although many of the spe­
cific analyses will serve two or more of these simultaneously:
1. The CPA must understand his client as an individual in order to 
be able to understand the client’s aspirations and ambitions and his 
motivations for wanting to sell the business.
2. He must understand the client’s business, the how and the why of 
its success, in order to be able to explain to a potential buyer just what 
it is that is for sale.
3. Finally, the CPA must help his client to explain what the business 
is in financial terms that can be easily comprehended by a potential 
buyer.
To the extent that he fulfills these purposes through a combination 
of analytical competence and personal sensitivity to others, the CPA 
will have already performed a valuable service to his client, and will be 
in a position to assist him even further in the negotiations that follow.
INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS
The initial negotiation between buyer and seller is a critical event 
for both parties. In one sense, the purpose of this meeting is merely 
to see if further discussions should be held, but in order to reach a 
decision on that issue, several important questions must be resolved, at 
least in a preliminary way. First, the personalities of the principals in­
volved must be sufficiently compatible to permit a fruitful discussion 
of substantive matters; one of the most common, though frequently un­
expressed, reasons for breaking off discussions is simply that the prin­
cipals “couldn’t do business with each other.”
The second major question is usually the primary topic of discussion 
at the first meeting: the rationale for the transaction from each party’s 
point of view. Here, the discussion is intended to help each party un-
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derstand the motivations of the other so that both may judge whether 
there is sufficient potential synergy in the transaction to make further 
discussions worthwhile. Dealing with each other in a guarded fashion, 
both parties attempt to identify areas of potential conflict between 
their interests that might subsequently prove to be significant enough 
to thwart the consummation of the transaction. Subsequent discussions 
will continue only if there appear to be sufficient points of mutual 
advantage to suggest that the parties will be able to overcome a po­
tential conflict in the course of more detailed negotiations.
Finally, and only if the first two questions seem susceptible to satis­
factory resolution, the initial negotiations will deal, at least gingerly, 
with the question of purchase price. Once again, the purpose here is a 
mutual desire of the two parties to see if each other’s thoughts on the 
matter of price are similar enough to permit the issue to be ironed out 
in the course of subsequent negotiations. The buyer at this stage 
usually has totally inadequate information on which to base a firm 
offer; the result is that price is usually discussed in terms of either 
(1) an asking price stated by the seller, or (2) a carefully qualified 
tentative offer by the buyer, “subject to substantiation of the informa­
tion already available and additional investigation.” Either approach 
tends to establish one side of the bargaining range, and if the other 
party feels that the first offer is within reasonable reach of the price 
that will be acceptable to him, further discussions are usually planned.
These points, and several others, are illustrated by the initial negoti­
ations between Hastings-Robinson, Inc. and Gotham Equipment Cor­
poration.
The Meeting on July 8
At the request of Mr. Spatz, Messrs. Hastings and Robinson agreed 
to meet with him in New York City on July 8, 1966. Prior to the meet­
ing, Hastings had discussed the impending negotiations with his lawyer 
and, although the counsellor was not present during any of the subse­
quent discussions, he was kept informed of the progress. At the time of 
the June 8th meeting, the owners regarded Gotham as their most 
formidable potential competitor, and they were very reluctant to dis­
close information which Gotham might find useful in improving its 
own position in the equipment rental industry. Therefore, Hastings 
replied negatively to Mr. Spatz’s request for recent financial statements, 
saying instead that he would bring some information with him to the 
meeting. Hastings then asked Nelson to prepare a set of highly con­
densed, comparative financial statements similar to those shown earlier
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in Exhibits 2 and 3 (pages 7 and 8). These statements were distributed 
to the Gotham representatives at the beginning of the meeting on 
July 8.
The meeting was held in Gotham’s well-appointed executive offices 
in mid-town Manhattan. During the initial pleasantries, Spatz intro­
duced an assistant who sat in with him during the meeting, and Hast­
ings introduced Mr. Nelson, explaining that the CPA was advising them 
on the financial aspects of its expansion plans. The discussion began 
with a general review of the type of rental business which Hastings- 
Robinson, Inc. engaged in, and its similarity to the activities of 
Gotham’s equipment rental division. Both Hastings and Spatz agreed 
on the great potential for the construction equipment rental industry 
during the years immediately ahead.
Mr. Spatz next directed the discussion to Hastings-Robinson’s in­
come statements and inquired about the depreciation policies which 
were used for the various types of rental equipment. Both he and 
Hastings agreed that depreciation was both the largest and the most 
subjective element of expense for an equipment rental company, and 
that it was impossible to evaluate the earnings of such a company with­
out knowing the details concerning its depreciation policies. As dis­
cussion seemed to indicate that the policies followed by both companies 
were reasonably compatible, Mr. Spatz also inquired about the salaries 
that had been paid to the owners and about the rates of interest 
paid on the debt carried by Hastings-Robinson, Inc. The salary 
question led rather naturally to the question of employment contracts 
for the two owners, and Mr. Spatz made it clear that he would not be 
interested in the acquisition unless both men would agree to work for 
Gotham for at least three years, and “hopefully, for a long time after 
that.’’ When Mr. Spatz learned that each owner had taken a salary of 
$20,000 and a bonus of $30,000 during the fiscal year ending January 
31, 1966, he remarked that some adjustment in salaries would be re­
quired to bring theirs in line with the salaries paid to other executives 
of Gotham, but that their total income would probably not decline 
because of the interest or dividends they would receive from investing 
their proceeds from the sale of the company.
This com m ent then led to a discussion of the form of the transaction, 
and both parties quickly agreed that an exchange of stock was most 
desirable because it could probably be treated as a tax-free exchange 
by Hastings-Robinson’s owners. Mr. Spatz pointed out that Hastings- 
Robinson stock was currently trading at about $62 per share and paying 
a dividend of $2.00. Concluding this part of the discussion, he said, 
“We’re definitely interested in acquiring Hastings-Robinson, Inc. It
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would really give us a strong foothold in the Midwest, and we need the 
kind of management experience that you could bring to us. So you’re 
‘sitting with a full poker hand’; what price do you want?”
Hastings refused to answer this question directly, stating that he and 
Mr. Robinson were not sure that they wanted to sell out at this time, 
but that they were willing to listen to whatever offer Gotham might 
make. “We honestly haven’t put a price on the business,” he con­
cluded, “but we think that we could continue to work with you and 
we’ll give careful consideration to your offer.” Spatz and his assistant 
then excused themselves for a few minutes to discuss the matter with 
their associates.
Shortly before lunch Mr. Spatz returned with John Hudson, the 
president of Gotham and introduced him to the three men representing 
Hastings-Robinson. Mr. Hudson was most cordial and said that he was 
quite impressed with the story that Mr. Spatz had told him of the rapid 
growth of Hastings-Robinson and the management abilities of its 
majority owners. He said that he could understand the unwillingness 
to disclose detailed financial information at this stage, but that this 
made it difficult to arrive at an offering price for the company. Never­
theless, he said that he and Mr. Spatz had agreed that they would be 
willing to offer $1 million worth of Gotham stock in exchange for all 
the common stock of Hastings-Robinson, subject of course to further 
investigation of the financial statements. The meeting broke up quickly 
at that point as Mr. Hastings thanked Messrs. Hudson and Spatz for 
their consideration and said that he and his partner would like to 
think it over.
Once outside the Gotham offices, the three men were unanimous in 
their disappointment about Gotham’s offer. As Mr. Nelson pointed 
out, the offer was only a little over five times the historical earnings of 
the company, about four times the prospective earnings for the current 
fiscal year, and “seemed totally inadequate for a company with a 
growth rate such as yours. If you do want to sell this company,” he 
continued, “it shouldn’t be too much trouble to find a buyer who would 
be willing to pay at least eight times earnings.” Mr. Hastings replied, 
“Well, it didn’t hurt us any to listen to them, but I don’t think we’ll 
bother to respond to an offer such as that.”
The Meeting on August 16
During the next three weeks, Mr. Nelson continued to work on his 
report dealing with the financial requirements for Hastings-Robinson,
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Inc.’s expansion. The pressure of current operations during the peak 
season of his client’s business precluded any opportunity for detailed 
discussions between Nelson and the owners about beginning the search 
for new financing or other possible buyers for the company. Then, in 
early August Mr. Hastings received another telephone call from Carl 
Spatz of Gotham.
Spatz expressed his disappointment that neither he nor Mr. Hudson 
had had a response from Hastings-Robinson concerning Gotham’s 
offer to acquire the company. Mr. Hastings explained that he had been 
very busy, but that both he and his partner felt that the offer had been 
so low that it did not merit serious consideration. Mr. Spatz said that 
he was not surprised at that reaction and that he felt “something like 
the man in the middle’ on this deal. As you know, Chuck,” Spatz con­
tinued, “I think that Hastings-Robinson’s merger into Gotham makes a 
great deal of sense for both companies, and I think that you agree with 
me on that. I’ve told Mr. Hudson that you and Jim are smart enough 
and capable enough to proceed with your own expansion program un­
less he can make a really attractive offer to you. He’s now come around 
a little bit, and he has told me that he would be willing to pay eight to 
ten times your current earnings, after they were adjusted to a basis 
that is comparable to ours. I don’t know what all the adjustments 
would be in terms of depreciation, salaries and bonuses, and income 
taxes, but I think that the multiple is about right. What do you think?”
Mr. Hastings replied to the effect that the proposal sounded sub­
stantially different than the one discussed at their first meeting, and 
suggested that it might be desirable to have another meeting in order 
to explore the matter further. He said that he, Robinson, and Nelson 
would be willing to come to New York again, and the date was set for 
August 16.
In preparation for the forthcoming meeting, Nelson worked up the 
calculation of the proposed selling price as shown in Exhibit 8, page 32. 
Operating profits before taxes for the first six months of the fiscal year 
were available from the company’s controller on August 10. This figure 
had not been adjusted to reflect bonuses to the owners and employees, 
and Mr. Nelson first estimated the amount of those adjustments. The 
second adjustment in Exhibit 8 was to recast Hastings-Robinson’s 
treatment of the investment tax credit. This matter had been discussed 
briefly at the meeting on July 8, and Mr. Nelson had learned that 
Gotham amortized investment tax credit over the life of the related 
equipment. Hastings-Robinson’s practice had been to apply the in­
vestment tax credit as a reduction in income tax expense in the year in
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Exhibit 8
HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC. 
Calculation of Selling Price 
August 16, 1966
Operating profits before taxes, six months ended July 31, 1966 $243,000
Less: Executive compensation adjustment (to bring Messrs.
Hastings and Robinson to $30,000 a year each $ 10,000
Provision for employee bonuses ...........................................  10,000
Total ...................................................................................  $ 20,000
Revised profits before tax ..................................................................  $223,000
Estimated pre-tax profits for the final six months of the year, after
similar adjustments ...............................................................................  260,000
Total estimated pre-tax profits, fiscal year 1967 ............................  $483,000
Provision for income taxes
Combined effective rate (federal and state) of 53% $256,000
Less: Amortization of investment tax credit
over average 7-year life
Credit accrued in fiscal year 1965 $12,000
fiscal year 1966 41,000
fiscal year 1967 30,000
Total accrued $83,000
1/7 credited to fiscal year 1967 
Net tax expense for fiscal year 1967
Adjusted profits after taxes
Price-earnings multiple
Total selling price ................................................................
Market value per share of Gotham stock
Number of Gotham shares required
Number of Hastings-Robinson, Inc. shares outstanding
Exchange stock ratio of Hastings-Robinson, Inc. for
Gotham
12,000
$244,000
$239,000
10
$2,390,000
$66.00
36,212
221,000
221,000 =  6.10 for 1
36,212
which the equipment was acquired. Based on Mr. Spatz’s remarks to 
Hastings about using adjusted earnings, Nelson inferred that an adjust­
ment such as that on Exhibit 8 would be required. The net effect of 
these adjustments was to yield an estimated profit figure for the fiscal 
year ending January 31, 1967, of $239,000, slightly above the operating 
budget that had been prepared at the beginning of that fiscal year.
Discussing this calculation with the owners, Nelson suggested that
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their asking price should be stated in terms of an exchange ratio of 
Hastings-Robinson, Inc. stock for Gotham stock. Hastings then raised 
a question about the subordinated debt which Hastings-Robinson had 
outstanding. These debentures were owned by Hastings-Robinson, 
Inc.’s stockholders, roughly in proportion to their ownership of the 
common stock. Mr. Nelson said that, if Hastings-Robinson were con­
tinued as a subsidiary of Gotham, the debentures need not be affected 
by the stock transaction. On the other hand, he said that Gotham 
might be willing to exchange its own debentures for those of Hastings- 
Robinson, Inc. After further discussion, the owners finally agreed that 
the asking price for the company would be a six-for-one exchange ratio 
on the common stock, plus a continuance or exchange of the sub­
ordinated debt.
The meeting in Gotham’s offices on August 16 turned immediately 
to the subject of price. Both Mr. Hudson and Mr. Spatz were present, 
representing Gotham, and Hudson confirmed his willingness to nego­
tiate on a range of eight-to-ten times Hastings-Robinson’s adjusted 
earnings. Mr. Nelson then presented Exhibit 8 on behalf of his client, 
and explained how they had calculated the asking price and what it 
was. He said that a six-for-one exchange would require 36,833 Gotham 
shares and, using Gotham’s closing price for the previous day of $66 
per share, would indicate a purchase price of about $2,431,000. Mr. 
Hudson pointed out that the asking price was actually higher by $212,­
000 because the subordinated debentures would remain, and he said 
that he had been assuming that because these securities were owned 
by the stockholders they would not be considered separately in the 
transaction. After a brief discussion about the terms of the asking 
price, Hudson and Spatz asked to be excused for a few moments and 
left the room.
They returned about twenty minutes later, and Mr. Hudson said that 
he had thought the matter over and had to insist that the subordinated 
debentures be wiped out prior to an exchange of common stock. “The 
tangible book value of this company is simply too low to justify such 
a premium for goodwill; if I can add the subordinated debt to the 
book value of the stock, the net worth is then about a million dollars 
and I think I could justify that to my board of directors.” He went on, 
“if Hastings-Robinson would go along with that adjustment,” he was 
prepared to offer nine times their estimated earnings of $239,000. Mr. 
Nelson calculated that this was equal to $2,151,000, or at $66 a share 
for the Gotham stock, 32,591 shares. Nelson then suggested that he 
and his two clients be given the opportunity to discuss this offer in
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private, and the representatives from Gotham left the room once again.
As soon as they were alone, Hastings and Robinson broke into smiles. 
Although Mr. Nelson had never been present at any discussion of what 
their “minimum” price would be, he had heard them say that any price 
above two million dollars was “in the right ball park.” The three men 
then spent fifteen minutes or so discussing the strategy for the next step 
in the negotiations and finally decided to agree to the stipulation re­
garding the subordinated debt and to offer an exchange ratio of 6½  
shares of Hastings-Robinson for each share of Gotham. As Nelson 
calculated it, this was equivalent to 34,000 shares of Gotham or a pur­
chase price of $2,244,000. The Gotham representatives were then in­
vited back to the conference room, and Nelson explained the terms of 
his client’s counter-offer. After thinking for a few moments, Hudson 
turned to the owners and said, “Well, it looks like we’ve got a deal.”
The final step that day was to prepare a letter of agreement between 
the parties. Mr. Hudson pointed out that once their agreement had 
been put in writing he would need an opportunity for his auditors to 
do a thorough investigation of Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s records in 
order to verify the representations that had been made in the negotia­
tions. Mr. Hastings said that there would certainly be no objection to 
this, but Mr. Nelson stated that, nevertheless, he did not want his 
clients to be a party to a binding agreement which would force them 
to sell the company based on a formula determination of profits sub­
ject to audit. He proposed that the letter state that Gotham in effect 
had an option to acquire all the stock of Hastings-Robinson in ex­
change for 34,000 shares of its own stock, such option to be exercised 
any time prior to October 1. “That way,” Mr. Nelson pointed out, “you 
won’t really have to make up your mind until after you have had the 
benefit of your auditors’ investigation, but my client won’t be placed in 
the position of having to argue over every last adjustment that they 
might propose.” A letter to that effect was drawn and, after review 
and minor redrafting by Hasting-Robinson’s counsel was signed on 
August 18.
ANALYSIS FOR THE BUYER
The role of the CPA as analyst and advisor to a seller may be more 
glamorous, but it is certainly no more important than the role that a 
CPA can play on behalf of the buyer. Working for either party, one of 
the critical factors which defines the scope of the CPA’s activities is
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simply how early he gets involved with the proposed transaction. In 
the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. illustration, the CPA working for the seller 
was actively engaged in useful analyses even before the possibility of 
selling the business was seriously considered; the CPA’s role, therefore, 
was quite an active one. On the other hand, the buyer in this illustra­
tion did not ask his CPA to become involved until after an initial agree­
ment had been reached with the seller. As a result, the buyer’s CPA 
played a somewhat more traditional role in this transaction. Subse­
quent cases in this bulletin will illustrate a variety of types of analyses 
that a CPA may perform for a buyer, and several of the more important 
of these are discussed briefly below.
Even if his engagement is restricted to a straightforward “investi­
gation prior to acquisition,” the buyer’s CPA must acquire a thorough 
understanding of the motivations of both parties to the transaction. 
Such an understanding will permit him to conduct a better investiga­
tion because it will help focus his attention on those aspects of the 
transaction which are particularly critical to its success. And, of course, 
if the CPA is involved in an earlier stage on behalf of the buyer, he 
will need such a background if he is to assist the buyer in the valua­
tion process and negotiations. Finally, the buyer’s CPA can play an 
important role in (1) evaluating the financial history of the seller by 
comparisons to industry data which may be available, and (2) making 
adjustments to the seller’s financial statements to cast them in a form 
suitable for comparison either to the buyer’s operating results or the 
results of alternative acquisition candidates that are being considered.
Valuation Procedures
If involved early enough to play a part in determining the value of 
the seller’s company, the CPA’s role is a demanding one. There is no 
neat formula for arriving at a price for the bundle of assets and abilities 
which the seller is offering; value cannot be determined in a vacuum. 
Rather, the only meaningful valuation is one couched in terms of the 
other opportunities or alternatives available to the buyer. The relevant 
question is: How attractive is this particular company when compared 
with other companies that might be purchased or with the direct 
acquisition of assets and personnel resources that would accomplish 
the same result? Approached in this way, valuation is a highly ana­
lytical, even though imprecise, art. The goal of the analysis is not to 
establish the price for which the transaction will be consummated, but 
to assist the buyer in arriving at his own judgment concerning what
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the upper limit of the purchase price might reasonably be. The fact 
that the subsequent negotiations may arrive at quite different values 
does not mean that the careful analysis was not worthwhile; without it 
negotiations may drift aimlessly, and a well presented analysis by the 
buyer’s CPA might help to narrow the bargaining range. Three of the 
most common valuation techniques are described briefly below.
Net worth or appraisal value. The owner’s equity in the value of the 
tangible assets he is selling is probably the most commonly used way 
of arriving at a price, particularly for very small businesses. The 
rationale for “tangible net worth” as a valuation is simple: the buyer 
has the alternative of acquiring a similar combination of physical assets 
on a piecemeal basis and starting a like operation from scratch. The 
owner-operator of a small service or distribution business may have 
developed an established clientele as a result of a convenient location 
and a pleasing personality. The latter is rarely for sale, and the former 
is rarely unique enough to demand a large premium. On the other 
hand, the net worth of such a business as stated in its financial state­
ments may be quite misleading, particularly if the fixed assets have 
been depreciated to a point below their replacement value. Thus, an 
appraisal of the current value of all assets may be required, and de­
pending upon the size and complexity of the task, the CPA may play 
an active role in arriving at a revised statement of tangible net worth. 
Normal auditing procedures (or an “investigation” to cover activities 
since the last audit statements) will usually be adequate for the cur­
rent assets and liabilities; the valuation of fixed assets may require spe­
cial expertise beyond the competence of the CPA.
Cash flow or return on investment. Another common valuation tech­
nique is that measured by the yield or rate of return on the investment. 
Again, the measure is a relative one: What rate of return could be 
earned on an alternative investment with similar risk characteristics? 
The rate of return concept is particularly useful for valuing two types 
of business: (1) businesses that are expected to have a relatively stable 
pattern of future earnings that will permit excess cash to be with­
drawn each year without impairing the earnings of future years, or 
(2) businesses such as real estate ventures that are essentially the liqui­
dation of fixed assets over time in which the total amount of money to 
be recovered exceeds the current purchase price of the business. Busi­
nesses in the first category produce a steady cash flow, either in the 
form of dividends or payments to management for its services, which 
may be treated as an annual yield on the investment. Businesses of the
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second type may be analyzed using discounted cash flow techniques 
to determine the equivalent annual rate of return on the declining un­
recovered investment. In either event, the critical factor is in arriving 
at an appropriate rate of return percentage to use in capitalizing the 
stream of earnings from the business. This point is really a matter for 
the buyer’s judgment, but stating the results of the transaction in terms 
of a rate of return percentage may make it easier for him to do relative 
value comparisons against alternative investments that he might make.
Price/earnings multiples. Finally, as the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. 
case illustrated, a price/earnings multiple is frequently used for valua­
tion purposes. Even more than with the first two techniques, price/ 
earnings ratios are a clear example of the importance of relativity in the 
valuation process; such ratios have no meaning except in comparison 
with similar ratios for alternative investments. Because of this fact, 
price/earnings ratios are rarely appropriate except in those situations 
where there is a public market for the stock of companies similar to the 
one being analyzed. Then, comparative valuations are possible al­
though still extremely difficult. Normally, a privately-owned company 
will not command a price/earnings multiple as high as that for an 
identical company that is publicly traded, simply because the capital 
invested in publicly traded securities has greater mobility. An even 
more important adjustment is that required to take account of any 
projected growth in future earnings of the company being acquired. If 
future earnings are not expected to increase, the price/earnings multi­
ple is merely the complement of the rate of return to be anticipated on 
the investment; an 8 per cent return may be achieved by paying a 
price equal to 12½  times the earnings, and so forth. On the other 
hand, many publicly traded stocks sell at multiples of 20, 25, or higher, 
and the owners expect that their return on investment will be reward­
ing because earnings in the future will be substantially greater than 
those of the recent past.2 Growth in future earnings is, of course, a 
critical factor in evaluation of a business, and the utility of price/ 
earnings ratios lies in the fact that they are available for a large range 
of publicly traded stocks. The job of the analyst here is to select those 
companies that are most analogous to the one being acquired, with par­
ticular emphasis on the rate of expected growth.
None of these evaluation procedures will be definitive in any par­
2 A particularly illuminating recent book that deals w ith price/earnings 
ratios in an analytical fashion is Knowlton, W inthrop, Growth Opportunities 
in Common Stocks (New York: H arper & Row, 1965).
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ticular circumstance; it may be appropriate to use all of them in an 
attempt to define a reasonable range for price negotiations. When 
negotiations between principals finally become serious, no mere set of 
comparative calculations is going to carry the day, but they may be 
an important buttress to the buyer’s judgment.
Evaluation of Operating Performance
Before a transaction can be consummated, the buyer must satisfy 
himself that the operating capabilities of his potential acquisition are 
sound. This task requires careful analysis of historical data, and is one 
in which the CPA’s expertise can be especially valuable. The extent to 
which the CPA is asked to perform this task will depend both on the 
buyer’s personal knowledge about the industry in which the seller is 
operating and the availability of in-house analytical capability within 
the buyer’s organization. In the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. illustration, 
the buyer was already operating similar businesses in other parts of the 
country; thus he had a good basis for evaluating Hastings-Robinson’s 
operations. The buyer was also large enough to have an analytical 
staff capable of evaluating Hastings-Robinson’s record. The CPA’s 
role in this case, therefore, was minimal. If either of these conditions 
are missing, however, the buyer’s CPA may be asked to perform this 
role.
When the buyer and the seller are operating in the same industry, 
the buyer will already have a thorough understanding of the essential 
requirements for profitable operations. Nevertheless, a careful analysis 
of the seller’s profit record over the last several years is required, par­
ticularly in those situations where the valuation of the seller is based 
primarily on past performance. Such an analysis is especially important 
in those situations where the seller has recently experienced a sharp 
upward trend in earnings. Can earnings be expected to continue at the 
new high level? Will the growth trend continue so that even higher 
earnings can be expected in the future? Or has the seller simply 
“dressed-up” the company for sale by recognizing some nonrecurring 
profits or modifying some of its accounting policies to represent a more 
favorable picture? Two techniques are particularly valuable in dealing 
with these questions:
1. Ratio analysis. The simple device of ratio analysis is a powerful 
analytical tool. When all operating figures are stated as a percentage 
of sales volume, for example, the pertinent questions about the oper­
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ating record become more apparent. W hy has the cost of sales per­
centage declined in the last two years? W hy are certain operating 
expenses showing favorable trends? There may be good answers to 
these questions, but they are, nevertheless, questions to which the 
buyer should have answers before he consummates the sale. In a 
similar fashion, other operating ratios may be used to test the quality of 
the seller’s management—ratios such as inventory turnover, the collec­
tion period on receivables, and rate of return on invested capital. Analy­
sis of this data will not only yield information about how the seller 
has operated in the past, but may also pinpoint opportunities for im­
provement in the business under the buyer’s management, thus helping 
the buyer to quantify some of the intangible advantages of acquiring 
the seller’s business.
2. Comparisons with industry data. The ratios developed above 
take on additional meaning when compared against the operating per­
formance of similar companies. The buyer’s own operating record 
provides the best comparative data, both because more detailed in­
formation is available and because a subsequent combination of the 
two businesses must be evaluated in any event. Operating data about 
other companies in the industry will also be useful, however, and the 
prime source of this data will usually be the industry trade associa­
tion. There are literally thousands of volunteer business associations in 
the United States,3 and many of these perform a statistical service for 
their members by collecting detailed operating information about 
highly specialized lines of businesses. This data is intended for use 
by management in evaluating their operations, but is also highly 
useful to a buyer who is attempting to evaluate the business of a seller. 
In addition, less detailed comparative data may be obtained from the 
annual reports of any publicly-held companies that are operating in 
the industry.
In the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. example, an analyst from Gotham 
spent an intensive two weeks after the August 16th meeting studying 
the operating record of each of the five rental yards operated by Hast­
ings-Robinson. In addition to operating data from Gotham’s own 
equipm ent rental division, the analyst also had available some industry 
ratios prepared by the American Rental Association. Exhibit 9 (page 
40) reproduces one page from an annual survey published by that as-
3 Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Association Activities 
(Washington, D. C., 1955).
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sociation, and illustrates the type of data that was available and that 
had been used by Mr. Nelson earlier in preparing the growth projec­
tions. Based on his study, the analyst was able to satisfy himself and 
Gotham’s management that Hastings-Robinson’s operating record was 
indeed a good one and was believable within the context of the industry.
In those circumstances in which the buyer does not have an intimate 
knowledge of the type of business engaged in by the seller, the CPA’s 
role may gain increasing importance. In addition to the types of 
analyses described above, the buyer may also need some general back­
ground information about the industry itself, and may commission his 
CPA to help enlighten him. Intensive research may be necessary if the 
CPA is to help his client gain a valid understanding of industry trends, 
the effect of general economic fluctuations on the particular industry, 
and a general appraisal of the risks inherent in operating in that in­
dustry. An analysis of this type is presented in the Rio Puerco National 
Bank case later in this study.
Adjustments to Historical Data
In most purchase-sale transactions of any size, the buyer’s CPA will 
be asked to perform some sort of audit or investigation of the seller's 
financial statements. In order to make appropriate modifications in his 
normal audit procedures, the CPA’s first responsibility is to gain a 
sufficient understanding of the proposed transaction to permit him to 
focus his investigation on the most critical elements of the seller’s ac­
tivities. If the purchase price rests on the tangible net worth of the 
seller, for example, different procedures would be required than if the 
purchase price were related to a multiple of the seller’s recent earnings. 
The former might require a limited “balance sheet” type of audit which 
would ignore minor adjustments in the recognition of the timing of 
profits; profit adjustments become critical in the latter case where each 
adjustment may be multiplied many times in the negotiation of the 
final purchase price.
The Hastings-Robinson illustration is a good case in point. After the 
tentative agreement reached on August 16, Gotham immediately con­
tacted its regular auditors, Greer, Black & Co., a national firm of CPAs. 
Mr. Craigie, a partner in that firm, had been in charge of the Gotham 
account for five years. As such, he was familiar with both the regular 
audit and the special management services engagements as performed 
for the client. Among the latter, Mr. Craigie was personally involved 
in an acquisition investigation for Gotham of a rental company in Cali­
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fornia a few months earlier. “However,” Mr. Hudson pointed out when 
he telephoned Mr. Craigie to give him the new assignment, “the Hast­
ings-Robinson, Inc. deal is a lot different from the last one. In Cali­
fornia we were paying only a small premium over the replacement 
value of the equipment inventory. Hastings-Robinson, on the other 
hand, has a much stronger business with an aggressive management 
that’s expansion-minded. In order to get them, we’re paying a good 
multiple of the earnings projected for the current year. They’ve got 
unaudited operating figures for the first six months, and we’ve got to 
be sure that we can rely on those figures.”
Mr. Craigie arrived in Cleveland on August 21 with a team of three 
assistants. On September 12, he submitted a draft report on his 
“limited review” of Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s statements to Gotham. 
While the report contained a balance sheet of Hastings-Robinson as of 
July 31, 1966, Mr. Craigie emphasized that he had devoted particular 
attention to the statement of earnings for the six months then ended. 
Excerpts from his report reflecting the adjustment to the earnings state­
ment are reproduced in Exhibit 10, page 44. “As you know,” he ex­
plained, in reviewing the draft of his report with Messrs. Hudson and 
Spatz, “the most critical expense item in this business is depreciation. 
All we’ve done in this draft is to make sure that Hastings-Robinson’s 
past depreciation policy has been consistently applied. But we’re also 
doing a special analysis of what the depreciation expense would be 
using Gotham’s depreciation policies. We should have that study com­
pleted in a few more days, and it will probably result in one more ad­
justing entry which will then put Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s adjusted 
earnings on a basis completely consistent with Gotham’s. Except for 
that final adjustment, I’d say that the situation at Hastings-Robinson 
looks pretty clean. For a small, rapidly growing company, their ac­
counting records and controls are good, and most of the adjustments 
that we’ve made are because they don’t make a tight cut-off for their 
monthly statements between audit dates.”
After reviewing Mr. Craigie’s draft, Mr. Hudson decided to make a 
copy of it available to Hastings-Robinson’s owners. In a brief phone 
call to Mr. Hastings, Hudson suggested they have another meeting to 
discuss the auditor’s report and work out the final terms of the trans­
action. A date was set for September 22.
Summary
The role of the CPA engaged by a buyer, like that of his counterpart 
engaged by a seller, may be a varied one. The CPA, as an analytical
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Exhibit 10
HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Pro Forma Statement of Income 
For the Six Months Ended July 31, 1966
(Examined by Independent Public Accountants Only to the Extent 
Indicated in the Accompanying Accountants’ Letter)
Per Company
Financial Pro Forma Adjustments* Pro Forma 
Statements Debit C redit Statements
Sales ................................... $1,687,656
  (1)$16,612 (2)$15,325
$1,687,656
Cost of sales 1,033,524  (4)
(27)
5,029 (3) 
7,300 (8)
2,091
957   1,035,092
(9) 9,000
Gross profit $ 654,132 $ 28,941 $ 27,373 $ 652,564
Other incom e:
Cash discounts earned 19,269 — — 19,269
Interest ........................ 4,771 -  (14) 2,147 6,918
Miscellaneous 5,006 -  (18) 696 5,702
Total income $ 683,178 $ 28,941 $ 30,216 $ 684,453
Expenses:
Selling, administrative   (6)$ 1,591 (15)$ 6,200 
and general .............. $ 394,332  (16) 554 $ 416,277
(See Schedule 3) (26) 26,000
Interest ....................
Cash discounts
33,692 (13) 6,330 (21) 5,244 34,778
allowed ................ 3,692 — — 3,692
Uncollectible
accounts expense .... 6,555 (5) 7,000 — 13,555
Other 2,090 — — 2,090
Total expenses $ 440,361 $ 41,475 $ 11,444 $ 470,392
Net income before taxes 
on income ....................
Federal and states taxes
$ 242,817 $ 70,416 $ 41,660 $ 214,061
on income .................... 83,043 (25) 29,362 (28) 11,383 101,022
Net income ...................... $ 159,774 $ 99,778 $ 53,043 $ 113,039
* Numbers in parenthesis refer to the adjusting entries given in the pages that 
follow.
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Exhibit 10, continued
HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Partial List of Pro Forma Adjusting Entries 
July 31, 1966
(1)
Cost of sales—rental income (depreciation) $16,612
For depreciation—small tools $ 9,160
For depreciation—heavy duty equipm ent 7,452
Additional depreciation for six months ended July 31,
1966, as shown by the difference between the 
amount recorded and the amount per data processing 
runs.
(2)
For depreciation—small tools ...............................................  7,232
For depreciation—heavy duty equipm ent ..........................  8,093
Cost of sales—rental equipment ................................... 15,325
To relieve reserve accounts for accumulated deprecia­
tion applicable to rental equipm ent sales.
(3)
Rental equipm ent inventory—small tools ..........................  2,091
Cost of sales—rental equipm ent 2,091
To adjust for credit inventory for accumulated depre­
ciation on equipm ent sales. C redit was m ade on 
books to inventory rather than cost of sales.
(4)
Cost of sales—rental equipm ent (maintenance of equip­
m ent) .................................................................................... 5,029
Inventories—gas ................................................................  5,029
To write off inventory of gas per books consistent with 
treatm ent at January 31, 1966.
(5)
Uncollectible accounts expense 7,000
Allowance for doubtful accounts 7,000
To increase provision for estimated reserve require­
ments at July 31, 1966.
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(6)
Inventories—new equipment .................................................. $ 1,796
Inventories—parts ......................... ...........................................  7,156
Rental equipm ent inventory—heavy duty ..........................  2,750
Selling, administrative and general expenses (data proc­
essing) .....................................................................................  899
Selling, administrative and general expenses (telephone 
and telegraph ......................................................................... 692
Plant and operating equipm ent .............................................  1,508
Trade accounts payable .................................................  $14,801
To adjust for unrecorded liabilities at July 31, 1966.
(8)
Trade accounts payable ..........................................................  13,082
Inventories—used equipm ent 12,125
Cost of sales—new equipm ent 519
Cost of sales—parts ..........................................................  438
To reverse January 31, 1966 year-end adjusting entry 
which company failed to reverse in current year .
(9)
Inventories—new equipm ent 9,000
Cost of sales—new eq u ip m en t.......................................  9,000
To adjust for error in pricing cost of sales.
(13)
Interest expense ......................................................................... 6,330
Prepaid interest 5,185
Accrued interest ................................................................  1,145
To adjust interest for six months.
(14)
Interest receivable ..................................................................... 2,147
Interest income ..................................................................  2,147
To accrue interest on certificate of deposit.
(15)
Prepaid expenses ....................................................................... 6,200
Licenses and taxes ............................................................  6,200
To set up vehicle license fees and privilege license fees 
applicable to last six months of fiscal year.
(16)
Policy adjustments ..................................................................... $ 554
Factory claims receivable ...............................................  $ 554
To adjust for outstanding claim written off in August.
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Exhibit 10, continued
(18)
Dealers’ finance reserve ..........................................................  696
Miscellaneous income ...................................................... 696
To record finance income on customers’ notes dis­
counted with Cleveland National Bank .
(21)
Retained earnings ..................................................................... 5,244
Interest expense ..................................................................... 5,244
To reverse interest for six months on notes payable to
stockholders for pro forma income statement.
(25)
Retained earnings ..................................................................... 41,468
Provision for federal and state taxes on in co m e ................ 29,362
Deferred investment tax credit .....................................  70,930
To set up deferred tax credit and to provide for taxes
equivalent to investment credit for six months net of 
amortization of credit of $4,384.40.
(26)
Bonuses ........................................................................................ 14,000
Officers’ salaries .........................................................................  12,000
Accrued salaries and wages ...........................................  26,000
To adjust pro forma statements for bonuses to be paid
to other than Hastings and Robinson and adjust 
Hastings and Robinson’s salaries to $30,000 each per 
annum
(27)
Cost of sales—Rental income (depreciation) 5,800
Cost of sales—Rental equipm ent 1,500
Retained earnings ............................................................  7,300
To adjust pro forma statements for the effect upon de­
preciation and gain on sales of rental equipment, 
attributed to the failure to change to straight-line 
depreciation on a retroactive basis.
(28)
Accrued federal and state income taxes ............................... 11,383
Provision for federal and state taxes on income 11,383
To reduce provision in pro forma statements for re­
duction in net income before taxes.
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professional, can be of great assistance to the buyer in the evaluation 
of a prospective acquisition. There are usually substantial amounts of 
historical data, both about the seller’s business and its industry, which 
will yield valuable insights about the proposed transaction if thor­
oughly examined. The CPA rarely has a greater opportunity for an 
explicit display of the value of his services than he does when engaged 
by the buyer in advance of a major purchase transaction.
On the other hand, there is an important difference in approach be­
tween engagements on behalf of the buyer or the seller. An analogy 
to the position of opposing lawyers in a legal suit is unsound, because 
in a purchase-sale transaction both parties are usually actively inter­
ested in reaching a mutual agreement. But the CPA engaged by one 
party in a transaction is in a different position than that of a disinter­
ested auditor rendering an opinion on statements to be issued to third 
parties. Acting for the seller, the CPA is careful to make no representa­
tions of his own, but he does assist his client in the preparation of, for 
example, projected operating statements which help express in quanti­
tative terms the future profit potential which the buyer sees as accru­
ing to him as the new owner.
Acting for the buyer, the CPA’s obligation is to shine the spotlight 
of analysis on any aspect of the transaction which should be brought 
to his client’s attention before the deal is closed. This inquiring ap­
proach is intended to disclose those areas of potential conflict or mis­
understanding which need to be dealt with before the final terms are 
arranged. The buyer can rely on his CPA for a competent and compre­
hensive analysis; thus, he has greater confidence in his own judgment 
as he approaches the final negotiations.
RESOLVING CONFLICTS
Despite the best of intentions by both parties, and even after an 
initial meeting of the minds has been reached, conflicts frequently 
arise during the final stages of negotiations which must be resolved 
before a purchase-sale transaction can be consummated. The CPA 
is usually involved in the final stages because he may be called upon 
to interpret his analysis and because his special skills may be required. 
Although the specific items of conflict may take myriad forms, three 
types of problems that are so common as to be almost generic in the 
negotiating process are discussed briefly in this section.
1. Past vs. Future. As one of the owners of Hastings-Robinson, Inc.
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put it in his first meeting with representatives from Gotham Equipment 
Corporation, “Looking at it from your point of view, I see that you 
can’t buy our company based on what may happen in the future, but 
I hope you see that I can’t sell it based just on what’s happened in the 
past.” This apparent conflict in point of view is not as serious as it 
might appear because, after all, the buyer is concerned with the future 
of the company he is thinking about acquiring. Rather, the conflict is 
perhaps better characterized as an optimistic view of the future by the 
seller in contrast to a pessimistic view by the buyer. Nevertheless, this 
difference in attitude between the two parties frequently is the cause 
of a series of minor conflicts that may continue to crop up until the 
deal is consummated.
2. Management Policies. Although the initial negotiations will be a 
major step in resolving the differences in attitude about the future be­
tween buyer and seller, another major area of potential conflict—that 
of reconciling differences between management policies of the two 
companies—is usually not resolved until the negotiations are fairly 
well along. When measured against the magnitude of the total trans­
action, the financial aspects of conflicting management policies may not 
be significant, but they can have an important impact of a more per­
sonal nature which may influence the subsequent course of the negoti­
ations. For example, the not-so-simple matter of executive prerequisites 
and privileges is an area where substantial differences in practice may 
exist between the buyer and the seller. Particularly in cases where the 
seller plans to continue as a manager of his unit within the larger 
organization of the buyer, the seller may find his lower relative status 
in the organization a difficult adjustment to make. Adjustments will 
usually be required in his salary and other compensation arrangements. 
On the other hand, certain existing policies of the buyer may accrue to 
the benefit of the seller’s organization; many small companies do not 
have pension plans, profit-sharing plans, or other fringe benefits that 
they will be eligible for as a part of a larger organization. Both the 
pluses and minuses, from each party’s point of view, must be resolved 
before the transaction is closed.
3. Accounting Differences. Finally, even though a tentative agree­
ment may have been reached in the initial negotiations, subsequent 
analysis may disclose significant differences in the accounting policies 
between the buyer and seller. These differences are particularly sig­
nificant where the buyer is a publicly-owned company and where the 
buyer employs more conservative accounting practices. In either of
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these events the buyer will probably insist on recasting the seller’s 
financial statements to the buyer’s accounting policies and, if the net 
effect of such a conversion is to reduce the profits and/or net worth of 
the seller, the entire issue of the valuation of the business may be re­
opened. Here again, the initial negotiations should have anticipated 
any major accounting issues, but minor points may still have to be 
resolved near the end.
All of these problems, and some others as well, are illustrated by the 
final negotiations in the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. case, as described 
below.
The Meeting on September 22
A day or two in advance of the meeting with Gotham, scheduled for 
September 22, the owners of Hastings-Robinson, Inc. and their CPA, 
Mr. Nelson, carefully reviewed a draft of the report which had been 
prepared by Greer, Black & Co., Gotham’s auditors. As Nelson ex­
pressed it, “They’ve made a total of 18 adjustments that affect our in­
come statement, but the net effect is small. A great many of the 
adjustments are for normal accrual items, both pluses and minuses, 
that occur only because you didn’t close your books at the end of the 
month as carefully as you would at year-end. On balance, they came 
up with an adjusted profit of $214,000 before taxes for the first six 
months compared to our estimate of $223,000 (Exhibit 8, page 32).”
“I don’t know what Gotham plans to do at the meeting,” Mr. Hast­
ings said, “but I’m certainly glad that we didn’t sign a tentative sales 
agreement which was a formula taking adjusted earnings and multiply­
ing it times nine and then dividing by the price of Gotham’s stock. Not 
only are our earnings slightly lower than we thought, but Gotham’s 
stock has also gone up 10 per cent and closed at $73 per share yester­
day. At this point, the only agreement between us is that they have the 
right to acquire all of our stock in exchange for 34,000 shares of 
Gotham. I think we ought to leave it at that and see what Gotham 
proposes to do.”
The three men then discussed alternative strategies for the forth­
coming negotiation, finally agreeing to adopt Hastings’ proposal.
At the meeting in Gotham’s offices on September 22, Messrs. Hudson 
and Spatz were joined by the company’s treasurer and by outside legal 
counsel for both parties although Hudson handled the negotiations on 
behalf of Gotham. Hudson explained that in addition to the adjust­
ments that Greer, Black & Co. had made in their draft report, one final
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adjustment to Hastings-Robinson’s earnings would be required before 
their earnings could be consolidated with Gotham’s. “Our depreciation 
practices are not radically different,” Mr. Hudson explained, “but they 
will have to be consistent. According to our auditors, that means you’ll 
have additional depreciation expense of about $74,000 for the full fiscal 
year.” This news was somewhat of a surprise to the Hastings-Robinson 
representatives, and some time was spent discussing how the adjust­
ments had been arrived at. Finally, Mr. Nelson said, “Before we pursue 
this matter any further, why don’t you tell us what this means in terms 
of Gotham’s intention to exercise its option to acquire our common 
stock.”
By way of response Mr. Hudson then distributed to each of the 
men from Hastings-Robinson a copy of the calculation presented in 
Exhibit 11, page 52. He explained that because adjusted earnings for 
the first six months were about $10,000 lower than the original esti­
mate he had also lowered the estimated earnings for the final six 
months of the current fiscal year. He had then made the special ad­
justment for depreciation and had reflected income taxes at a some­
what lower effective rate than had been used in the calculations for 
the August meeting. The net result was an adjusted profit after tax of 
$209,000, $30,000 lower than the figure that had been used to arrive at 
a price in August. Applying the same price earnings multiple, and 
using the price of Gotham’s stock as it existed on August 16, the new 
calculation indicated that only 28,500 shares of Gotham stock would 
be required in the exchange. “The overall adjustment to your earnings 
is too great to ignore,” Mr. Hudson concluded, “and therefore we do 
not plan to exercise our rights under the agreement calling for 34,000 
shares. I was really reaching when I agreed to that figure to begin 
with, and applying the same factors now, the best offer I can make is 
29,000 shares. Why don’t we leave you alone for a few minutes and let 
you have a chance to think it over?”
After the Gotham team had left the room, the three men from Hast­
ings-Robinson, Inc. had a spirited discussion concerning the next step 
in the negotiations. Hastings pointed out that, “At least the situation 
is not all black; they’re still using the $66 value for the Gotham stock 
even though the market is 10 per cent higher. But 29,000 shares is 
quite a bit less than 34,000.” After some further discussion, a strategy 
suggested by Mr. Nelson was accepted. He rehearsed briefly with the 
owners what he planned to do, and invited the Gotham representatives 
back to the conference room.
“We’re disappointed,” Mr. Nelson began, “that you don’t want to go 
through with the deal the way it was originally set up. During the last
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Exhibit 11
HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Calculation of Selling Price Prepared During the Meeting
W ith Gotham Equipm ent Corporation 
on September 22, 1966
Net income before taxes on income, for six months ended July
31, 1966, per accountants’ report .................................................... $ 214,000
Estimated pre-tax profits for final six months, reflecting addi­
tional adjustments for executive compensation and employee 
bonuses ................................................................................................  250,000
Total pre-tax profits $ 464,000
Less: Special adjustment for depreciation expense, to bring
Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s provision into agreement
with Gotham’s existing policies 74,000
Adjusted pre-tax profits $ 390,000
Provision for income taxes:
Effective tax rate, per separate analysis by Goth­
am’s accounts, 51.2% ....... ...................................... $199,700
Less: Surtax credit for two subsidiaries (10,000)
Amortization of investment tax credit (8,700)
Net tax expense 181,000
Adjusted profits after taxes $ 209,000
Price-earnings multiple— as agreed at meeting on August 16th 9
Total purchase price $1,881,000
M arket value per share of Gotham stock as of August 16th $ 66.00
Number of Gotham shares required 28,500
month, both companies have had a chance to get to know each other 
better, and for our part, at least, we’re increasingly convinced that this 
merger makes sense. On the other hand, in the euphoric atmosphere 
of five weeks ago, we gave you a copy of my report about our expansion 
plans as an independent entity. We still think those plans are sound, 
and we don’t feel under any compulsion to sell at this time unless the 
price is too attractive to pass up.
“You’ve modified your original offer primarily on the basis of some 
accounting adjustments that reflect a more conservative accounting 
practice. Our auditors have approved the depreciation policy and the 
handling of the investment tax credit, but adjusting the earnings to 
yours does cause a decrease which is then multiplied many times be­
cause of the price/earnings factor. On the other hand, there are some
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offsetting factors which have not been included in your calculations, 
such as the savings from eliminating some of the corporate overhead, 
cheaper forms of debt financing that will be possible when they are 
a part of the Gotham group, and some increased volume for the equip­
ment manufactured by Gotham and its subsidiaries where they may be 
using competitive makes now. All of these things will serve to increase 
Hastings-Robinson’s profit contribution to the over-all Gotham group.
“Even more important, what Gotham really wants to buy here is not 
earnings but the management team. Hastings-Robinson is strongly 
positioned in the Midwest and they have the know-how and desire 
to grow. You’ve got the desire, and also the money that they need for 
their expansion, and the last few dollars on the purchase price today 
will look small compared to the performance of Hastings-Robinson a 
few years from now.
“That’s why,” Mr. Nelson went on, “I think that the real stumbling 
block to closing this transaction is the use of a P-E ratio. Last month 
there was an agreement to sell the company for 34,000 shares, equiv­
alent to a price of $2,244,000. If our earnings on your basis will be 
only $209,000, then that means that you are paying a multiple of about 
10.7—and what’s wrong with that? Gotham’s stock is selling at a 
multiple of 17 times earnings, so your present stockholders will be 
getting an immediate leverage on the earnings as soon as the deal is 
closed. So,’’ Mr. Nelson concluded, “my client thinks that the deal 
struck a month ago was a fair one, and they see no reason to change 
it now.”
Mr. Hudson said that he certainly agreed with many of the points 
that Mr. Nelson had raised, and that he would like to discuss the mat­
ter further with his associates. The Gotham team then excused them­
selves and left the conference room once again.
Once they were alone, Mr. Hastings complimented Mr. Nelson on 
his presentation of the Hastings-Robinson position, saying, “You put it 
to them a little more strongly than I would have been able to, because 
I’ve got to be able to work with these people for years in the future in 
the event that we close this deal.” All three men recognized, however, 
that any agreement was going to have to be a compromise. After some 
discussion, management decided that if Gotham came back with a 
counter-offer that indicated any willingness to negotiate toward a 
middle ground, they would also make some concession from the posi­
tion just stated by Mr. Nelson.
When the Gotham team returned, Mr. Hudson announced that they
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had decided to increase their offer to 30,000 shares of Gotham stock. 
Mr. Nelson replied that he and the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. owners 
had also been doing some refiguring. The original price had been 
predicated on a 6½  for 1 exchange ratio, but the Hastings-Robinson, 
Inc. owners had now decided that they would agree to a 7 for 1 
exchange which would require 31,571 shares of Gotham stock. Mr. 
Nelson pointed out that this figure was almost exactly halfway between 
the original 34,000 shares and the 29,000 shares represented in 
Gotham’s latest calculations. “We think that going halfway is about as 
fair as you can be,” Mr. Hastings concluded. Mr. Hudson once again 
took his team of negotiators out of the conference room, but returned 
in a few moments saying, “Well, if it’s worth 30,000 shares, it must be 
worth 31,000. Is that agreeable?” Messrs. Hastings and Robinson 
glanced briefly at each other, then turned to Mr. Hudson, nodded, and 
everyone broke into smiles. The legal closing of the transaction 
occurred approximately three weeks later.
Later in the afternoon of September 22, the three men from Hastings- 
Robinson, Inc. were reviewing the events of the day. “You really did a 
fine job for us, Dick,” Mr. Hastings said, “especially in keeping Jim and 
me from having to take a hard bargaining position with people we are 
now going to have to work for. I don’t have any qualms about this 
arrangement at all now; Hudson and Spatz conducted themselves like 
real gentlemen throughout the whole show, and I’m sure that the 
relationship is off to a fine start.”
Summary
The CPA’s role in the purchase or sale of a small business frequently 
involves more than doing an audit or an investigation prior to an acqui­
sition; he may serve as a business analyst, an advisor, a negotiator, or 
some combination of all of these. The CPA can be particularly helpful 
to his client in the latter group of management services both because 
of his objectivity and because of his greater familiarity with the finan­
cial aspects of such transactions. When engaged for these reasons, the 
CPA’s approach to the problem is to attempt to make explicit the fol­
lowing two types of information which are required before a mutually 
satisfactory agreement can be reached:
1. Knowledge about the business. The buyer must have a thorough 
understanding of exactly what he is acquiring from the seller. Such 
understanding requires careful examination of both the history of the
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business and the critical characteristics of the industry in which it oper­
ates. But the buyer is even more interested in the future of the busi­
ness, and the CPA who is assisting the seller must try to translate the 
seller’s views about the potential of his business into financial terms 
that will be meaningful to the buyer.
2. Knowledge about the motivations of the parties. Of equal or 
even greater importance, both principals in the transaction will be able 
to negotiate more fruitfully if they understand the factors that are 
motivating the other party. The CPA can be of great value to his client 
by helping him to get a clear understanding of the motivations of 
both parties, and by devising a negotiating strategy that capitalizes 
on the elements of mutual interest.
With dedicated effort by all concerned, this knowledge will be 
achieved, and the CPA will have the professional satisfaction of having 
participated in an important and successful transaction on behalf of 
his client.
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LIST OF CASES
The remainder of this bulletin consists of four case studies. The 
cases are arranged roughly in order of increasing complexity in terms 
of the amount of analysis required by the reader using the cases for 
staff training purposes.
1. Rio Puerco National Bank. A wealthy investor asks his CPA firm to 
help him evaluate the proposed purchase of a majority interest in a 
local commercial bank.
2. The Economy Supermarkets. The owner, approaching retirement, 
has decided to sell his two supermarkets and wants his CPA to 
“handle the whole thing for me.”
3. Radionics, Inc. This rapidly-expanding electronics company needs 
more capital. The owner must decide what percentage of the equity 
to sell in order to raise $50,000.
4. Rack Service Corporation. The latest proposed acquisition, after 
three earlier ones, will further complicate an intricate set of corpo­
rate-investor relationships. The CPA is asked to try to anticipate 
some potential future problems and recommend a plan of action.
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Rio Puerco National Bank
In January of 1964, the Albuquerque, New Mexico office of Warner, 
Simmons & O’Hearn, a major national accounting firm, was approached 
by one of its clients, Robert Freeland, in connection with his possible 
acquisition of a commercial bank located in the city. The managing 
partner, Philip Harte, called in Frank Gordon, a manager in the firm’s 
management advisory services section, and asked him to prepare the 
requested evaluation.
Robert Freeland
Mr. Freeland had become a client of the firm in 1959 when he re­
quested consultation on his personal tax return. After 1959 the firm 
continued to provide him with advice on tax matters and, in addition, 
had conducted several purchase investigations for him which cul­
minated in his acquisition of an apartment house and a small manu­
facturing company. Several other potential investments had been 
rejected after the firm’s investigation.
Mr. Freeland, who was in his mid-thirties, was independently 
wealthy, having inherited an estate of approximately $2 million. His 
wife’s estate was said to be worth close to $6 million. His principal 
occupation since graduation from college dealt with the investment of 
those funds. He also spent a great deal of time working for charitable 
organizations and in the past had served as treasurer of various private 
schools and as the director of a number of fund drives. He normally 
did not become involved in the active management of the companies 
he acquired, but made an exception in the case of the apartment house 
that he acquired in 1961. Much of his time since then had been spent 
in improving the profitability of that investment, but as of mid-1963, 
he turned the operation of the apartment house over to a resident man-
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ager and began to look for other investment opportunities. His direct 
involvement in the operation of the apartment house had whetted his 
appetite, and he sought an opportunity to build a successful company 
relying on his own management ability.
Through a golfing associate he heard that the aging owner of the 
Rio Puerco National Bank in Albuquerque was considering selling his 
interest in the bank. In explaining to Mr. Harte why he found the 
prospective investment appealing, Mr. Freeland said, “First, banking is 
a very respectable business and is thus compatible with my social posi­
tion in the community. Second, because of my business contacts and 
other investments, I believe I can substantially increase the volume of 
any bank with which I become associated. Third, I believe that banks 
in general provide an adequate return on investment with little risk. 
Finally, and of great importance, I feel that a major acquisition of this 
nature would give me a chance to prove to myself that I can be success­
ful in my own right by revitalizing an important local institution.”
Mr. Freeland told Mr. Harte that he had discussed the opportunity 
in general terms with his wife because the acquisition of the bank 
would require the liquidation of a substantial portion of her holdings 
in the common stock of the Dem-a-Lex Dynamics Corporation, a “blue 
chip” company listed  on the New York Stock Exchange. The average 
dividend yield of this stock in 1963 had been close to 4½  per cent, and 
it was selling at a price equal to 15 times the earnings for that year. 
This liquidation would be necessary since Mr. Freeland’s own funds 
were tied up in the ownership of small companies rather than in the 
common stock of larger companies traded on the stock market. He had 
also expressed, on several occasions, his reluctance to borrow large 
sums of money because of the mental strain and worry that he asso­
ciated with outside funds.
A large part of Mrs. Freeland’s holdings had been placed in oil and 
gas properties in order to obtain the associated depletion and drilling 
cost write-offs. This resulted in a joint tax rate far below that which 
might be expected based on their combined equities. Their joint return 
for 1963 showed that they were in the 50% tax bracket.
The Rio Puerco National Bank
The Rio Puerco National Bank, located in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, had been founded by the father of its current president. It 
was the second-largest bank in the city, with total deposits of over 
thirty million dollars (the largest bank had nearly double these de­
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posits). The president of the bank, in his mid-sixties, had decided that 
he should sell his interest in the bank within the next three to five years 
because he was reaching the age where he wanted to travel and had 
no heirs who could take over the bank’s operations. He was proud of 
the fact that he had doubled the size of the bank since taking it over 
from his father. He attributed this to the many close friends he had 
made in the community through various clubs and civic activities.
Albuquerque, the largest town in the state with a population of 
150,000, was located on the old Santa Fe trail to California. It received 
a substantial share of its income from the tourist trade but its prime 
support came from oil, ranching and light industrial interests in the 
adjacent region. It was also the seat of the University of New Mexico, 
a rapidly growing institution. The city had shown above-average 
growth during the past two decades but not the explosive growth of 
Phoenix, Arizona, or many of the other larger cities in California.
After hearing that the stock in the bank might be for sale, Mr. Free­
land contacted the bank president who confirmed that he would be 
interested in discussing the sale of his stock. He pointed out that he 
owned 51 per cent of the common stock or 15,300 of the 30,000 shares 
outstanding and stated that he wanted to be paid in full for all of his 
stock at the date of the transfer. He indicated that he wanted to retire 
from the bank as of the date of the sale but stressed that the executive 
vice president was a capable person and would be able to operate the 
bank as he had done on past occasions when the president was absent. 
He gave Mr. Freeland copies of various financial statements and agreed 
to provide any additional information that would be required.
Interview with Messrs. Harte and Gordon
It was at this point that Mr. Freeland walked into Mr. Harte’s office 
and asked him to have the potential investment evaluated. As he 
handed him copies of the bank’s financial statements, he commented, 
“I’m putting this in your lap, Philip. I don’t know anything about 
banks, but I think this might be a good investment. The bank president 
mentioned a preliminary sales price, but I’m not going to tell you what 
it is now because I want you to look at this independently and tell me 
what you think it’s worth. I don’t want you biased by the president’s 
idea of what his stock is worth.”
Freeland further commented that he hoped the firm would be able 
to complete its analysis within the next ten days, as he understood from 
the bank president that two other parties were also interested in pur­
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chasing the stock. One of these was a bank holding company. Harte 
assured him that the firm’s study, for which Mr. Frank Gordon would 
be responsible, would be completed within that time period.
Before starting his analysis of the investment opportunity, Mr. Gor­
don reviewed the firm’s reference binder on banks, prepared by the 
home office. During this review he made several notes on topics which 
he felt might be relevant during his analysis. The following condensed 
summary of these notes was subsequently provided to Mr. Freeland 
for his own background information.
Notes on Banking*
Banks are financial institutions dealing in money and credit. The 
traditional function of banks has been to lend money and this is 
still their most important economic function. The receipt of de­
posits and the transfer of money and credit are related operations 
which have evolved as a result of the lending function. The 
primary bank functions could be summarized as follows:
1. The lending of money.
2. The receipt of deposits.
3. The payment of checks.
4. The transfer of funds.
5. The collection of sundry financial statements.
6. The administration and safekeeping of property for others.
7. The investment of funds.
Because of these functions, banking has long been recognized 
as a business that is ‘affected by the public interest.’ The ‘public 
interest’ has been responsible for the restriction of banking func­
tions to reputable institutions, and the public regulation of those 
who engage in the banking business.
Banks may be classified as state or national, as members or non­
members of the Federal Reserve System, as commercial or savings 
banks, and as insured or noninsured by membership in the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
State banks are banks incorporated under the general banking 
laws of the respective state in which they operate. National banks 
are chartered by the Federal government and are operated under
* Since 1964, w hen Mr. Gordon took these notes, many changes have been 
made in the banking regulations. The reader is asked to take this into con­
sideration in reading these excerpts.
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the direction of the Comptroller of the Currency, a government 
official. They may be located in any state and have greater uni­
formity in powers and operating practices than state banks.
All national banks are required to be members of the Federal 
Reserve System. State banks may become members upon applica­
tion and acceptance. With few exceptions, both types of banks 
operate under the same rules and regulations. Non-member banks 
consist entirely of state banks and are predominantly small banks.
Commercial banks are organized primarily for the purpose of 
lending money, receiving deposits, and transferring money and 
credit. It is very common, however, for commercial banks to re­
ceive savings deposits and to perform in a trust capacity in addi­
tion to their commercial bank functions. Savings banks (and 
savings departments of commercial banks) accept deposits on a 
time basis. A regular rate of interest (or dividends in the case of 
mutual associations) are paid on these deposits. The funds de­
posited are invested chiefly in long-term securities, including 
mortgages or real estate.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was organized to 
protect the depositors of insured banks; the maximum insurance 
protection for each depositor is $10,000. All members of the Fed­
eral Reserve System (national and state banks) must participate 
in the deposit insurance plan. Non-member banks of the Federal 
Reserve System and mutual savings banks may become insured 
banks upon application and acceptance.
National banks are established under the National Banking Act 
of 1863. The Act provided, among other things, for a system of 
national banks subject to uniform laws and regulations. A Comp­
troller of the Currency (appointed by the President of the United 
States and responsible to the Secretary of the Treasury) was desig­
nated and charged with the administration of the laws relating to 
national banks. At the present time, the major duties of the Comp­
troller include:
1. The chartering of national banks.
2. The supervision of national banks through examinations and 
statement calls.
3. The preparation of various reports, including an annual report 
to Congress.
4. Acting as a director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo­
ration.
Once chartered, a national bank is subject to regulation and
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supervision. Supervision is accomplished primarily through bank 
examinations and call statements. The bank examinations are 
conducted by examiners appointed by the Comptroller, and na­
tional banks are examined at least twice a year. The Comptroller 
of the Currency has statutory authority to obtain three reports of 
condition each year (referred to as “call reports”) from every na­
tional bank on forms prescribed by him. These reports must set 
forth a detailed statement of assets and liabilities of the bank as of 
the close of business on the date specified (call date). The reports 
must be transmitted to the Comptroller within five days after the 
call. In addition to these reports of condition, every national bank 
is required to file a report of earnings and dividends to the Comp­
troller at the end of each six months—namely, June 30 and Decem­
ber 31. The final report each year shows earnings and dividends 
for the entire year.
State banks are subject to the supervision of state banking 
authorities. Each state has laws and regulations covering the 
chartering and organization of banks within its jurisdiction. The 
administration of the applicable laws is similar in scope and pur­
pose to that exercised by the national banking authorities. Ex­
aminations of the banks are conducted and calls for statements are 
made. While there are many variations between the various 
states’ laws, the principal differences are concerned with capital 
stock requirements and the loan limitations.
The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 and is 
comprised of the following:
1. The Board of Governors
2. The Federal Open Market Committee
3. The Federal Advisory Council
4. Twelve Federal Reserve Banks with 24 branches
5. Member banks numbering 6,900
One of the most important responsibilities of the Board of Gov­
ernors concerns the credit policies of the System. Some of the 
means by which this control is effected include (1) the establish­
ment of reserves to be maintained by member banks against de­
posits, (2) full representation on the Federal Open Market Com­
mittee which regulates the open market operations carried on by 
the Federal Reserve banks, (3) the determination of discount 
rates charged by the Reserve banks on their discounts and ad­
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vances, and (4) the promulgation of regulations designed to pre­
vent an undue diversion of funds into speculative operations.
In connection with its supervision of the member banks, the 
Board of Governors is authorized, among other things:
1. To pass upon the admission and termination of membership 
in state banks and trust companies.
2. To examine and receive statements of condition from member 
banks.
3. To limit the rate of interest which member banks may pay on 
time and savings deposits.
4. To remove officers and directors of member banks for con­
tinued violations of law or unsafe or unsound practices in con­
ducting a bank’s business.
5. To suspend member banks from the use of the credit facilities 
of the System.
6. To pass on applications of national banks for authority to exer­
cise trust powers or to act in fiduciary capacities.
The number of directors usually varies with the size of the bank.
The regulations of the Federal Reserve System provide that mem­
ber banks shall not have less than five or more than twenty-five 
directors. Citizenship, residence, and stock ownership are basic 
principles upon which directorships in national banks rest.
In commercial banking, deposits generally fall into two major 
classes, demand deposits and time deposits. A demand deposit is 
payable at any time the depositor elects to withdraw funds. They 
are payable on written order, usually a check, and are commonly 
found as commercial accounts in commercial banks. On occasion 
demand deposits may be evidenced by certificates of deposit; how­
ever, only a small proportion of demand deposits are in this 
category.
Time deposits are those which are payable at a certain future 
date. Savings accounts which constitute the largest group of time 
deposits are normally paid by banks on demand; however, banks 
may require thirty or more days advance notice of withdrawal. 
Time deposits are also represented by time certificates of deposit 
and time deposits on open account.
The general rule of distinction between the two classes is that 
those deposits requiring thirty days’ notice (or more) prior to 
withdrawal are classed as time deposits; all other deposits are 
demand deposits. The distinction is important because of reserve
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requirements and the regulation on interest rates. The present 
reserve requirements, for example, are 6% on time deposits, and 
22%, 19% and 13% on demand deposits, depending on whether 
the institution is in a central reserve city, a reserve city, or else­
where, respectively. The payment of interest on demand deposits 
is prohibited for members of the Federal Reserve System, and a 
maximum rate is prescribed for time deposits.
The general accounting problems faced by banks do not differ 
greatly from the problems faced by any financial institution. In 
banks, however, the influence of tradition and conservatism has 
been particularly strong. This, coupled with the influence of the 
regulatory bodies, has resulted in certain accounting policies 
which differ from normal commercial practice.
Historically, the method of accounting employed by banks was 
the cash basis. In the majority of small banks, the cash basis con­
tinues to be used. Thus income is recorded only when it is realized 
and expenses become a matter of formal record only when paid. 
[Note: Rio Puerco National Rank is no exception to this practice 
as it keeps its books on the cash basis.]
From an auditing viewpoint a cash basis bank may present state­
ment problems. On the asset side the failure to set up the accrued 
income on loans and investments may represent a material item. 
The failure to record the liability for Federal income taxes will 
result in understatement of liabilities. If discounted loans are 
relatively heavy, then unearned discount may be material. De­
pending upon the date of the audit, the liability for savings inter­
est may also have to be considered.
Small banks on a cash basis are well aware of the advantages of 
the accrual basis. Normally they feel that they do not have the 
staff to carry out the mechanics of the system. With the passage 
of time and the growth of the bank, a transitional stage in the 
method of accounting takes place. During this stage the bank 
may be on the accrual basis for some accounts and on a cash basis 
for others. In almost all large banks the books are kept on a full 
accrual basis.
One of the long-standing practices in bank accounting has been 
the rapid depreciation of property accounts. Thus, building and 
furniture and fixtures may be written off over very short periods 
of time, without regard for useful life. This practice, generally ac­
cepted within the banking industry, stems from the banker’s desire 
to remove items from the statement of condition which cannot
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readily be converted into cash. From the regulatory agencies’ 
point of view, such a write-off appears to be encouraged. In addi­
tion, the lack of such a fast write-off sometimes seems to be used 
by the regulatory agencies as an oblique criticism of undercapital­
ization. After the fixed assets have been reduced to a nominal 
value, it is not unusual to find that additions thereafter are 
expensed.
Another feature of conservatism in bank accounting is the 
creation of a reserve for contingencies. The components of such 
a reserve may be earmarked, e.g., an additional reserve against 
loans and discounts, or a reserve for decline in investments—or 
they may be unspecified as to purpose. Such a reserve is generally 
created out of undivided profits rather than by a charge against 
profits.
The normal capital accounts of a bank are capital stock, surplus 
and undivided profits. As in an industrial company, the capital 
stock account reflects the amount of owner’s contribution dedi­
cated to capital stock through the issuance of shares, normally 
common shares.
Surplus in bank accounting is roughly comparable to capital 
surplus or paid-in surplus in industrial practice. The surplus ac­
count comes into being through stockholder’s contributions, that 
is, the excess of the price paid for capital stock over the stated 
value of the stock. Additions to surplus are made by transfers from 
undivided profits until surplus is at least equal to capital stock. It 
should be noted that the surplus account represents a permanent 
part of the capital of the bank designed to provide additional 
protection for depositors.
The undivided profits account in a bank is much the same as 
earned surplus in an industrial corporation. Net profits are trans­
ferred to undivided profits, and dividends are declared out of un­
divided profits. In many small banks, however, the undivided 
profits account may be treated as a profit and loss account with all 
income and expenses, contingency provisions, etc., passing through 
the account. Even in some of the larger banks, the undivided 
profits account is used to absorb write-offs, a variety of provisions, 
etc.
A bank which is incorporated under the laws of the U. S. and 
which is subject by law to supervision and examination by state 
or Federal authority having supervision over banking institutions 
is subject to tax on its net income at the same rates as other corpo-
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rations. It likewise is subject to the provisions of capital gains tax. 
In the state of New Mexico, all bank income is also subject to a 
6% excise or franchise tax. The interest earned on municipal 
bonds as well as on obligations of a state or the District of 
Columbia is exempt from taxation.
The Internal Revenue Code permits a bank to deduct as bad 
debt losses each year an amount computed by applying a formula 
percentage to total loans outstanding at the close of the taxable 
year. The formula percentage is a ratio based on the actual loss 
experience of the bank during a consecutive 20-year period of 
time. This factor has been computed at .63% for the Rio Puerco 
National Bank. This was .10 to .15% less than the average experi­
ence factor for the Dallas Federal Reserve District.
Gordon’s Initial Approach
With this background, Gordon proceeded to examine the informa­
tion that Mr. Freeland had obtained from the bank president on his 
first visit. A condensed form of the call report as of December 31, 1963 
is reproduced in Exhibit 1, page 67. The bank directors, however, did 
not believe the values shown on the call report truly reflected its real 
economic values. They had taken the call report capital account figures 
and adjusted them upward to reflect other values which they felt 
should realistically be included as part of the capital. These book 
values as adjusted by the bank are shown in Exhibit 2, page 68. Mr. 
Freeland had also obtained copies of the Earnings and Dividends Re­
ports (income statements), as submitted to the Comptroller of the 
Currency, for the period 1959 through 1963. Those reports have been 
reproduced in comparative form as Exhibit 3, page 70. As in the case 
of the statement of condition, the bank did not feel the reported earn­
ings fairly reflected the earning capacity of the institution, and there­
fore made certain adjustments to the earnings reported for 1963. The 
bank believed that the adjusted earnings for 1963 gave a much better 
indication of real earnings for 1963. The net income as adjusted by the 
bank is shown as Exhibit 4, page 72.
After an initial examination of these statements, Gordon decided to 
develop a preliminary plan of attack and determine what other infor­
mation he would like to have. He planned to talk with the bank presi­
dent within a day or two and knew it was essential to obtain any clarifi­
cation of questionable items or additional facts at that point since time 
was of the essence.
Before talking with the bank president, Gordon looked through
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Exhibit 1
RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK 
Report of Condition at the 
Close of Business, Decem ber 31, 1963
Assets:
Cash on hand and due from banks $5,364,580.72
U. S. Government securities due or callable
in less than one year .....................................  4,092,775.96
U. S. Government securities due or callable
after one year .................................................. 7,475,245.51
O ther bonds ......................................................................................
Loans and discounts (net of loss reserve) .................................
Federal Reserve Bank stock
Bank building—furniture and fixtures
O ther real estate .............................................................................
O ther assets ......................................................................................
$16,932,602.19
1,537,456.10
16,693,484.57
48,000.00
501,657.77
105,000.00
5,886.09
$35,824,086.72
Liabilities:
Deposits ............................................................................................
Capital stock $ 600,000.00
Surplus ................................................................... 1,300,000.00
Undivided profits and reserves 250,000.00
$32,731,247.42
Total capital accounts 
Reserves for taxes and other expenses 
Deferred income
$ 2,150,000.00 
650,000.00 
292,839.30
$35,824,086.72
Moody's and other financial reporting sources to see if he might be able 
to develop some tentative guidelines in terms of market prices, com­
parative earnings and dividends, or other similar price standards. He 
recognized that the term “book value” was anomalous and could 
imply different values even in similar situations. For example, the book 
value of a recently-established bank might be close to its market value, 
while for an old established institution it might be only 50 to 75 per 
cent of market value. He also knew that reported earnings might not 
reflect the true earning capacity of a concern in the long run and that 
the earnings figure could be affected by extraordinary items. Finally, 
he felt that the market price of a stock was meaningless when the pur­
chase of a controlling interest was planned rather than the purchase
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of a smaller number of shares for investment purposes. This question 
would be further complicated if the stock was thinly traded.
In spite of these drawbacks, he believed that such figures from other 
banks might provide him with useful ideas. From various sources he
Exhibit 2
RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK 
Book Values as Adjusted by Bank 
Decem ber 31, 1963
Capital accounts:
Capital stock ......................................................
Surplus .................................................................
Undivided profits ..............................................
Reserves ...............................................................
Personal loan reserve .......................................
Property:
Building—appraisal value .............................
Less book value ................................................
Furniture and fixtures—appraisal value 
Less book value ................................................
Loan less re se rv e ...................................................
Loans charged off b u t co llec tib le .....................
Interest collected, not earned ...........................
Accrued interest:
Loans ...................................................................
Government bonds ...........................................
Municipal bonds ..............................................
Personal loans ....................................................
Prepaid expenses:
Insurance premiums .......................................
Postage in m eter ..............................................
Supplies (estim ated) .......................................
Appreciation on bonds:
Government bonds ............................................
Municipal bonds ..............................................
Adjusted book v a lu e ....................................
Book value per share* ............................
Rounded .....................................................
$ 600,000.00
1,300,000.00
250,000.00
650,000.00
26,500.00
$1,425,000.00
445,000.00
$ 275,000.00 
161,008.00
$ 70,000.00
80,000.00 
17,000.00 
25,000.00
$ 38,680.00
9,000.00
25,000.00
$ 100,000.00 
15,000.00
$2,826,500.00
980,000.00
113,992.00
346,956.00
30,000.00
292,839.00
192,000.00
72,680.00
115,000.00
$4,969,967.00
165.67
166.00
* Based on the 30,000 shares outstanding of which the bank president owns 
15,300 or 51%.
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was able to obtain market price, book value, earnings, dividends, and 
certain other information for various banks in the state. This data is 
given in Exhibit 5, page 73.
Since the information available on local and regional banks was 
limited and because Rio Puerco was one of the largest banks in New 
Mexico, Gordon thought it would be desirable to obtain more detailed 
but comparable figures for banks in an adjoining state. Since the stocks 
of several banks in Colorado were publicly held by a large number of 
shareholders, more information was available from published sources. 
Exhibit 6, page 74 presents a compilation of market price, earnings 
and dividends for five such banks. Further study of reference material 
led to the conclusion that published financial information on banks and 
bank stocks was scanty and that the data presented in Exhibits 5 and 6 
was the most comprehensive and comparative information available.
Meeting with Bank Officials
After examination of the above information, Gordon made an ap­
pointment to visit the president of the Rio Puerco National Bank the 
next day. The president suggested they meet for lunch and that 
Gordon could then spend the afternoon gathering the information he 
needed. During lunch, the president spoke in glowing terms of the 
rapid growth of the bank during the past few years and the tremendous 
future potential of business in the Albuquerque area.
Afterward Gordon inquired of the president if he had any figures to 
substantiate the bank’s past growth and of other banks in the area. The 
president replied, “We do have a scrapbook with newspaper clippings 
about all the local banks. We haven’t done much with it but you’re 
welcome to browse through it.” This scrapbook contained published 
call reports and various other social and personal information about 
other banks in the area. From it, Gordon was able to compile compara­
tive data with regard to loans and deposits for several local and regional 
banks. This is included in Exhibit 7, page 76.
In response to a second question, the president commented that no 
projections had been made of expected future growth but that based 
on the expected growth of the state the bank could not help but 
prosper. The president indicated that he did not feel further discussion 
of this point would be fruitful.
Gordon then raised certain questions with respect to the adjustments 
made by the bank to the book values. At this point the president asked 
the bank’s chief accountant to take over. The president thanked
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Exhibit 4
RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK 
Net Income for 1963 as Adjusted by Bank
Net income for year 1963 as shown on the
Report of Earnings and Dividends (see Exhibit 3)
Add back:
Excess depreciation and writedowns deducted in
$193,532.00
arriving at net income:
Furniture and fixtures $58,000.00
Real estate charge down ........................  35,000.00
Special loan reserve 6,360.00 99,360.00
Expenses paid in advance but deducted in arriving 
at net income:
Clearing house assessment $ 8,729.00
Advertising ..........................  7,426.00
Excess expense accruals 72,680.00
Trust income earned but not included (not billed) 
in arriving at net income
Adjusted net income for 1963
Adjusted net earnings per share .........................................
88,835.00
4,000.00
$385,727.00
$12.82
Gordon for coming and offered to provide any further service he could.
The following section consists of excerpts from Gordon’s notes of his 
conversation with the chief accountant. They first discussed adjust­
ments made to the statement of condition, then to the report of earn­
ings and dividends.
Statement of Condition
1. Appraisal value of building and furniture and fixtures. An inde­
pendent appraisal firm had placed a value of $1,425,000 on the bank 
building, the land on which it stood, and on an adjacent parking lot. 
This land and the parking lot were appraised at $475,000 and $200,000, 
respectively, while the value of the building was set at $750,000. The 
building had been constructed in 1936, was in good repair, and was 
located at the major downtown intersection. Offices in the building
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were rented to professional men and to local business firms. The 
furniture and fixtures had been appraised by the same independent 
firm at a value of $275,000.
2. Undivided profits. This account consisted of profits which had 
not been transferred to surplus. It was maintained at a substantial level 
as reserves were set up from this account. For example, a personal loan 
reserve of $26,500 had been set up from the account to cover a loan 
of this amount when the debtor had declared bankruptcy. Subse­
quently, however, the debt had been partially paid, a loss had been 
recognized and the reserve had been closed into net income for 1963 
which was subsequently closed into undivided profits.
3. Personal loan reserve. This account did not appear on the pub­
lished call report. The chief accountant said it had been set up out of 
undivided profits to cover a loan made to a local businessman who 
subsequently declared bankruptcy. He had been instructed by the 
treasurer to add this reserve to the capital accounts.
4. Reserves. The reserve account of $650,000 was composed of two 
major items. These were:
Reserve for bond profit and loss $261,516
Excess expense accruals 380,000
Rounding 8,484
$650,000
The reserve for bond profit and loss was a contingency reserve set up 
out of capital to absorb any losses from the bond account. The chief 
accountant pointed out that this was done out of conservatism and was 
not a common practice in bank accounting. He pointed out that the 
president’s experience during the great depression was the real reason 
for this excess reserve. No charges had ever been made to this account 
since its inception in 1939. The excess expense accruals of $380,000 
had been estimated by the chief accountant. These were “excess” 
amounts beyond th a t required for the estim ated liabilities, even though 
the cash basis financial statements reflected neither accrued assets nor 
liabilities. Referring to his memorandum records on an accrual basis, 
he provided the following data:
(a) Income taxes. The balance in this account on December 31, 1962 
was $355,276.02. Provisions made during 1963 amounted to $262,­
174.13. Payments made during 1963 were: 1962 tax due on Fed­
eral return of $147,027; 1962 tax due on state return, $2,964; 
payments on estimated 1963 tax for Federal of $58,000 and state
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of $37,000. The bank now estimates that 1963 Federal taxes will 
be $195,000, and state taxes will be $37,000.
(b) Interest on time deposits. The balance on December 31, 1962 
was $54,821.14; provisions made during 1963 amounted to $252,000 
while payments made during 1963 totaled $215,255.77. The bank 
estimates that approximately $21,000 in interest on savings ac­
counts and certificates of deposit remains unpaid as of December 
31, 1963. Interest payment dates are June 1 and December 1.
(c) Property taxes. The balance in this account on December 3 1 , 1962 
was $27,142.66. Provisions made during 1963 amounted to $25,­
200 while payments during the year totaled $29,278.40. Actual 
1963 taxes payable in 1964 per assessment are $28,158.
(d) F.D.I.C. expense. The balance in this account on December 31,
1962 was $22,037.76, while $12,000 more was provided during 
1963. A payment made during 1963 amounted to $9,234.61. In 
January 1964, a payment of $9,939 was made covering actual 1963 
F.D.I.C. expenses. The total assessment for the year 1964 is ex­
pected to be $9,976.
(e) Clearing house dues. The account balance on December 31, 1962 
was $8,003.85. An additional provision of $8,400 was made during
1963 while payments of $7,675.02 were recorded in 1963, repre­
senting dues for 1964. The clearing house requires that dues be 
paid one year in advance.
(f) Insurance. The account balance on December 31, 1962 was 
$10,364.87 while an additional amount of $28,314.66 was provided 
during 1963. Payments of $38,679.53 were made in 1963. Ap­
proximately $30,000 of this amount was prepayment of premiums 
on a three year policy running through early 1966.
(g) Advertising. The balance in this account as of December 31, 1962 
was $10,044.32. An additional provision of $30,000 as well as pay­
ments of $32,618.31 were made during 1963. The latter included 
a prepayment of $8,754.
5. Loan loss reserve. The bank had provided an allowance for loan 
losses of $346,956 on total loans outstanding of $16,880,000. The bank 
contended that they had examined all loans on their books and had 
concluded that all of them were good loans. Thus, they believed that 
the entire value should be added back to capital. The chief accountant 
said that this was reasonable since the bank’s loss experience factor for 
the past twenty years had averaged only about .063%. The bank also 
increased surplus by $30,000 for loans charged off in the previous years
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but which they were confident would be collected during the current 
year.
6. Interest collected, not earned. The bank had collected $292,839 
interest in advance on installment loans (the loans were discounted at 
the time they were made) and felt that this should be added to capital 
since the present bank management had generated this income, even 
though it might not be recognized for several years.
7. Accrued interest. The amount of $192,000 represented interest 
earned but not yet collected. The bank felt they should increase 
capital by that amount since it had been generated by the present bank 
management.
8. Prepaid expenses. The chief accountant stated that postage in 
the meter amounted to $9,000 and that he estimated unused supplies 
would approximate $25,000. Prepaid insurance as noted earlier 
amounted to $30,000.
9. Appreciation on bonds. Bonds held by the bank were currently 
worth $115,000 more than original cost. Thus the bank contended that 
capital should be increased by this amount.
Statement of Earnings and Dividends
The following items were added to net income by the bank to arrive 
at a more realistic value. The explanations given were those stated by 
the chief accountant.
1. Excess depreciation—furniture and fixtures. In 1963 the bank 
had purchased a substantial amount of new, modern bookkeeping 
equipment. In order to be conservative, accelerated depreciation 
amounting to $58,000 had been recorded. The bank contended that the 
$58,000 was not in fact real depreciation, but only book depreciation 
and therefore should not be charged to net income for 1963.
2. Real estate charge down. This $35,000 represented a portion of 
the value of the parking lot. The bank was instructed by the bank 
examiner to reduce the value of the land by this amount since a bank 
was not supposed to be a dealer in real estate. The bank contended that 
the land did not, in fact, depreciate in value, and thus net income for 
1963 should not be forced to bear the burden of this charge. The ad­
justed statement of condition included the land at its appraised value.
3. Special loan reserve. A special reserve of $6,360 on an installment 
loan was established out of 1963 income.
4. Prepaid expenses. Several expenses had been paid in advance
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but were deducted in arriving at net income for 1963. The balance of 
the prepaid expenses of $72,680, shown on the adjusted statement of 
condition, was the first item added to net income. The balances shown 
in the clearing house dues and advertising accounts were also added to 
net income for 1963.
With this information, Gordon returned to his office and began his 
analysis of the bank as a prospective investment opportunity. He 
realized that he had only a day or two to prepare his presentation but 
that he had to reach a reasonable conclusion with regard to the merits 
of this investment for Mr. Freeland.
Questions
1. Develop a preliminary plan for the evaluation of the bank as an 
investment.
2. Using the information obtained from the bank’s accountant, pre­
pare accrual basis financial statements for 1963.
3. Using information from external sources, what do you believe 
would be a reasonable price for Mr. Freeland to pay for the controlling 
interest in Rio Puerco National Bank?
4. Based on your analysis, how would you advise Mr. Freeland?
Gordon’s Analysis
In his purchase investigation of the Rio Puerco National Bank, 
Gordon attempted to develop some guidelines or limits within which 
Mr. Freeland could operate in negotiating the final purchase price. As 
a background he used various ratio and percentage comparisons that 
had been computed for other local and regional banks. It was his in­
tention to develop a range of possible prices rather than to compute a 
single “equitable price.”
In order to compute the ratios, it was necessary to first adjust the 
bank’s book value and reported earnings figures in order that they 
might reflect the true economic value of the bank. These adjustments 
were broad in scope rather than detailed since it was felt that refine­
ments could be made if negotiations showed that there was a possibility 
of reaching common ground. On the same basis, the appraisal values 
and other figures used in the adjustments were accepted by the public 
accounting firm without question. If it later appeared that an agreed-
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upon selling price was possible, then a detailed examination of these 
figures would be made.
After the initial contact with Mr. Freeland, Gordon thought about 
the approach he would use in making the purchase investigation. In 
addition to developing guidelines, he tentatively outlined his plan of 
attack and made an estimate of the time required to complete the job. 
Three days after the initial contact, Gordon and Mr. Harte, the manag­
ing partner, met with Freeland for a half hour to outline their proposed 
approach to the investigation. At this time they estimated that the job 
would require approximately 100 hours and stated that Mr. Freeland 
would be charged at Gordon’s regular billing rate of $18.00 per hour 
plus expenses.
The preliminary outline, shown in Exhibit 8, page 83, was discussed 
with Mr. Freeland at the meeting. Gordon pointed out that the ratios 
discussed in the outline might not be appropriate in this case, since 
they reflected the price when individual shares were sold, not the price 
when control was purchased. However, they were the best figures 
available and Gordon concluded that they would probably provide 
useful guidelines. The deposit and the loan and discount information 
for selected city and regional banks, as shown in the first two headings 
of Exhibit 7, was also attached to the tentative outline, but it was not 
discussed at the meeting.
Gordon pointed out that additional information would be required 
to compute the desired ratios and that a visit to the bank would be 
necessary in order to verify the bank’s book value and adjusted earn­
ings figures. Mr. Freeland accepted the tentative outline without 
reservation or comment. The meeting adjourned with the understand­
ing that another meeting would be held in the next few days when the 
final report was completed.
After the meeting with Mr. Freeland, Gordon arranged to visit the 
bank and obtained the information presented earlier (pp. 67-72). In 
beginning his analysis, his first action was to examine the detailed 
information behind the excess expense accruals of $380,000 included 
in the $650,000 of reserves shown on the statement of condition (Ex­
hibit 2). In order to compute the actual excess expense accrual, he 
analyzed the information given him by the chief accountant as shown 
in Exhibit 9, page 86. He then proceeded to analyze the other adjust­
ments made by the bank to the statement of condition. His analysis of 
the bank’s adjustments and his own adjusted book value figures are 
given in Exhibit 10, page 88. Appended notes explain each of these 
adjustments. The final adjusted book value per share as computed by
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Exhibit 8
Outline of General Considerations 
for Acquisition of Rio Puerco National Bank
1. The price at which a large block of the stock of any bank is sold is 
not generally subject to factual determination; however, a range of 
prices based on generally accepted criteria can usually be estab­
lished.
2. In some cases a satisfactory price is determined as follows:
A. Compare the earnings, book value and most recent stock prices 
of the bank to be sold with the earnings, book value and most 
recent stock prices of other banks of reasonable comparative size 
in similar communities.
B. Determine the price at approximately the same ratio to the 
bank’s earnings and book value as sales of the stock of other 
similar banks bear to their earnings and book value.
Example:
Ratios Based on 
Net Operating Book
Earnings Value
Highest ratio $xxx $xxx
Lowest ratio xxx xxx
Average ratio ...................................................  xxx xxx
(Price then negotiated using data obtained above)
3. In a similar study made recently we discussed the matter of pricing 
bank stock with several local brokers and obtained the following 
informal opinions:
A. A fair price may result using a price-earnings ratio of between 
12 and 15. Use of this ratio assumes there is a broad enough 
market to consider earnings as a basis in establishing stock price; 
the importance of the ratio (as a criterion in determining stock 
price) declines if the issue is not well known and the stock does 
not have a fairly wide marketability. Thus, book value may be 
a better basis for determining price if there are limited stock­
holders and limited marketability.
B. Determination of fair prices in relation to book value varied 
from a market price slightly under book value to 178% of book 
value based on preliminary calculations for selected city and 
regional banks. (See attachment, page 84.)
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Exhibit 8, continued
Attachment to Preliminary Outline of 
General Considerations for Acquisition of Rio Puerco National Bank
Comparative Book Value Data For Selected City and Regional Banks
as of December 31, 1962
Market Price Book Value M arket Price as a %
Per Share Per Share of Book Value
Rio Puerco
National Bank1 $ 65.00 $67.24 97%
Bank A 42.00 23.58 178%
Bank B 62½ —58.00 63.44 95%
Bank C 42.00 27.64 154%
Bank D 35.00 31.96 110%
Bank E 27½ —25.00 27.94 94%
1 For the year ending December 31, 1961, Rio Puerco’s figures for the above 
column headings were $65, $73.14, and 89% respectively.
Note: These figures were subsequently incorporated into the more comprehensive 
tabulation included as Exhibit 5.
Gordon was $140 as contrasted with the per-share value of $166 de­
veloped by the bank.
He then analyzed the statement of earnings and dividends (Exhibit 
4) in the same manner based on the information given earlier. From 
this he developed an adjusted earnings per share figure of $11.96 in 
contrast with the bank’s computed per share earnings of $12.86. These 
computations are shown in Exhibit 11, page 92. In order to observe 
the earnings potential of the bank apart from the loss and gain on 
securities and other special charges, Gordon prepared Exhibit 12, page 
94. He contended that these charges camouflaged the bank’s true 
earning potential since they were non-recurring non-regular items, and 
therefore should not have an effect on reported income.
He further reasoned that a bank was not in business to buy and sell 
securities, but to earn interest on its deposits. Therefore, if gains and 
losses on securities are included in the net income, distortion of real 
net income occurs. In many instances, bond profits and losses are 
planned so that the losses occur in one year, and profits the next so that 
profits will not offset losses. Thus, profit could be substantially affected 
by the sale of securities at an appropriate point in time. Furthermore, 
he contended, the sale of such securities constituted the liquidation of
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earning assets. The figures computed in this exhibit, however, were 
not used in subsequent comparisons or analysis. They had been used 
for information only.
In order to compare the growth of Rio Puerco with similar banks in 
the region, Gordon computed ratios showing Rio Puerco’s relative 
growth in deposits over a period of time in comparison with other 
regional and city banks. These computations are summarized in Ex­
hibit 13, page 96, and are based on the figures given in Exhibit 7. 
From Exhibit 5, he then calculated three commonly used measures of 
the relative value of a bank’s stock. These are: market value as a 
per cent of book value, a price-earnings ratio and yield based on cash 
dividends. These respective ratios for selected banks in New Mexico 
are shown in Exhibit 14, page 97. Similar measures of performance 
and stock values were calculated for the five Colorado banks shown in 
Exhibit 6. These ratios are summarized in Exhibit 15, page 98.
From these various computations, Gordon constructed a range of 
prices per share ranging from $140 at 100% of book value to $280 at 
200% of book value. This range appeared reasonable based on the 
percentage of book to market value of other bank stocks. Similarly, 
with selected earnings in multiples of from ten- to fifteen-times earn­
ings, the price of the stock ranged from $121 to $182 per share. The 
expected return on investment for the above range of stock prices was 
from 4.4% to 10.0% before taxes. The after-tax return (based on 
Mr. Freeland’s current tax bracket) was from 2.2% to 5.0%. These 
summary calculations are given in Exhibit 16, page 100.
The purchase investigation thus completed, Gordon was ready for 
a final meeting with Mr. Freeland. His report consisted of the follow­
ing exhibits with Exhibit 16 serving as the frontispiece and focus of 
the report: Exhibits 16, 10, 9, 11, 3, 12, 13 and 7, and 14 and 5 (in that 
order). There was no written summary, description, or cover letter 
attached to the report which was sent to Mr. Freeland and a meeting 
was scheduled for two days later.
The meeting was held with Gordon, Harte (the managing partner), 
Mr. and Mrs. Freeland, and the Freeland’s lawyer in attendance. The 
first point of discussion centered around Exhibit 13. This exhibit 
showed that Rio Puerco had slowly been losing its share of the market 
and that it had not shown any substantial growth. Furthermore, Gor­
don pointed out that the smaller new state banks had been growing 
at the expense of the larger established banks in the community. Those 
in attendance at the meeting concluded that Rio Puerco was not
(text continued on page 93)
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Notes to Exhibit 10— Adjusted Book Value
(1) Reserves
Excess accruals (including setting up prepaid expenses for clearing 
house, insurance, and advertising) are $378,378 per Exhibit 9, but the 
estimated liabilities (net of prepaid items) should be recorded at $149,­
668 in order to reflect book value on an accrual basis. Adjusting for 
58%  tax impact (52%  Federal plus 6%  state) as on other items below, 
reduces this to $62,861.
(2 ) Personal loan reserve
Collection of this item is apparently unlikely. Since it has been written 
off already, it should not be added back.
(3 ) Loan loss reserve
Total loans (approximately) at December 31, 1963 .... $16,880,000 
Average loss experience fa c to r...........................................  .063%
Estimated required reserve.................................................. $ 106,344
Per bank required reserve....................................................  —
Adjustment ..........................................................................  $ (106,344)
(4) Unearned interest
Interest collected, not earn ed .............................................. $ 292,839
Adjustment, representing income taxes to be paid 
thereon at 58% (rounded) (52%  Federal plus 6%  
state) $ (170,000)*
(5) Accrued interest
Accrued interest on loans and securities $ 192,000**
Adjustment, representing income taxes to be paid 
thereon, except $17,000 municipal, at 58%
(rounded) ............................................................................  $ (102,000)
* Additional adjustments may be proposed representing the oper­
ating costs which will be incurred in collecting the $292,839 un­
earned discount during the periods of maturity, and also based on 
the present value of the next income to be realized.
** Includes $25,000 on personal loans which would indicate this
amount may represent unearned discount already taken into un­
divided profits through earnings, since the following were noted:
Interest collected, not earned per 12/28/63 report of condition .... $317,780.29
Interest collected, not earned per 12/31/63 internal statement of
condition ..............................................................................................  $292,839.30
If so, adjustment should be made ......................................................  $ 24,940.99
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Notes to Exhibit 10—Adjusted Book Value, continued 
(6) Prepaid items
Delete prepaid insurance treated in Exhibit 9 and included in adjust­
m ent (1) above.
(7) Appreciation on bonds
Appreciation on bonds per Bank ................ $115,000
Adjustment (rounded) representing
income taxes to be paid upon sale,
at 31% (25% Federal plus 6% state) .......  $(35,000)
(8) Property
Land and buildings
Appraised value—
Land—
Banking premises land $475,000
Parking lot 200,000 $ 675,000
Building 750,000
$1,425,000
Net book value—
bank building and land, and
parking lot ............................................................. 445,000
(original cost 
$175,000)
Excess of appraised value over book value ......  $ 980,000
Adjustment at 2 5 % ........................................................... ......  $ (245,500)
Furniture, fixtures, equipm ent
Estimated value (to be inventoried) ......  $ 275,000
Net book value .................................................................. 161,000
Excess of estimated value over book value $ 114,000
Adjustment at 25% ......................................................... ......  $ (28,500)
Determination of a mutually fair value is principally a matter for negotiation and 
there are a number of alternatives to be considered in such determination. Con­
siderations include:
(1) Step-up in basis not available to buyer except through purchase of assets 
rather than stock. Depreciation is not available on the appreciation.
(2) The value of the appreciation increment inures to the buyer only if it is in­
tended to use the assets in the business as opposed to disposing of them.
(3) Income tax payable by the seller on realization of the appreciation. (25% 
capital gains tax)
(4) Alternatives to both the buyer and seller in disposition and ultimate owner­
ship.
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Exhibit 11
RIO PUERCO NATIONAL RANK
Net Income for 1963 as Adjusted by Bank 
and by W arner, Simmons & O’H earn
Per Bank
Net income for year 1963 as
shown on Report of Earnings
and Dividends (Exhibit 3) .....  $193,532
Add back:
Excess depreciation and 
write-downs deducted in 
arriving at net income:
Furniture and 
fixtures $58,000
Real estate
charge down 35,000
Special loan reserve 6,360 99,360
Expenses paid in advance but 
deducted in arriving at net 
incom e:
Clearing house
assessment $8,729
Advertising 7,426
Excess expense
accruals 72,680 88,835
Trust income earned but not 
included (not billed) in ar­
riving at net income 4,000
Adjusted net income 
for 1963 ................................. $385,727
Adjusted net earnings
per share ...............................
Adjustments Net Income 
(see notes) as Adjusted
$193,532
$(26,500) (1) 72,860
(511) (2) 88,324
 4,000
$(27,011) $358,716
$11.96$12.86 $(.90)
Notes:
(1) Represents the $26,500 personal loan reserve closed to income for 1963 and 
to undivided profits. The net income of $193,532 included this transfer as 
income when in fact it was transfer of a reserve (Note 2, Exhibit 10).
(2) Excess expense accruals per Bank .....................................................  $88,835
Excess expense accruals per Exhibit 9 ................................................ 88,324
$ 511
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(text continued from page 85)
“setting the world on fire” and that its performance in relation to 
competitive banks was acceptable but not outstanding.
Gordon pointed out that future growth had not been projected as 
there appeared to be no forseeable factors that would change the 
present trend of the bank’s growth pattern. He did conclude, how­
ever, that if negotiations proved that a common meeting ground could 
be reached, then such a projection might be desirable.
Mr. Freeland agreed with Gordon’s analysis on this point but con­
cluded that this finding was not alarming as he was confident he could 
draw deposits away from other banks and generate substantial new 
deposits because of his business contacts. He said he was quite sure 
he could materially increase the bank’s growth and therefore its medi­
ocre past performance would not make or break the deal.
Gordon next explained his adjustments to the book value and re­
ported earnings figures. These were accepted by Mr. Freeland without 
comment.
The focus of the meeting next turned to the summary figures (Ex­
hibit 16, page 100) and at this point Mr. Freeland showed renewed 
interest. Gordon pointed out that if the stock could be purchased at 
book value of $140 per share, this would provide an after-tax return on 
investment of 4.4 per cent. If, however, he had to pay 150 per cent of 
the book value, he would receive an after-tax return of only 2.9 per 
cent. Gordon again pointed out that purchase of a controlling interest 
was different from merely purchasing shares of stock but that no in­
formation on price was available with respect to the purchase of con­
trol. All present concluded, however, that the ratio of market to book 
value still provided a very useful guideline. It was also noted that the 
book value of a bank stock was a much more meaningful figure for a 
bank than for a manufacturing concern, where price-earnings ratios 
seemed to be of paramount importance.
Mr. Freeland at this point stated that the bank’s president was asking 
$240 per share for his stock. This meant that his after-tax return on 
this basis would be less than 2.5 per cent. Although this was not com­
pletely ridiculous in his eyes, it certainly was not spectacular. In 
comparison with tax-free municipal securities or even with the return re­
ceived on his current employment of funds, the anticipated return at 
$240 per share did not seem acceptable. He did conclude, however, that 
it might be worth talking with the bank president to determine whether 
or not he might be open to an offer which would provide him with 
a before-tax return closer to 8 per cent or 9 per cent. The thought of
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Exhibit 12, continued
Notes:
(1) The tax effect of capital gains and losses on security sales was computed at 
25% on gains and 52% on losses. Gains or losses on security sales are shown 
net of the tax effect so determined and a corresponding adjustment was made 
to “Taxes on net income” to reflect in that category only the taxes applicable 
to net operating income. The additional provision for income taxes represents 
the difference between the actual tax liability and the tax provision per books. 
Also see Exhibit 9.
(2) Depreciation deducted for tax purposes but not for book
purposes ...................................................................................... 1959 $65,690
1960 49,794
1961 53,837
1962 14,157
Equipment expensed for book purposes, but capitalized for
tax purposes ...............................................................................  1959 $ 5,081
1960 2,032
1961 22,823
1962 14,363
(3) Bad debt expense of $82,235 was deducted for tax purposes in 1961 but not 
deducted for book purposes until 1962. The tax effect of this deduction, 
approximately $42,760, has been added to 1961 taxes on net operating in­
come to provide income taxes on the income to which the taxes relate, and 
deducted from the 1962 transfer to reserves.
(4) Taxes on net income in 1963 were estimated by the Bank to be $195,000 
Federal income tax and $37,000 state income tax.
managing a bank with its associated prestige and an opportunity to 
create larger deposits still appealed to Mr. Freeland even though it did 
not appear that this was an investment which would yield a substantial 
return.
Gordon and Mr. Freeland then made an appointment to visit the 
bank president the next day. As directed, Gordon gave the bank a 
copy of the report he had prepared for Mr. Freeland and explained his 
approach and computations as he had done with Mr. Freeland. The 
bank president was interested in the approach taken by Gordon as he 
had never seen most of these comparisons before. He objected to the 
fact that no allowance had been made for future growth but again was 
unable to substantiate his optimistic feelings. He did not appear 
adamant on this point. He also believed that the entire loan loss re­
serve should have been added back to book value as he contended the 
bank had no noncollectable loans on its books. At this point he ap­
peared to resent all adjustments made to the bank’s value, but con­
ceded that they were reasonable.
The bank president examined the figures shown in Exhibit 16 with
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Exhibit 13
RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK 
Comparisons Showing Rio Puerco as a Per Cent of 
Total and Increases (Decreases) of Various Categories 
(Based on Exhibit 7)
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Per cent of Rio Puerco to total for
following items:
Demand deposits .................. 23.8% 23.7% 24.0% 23.4% 23.1%
Time deposits ........................ 23.7 22.9 20.3 21.2 20.3
U.S. Government,
state and other deposits 31.8 39.6 32.3 19.9 22.4
Total deposits ........................ 24.8 25.6 24.1 22.3 22.2
Percentage increase (decrease) 
for following categories:
Total deposits:
Rio Puerco National Bank 17.6% 1.0% (5.5)% 5.2% 8.6%
Bank A ............................. 14.8 (2.9) 3.6 18.8 5.8
Bank B 10.9 (10.1) (3.3) 7.6 7.1
Total of four smaller banks
in Albuquerque 7.8 3.6 21.5 20.9
Bank C 24.2 (5.2) (7.4) 2.9
Bank D 7.1 9.8 6.6 6.6
Bank E .............................. 13.2 9.6 24.7 3.2
Demand deposits:
Rio Puerco National Bank .4% (5.1)% 10.2% (.7)%
Bank A 2.3 (8.0) 14.7 (.9)
Bank B (8.9) (6.2) 12.2 ( .6)
Four smaller state banks 12.2 (2.2) 13.9 7.7
Total .8 (6.2) 13.0 .5
Time deposits:
Rio Puerco National Bank (9.5)% 2.0% 7.7% 27.2%
Bank A (12.3) 41.5 (7.0) 31.4
Bank B (2.8) (2.8) 1.3 36.7
Four smaller state banks 6.7 ( .8) 29.3 37.7
Total .............................. (6.5) 15.1 3.3 32.7
U.S. Government,
state and other deposits:
Rio Puerco 16.8% (14.4)% (14.5)% 20.8%
Bank A (13.1) 6.4 101.2 (2.2)
Bank B ............................... (35.9) 21.5 (6.8) (21.7)
Four smaller state banks (8.6) 44.9 35.9 33.8
Total (6.3) 4.9 38.9 7.5
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interest and commented that it was wonderful what accountants could 
do with figures. “You can prove anything you want with figures if you 
just know how.” The suggestion of a lower price seemed unacceptable 
to him; he insisted that the analysis completely ignored prospects of 
future growth. The suggestion that if this were done probable in­
creases in interest rates paid on deposits would also have to be con­
sidered seemed to be of little interest to him. The meeting was con­
cluded when he asked for additional time to look over Gordon’s report.
(text continued on page 100)
Exhibit 14
RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK 
Commonly Accepted Measures of Relative 
Stock Values Computed From Information
Given in Exhibit 5
Market Value Price- Yield Based
as % of Earnings on Cash
Book Value Ratio Dividends (Note)
Banks with resources (assets)
over $30 million— 1962:
Bank A .............................. 178% 13.2 3.57%
Bank C .............................. 152 4.52
Bank D .............................. 110 19.7
Bank V 89 22.2 3.08
Average .......... 132% 18.4 3.72%
Banks with resources (assets)
under $30 million— 1962:
Bank B .............................. 95% 17.2 5.40%
Bank E  .............................. 94 3.82
Bank W 79 14.8 4.45
Bank X  .............................. 89 4.55
Bank Y 93 4.27
Bank Z .............................. 126 10.0 3.21
Average 96% 14.0 4.28%
Note: The value of this comparison of cash dividends to market price may be 
limited, since one bank may be paying dividends entirely from current 
earnings while another bank may be paying dividends from previously 
accumulated earnings. This cannot be determined for those banks for 
which net income per share was not available. The possible limitation 
on market value data discussed in Note 2, Exhibit 5, applies to this de­
termination also.
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(text continued from page 97) 
This was Gordon’s last contact with Freeland and the bank president. 
His firm’s engagement was terminated at this meeting.
Subsequently it was learned that Mr. Freeland had offered the bank 
president $165 per share for his interest and that the bank president 
had promptly turned down the offer.
Exhibit 16
RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK 
Summary Calculations Showing Price 
Based on Various Per Cents of Book Value 
And Earnings Multiples
Investment Based on Adjusted
Book Value (Exhibit 10): Per Share
Total
Investment (1)
Investment, if based on:
100% of $140 book value per share $140 $2,142,000
125% of $140 book value per share 175 2,678,000
150% of $140 book value per share 210 3,213,000
175% of $140 book value per share ....  245 3,749,000
200% of $140 book value per share 280 4,284,000
Investment Based on Adjusted
Earnings Per Share (Exhibit 11):
Investment, if based on price:
10 times earnings per share of $11.96 $120 $1,835,000
12 times earnings per share of $11.96 144 2,200,000
15 times earnings per share of $11.96 179 2,740,000
Return on Investment, Based on 
Earnings Per Share of $11.96 and:
Price of $140 per share 
Price of $175 per share 
Price of $210 per share 
Price of $245 per share 
Price of $280 per share
Price of $120 per share 
Price of $144 per share 
Price of $179 per share
Before After
Personal Personal
Income Taxes Income Taxes(2)
8.7% 4.4%
7.0 3.5
5.8 2.9
5.0 2.5
4.4 2.2
10.0% 5.0%
8.4 4.2
6.7 3.3
(1) Based on purchase of 15,300 shares, representing 51% of the 30,000 shares 
outstanding.
(2) Assumed tax rate of 50%.
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The Economy Supermarkets
Burton Krueger, CPA, had been performing tax and auditing services 
for Daniel Dameron, owner of two successful supermarkets in a major 
metropolitan area for almost two decades. For the past several months, 
Mr. Dameron had been talking in semi-speculative terms of disposing 
of his supermarket properties. Thus, it was not with complete surprise 
that Krueger received Dameron’s telephone call in late April 1961.
“Burton,” Dameron commenced, “I’ve decided—and you know how 
many things are involved—to sell both of my supermarkets. I want 
you to handle everything for me, and I’m willing to make liberal 
financial arrangements depending, of course, on the kind of deal I 
get. We’ve talked casually about doing this, but now I’m ready for 
action. I haven’t any idea at all about who might make a good prospect. 
I specifically want you to handle that part of it. If you handle the 
whole deal for me and if you can find an acceptable purchaser for me, 
I’ll be willing to pay your fee as you had proposed earlier. Otherwise, 
we can work out some other arrangement that will be in our best 
interest. What do you say? I’m ready to move, and I want you to 
handle this for me.”
Krueger’s mind flashed back over his long and pleasant professional 
association with Mr. Dameron. He had a high degree of respect for 
Dameron, and had reason to believe that Dameron’s feelings reflected 
a comparable level of confidence. Although the proposal was unlike 
any of the work that he had done for Dameron in the past, Krueger 
had been involved in such assignments for other clients. The two men 
arranged to have lunch later in the week for an initial “brass-tacks” 
discussion.
History of Daniel Dameron’s Supermarket Operations
As soon as he had cleared his desk of other matters, Krueger re­
viewed his knowledge of the development of Dameron’s operations.
101
He noted significant points as he reflected on the past years, feeling 
that he would gain some additional insight into the problem of de­
veloping a good disposal plan for his client.
For a number of years, Daniel Dameron had held a major super­
visory position with a national retail grocers organization. He also 
had sufficient private retail experience to know (1) what he was 
looking for and (2) what abilities he felt he could bring to his own 
retail grocery operation. In 1944 he located an area that appeared to 
hold promise for future development. He had spent considerable time 
studying various locations within this geographic area, and finally 
concluded that a market in the “Economy Shopping Center” of a fair­
sized metropolitan district was what he was looking for. He acquired 
a lease on the premises and opened the “Economy Supermarket.”
Dameron operated with a high degree of success at the Economy 
location to the expiration of his first lease in mid-1949. At that time 
his landlord complimented him for doing such a fine job of developing 
his supermarket. He also informed Dameron that considering the suc­
cess of the operation he felt it proper to ask for increased rental on the 
lease renewal. He then made what Dameron described as impossible 
demands. Dameron replied in effect, “No, you can’t do that to me.” 
But the landlord maintained his position and Dameron, exercising his 
only alternative, vacated the premises.
In March of 1950, Dameron opened a new store in the Maryvale 
area, a semi-suburban area of the city. The store was successful almost 
immediately. From the beginning of Dameron’s business activities in 
that area, Burton Krueger had done his audit and tax work.
In the early part of the 1950’s, Dameron’s office manager resigned. 
Krueger recommended a good friend of his (also a certified public 
accountant) who was ultimately hired and who stayed with Dameron 
for a period of four years. He left after feeling that he had “reached 
his potential” and was replaced by a man from a national mail-order 
organization.
In 1955, after the new “accountant” had had some time to acclimate 
himself to the Economy operation, Daniel Dameron’s son—a graduate 
of a well-known school of business administration—decided to leave 
his position with a national manufacturing concern. Clayton Dameron 
joined his father’s business, starting literally at the bottom of the 
ladder.
Approximately a year later, Daniel Dameron completed arrange­
ments for the purchase and development of a new market in the West­
brook section of the city. This operation, unlike the three previous
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leasehold arrangements, was to be owned outright by Mr. Dameron. 
Clayton Dameron, having had a year in which to fit into the organiza­
tion, was transferred to the new Westbrook Economy Supermarket as 
an assistant manager.
After a time, the company’s accountant turned out to be the wrong 
man for the job and he was released. Young Dameron asked for the 
job and his father agreed that such a move into top-level management 
was a good thing. So, Clayton assumed the duties of “office manager, 
accountant, and operations manager.” Krueger observed that the 
younger Dameron was quick to adapt to his new position and con­
sistently demonstrated the ability to manage the business intelligently.
The next several years of operations, from 1957 to 1961, saw the two 
Economy Supermarkets grow and prosper. During this period Daniel 
Dameron became ill and began to think in terms of planning his estate. 
He assumed some of the characteristics of semi-retirement. Concur­
rently, Clayton Dameron took on—along with the two store managers 
—increased management responsibility.
By early 1961, however, Clay Dameron had decided that, for a 
variety of reasons, he did not want to commit himself to continuing the 
supermarket operations for an extended period of time. He and his 
father came to the conclusion that it would be most advantageous to 
sell the properties if suitable terms of sale could be arranged. Thus, 
Daniel Dameron called Burton Krueger in April 1961, and formally 
announced his intentions. It was not unusual for him to call Krueger; 
the two men had enjoyed a long and satisfactory relationship. Krueger 
knew the inner workings of the Dameron operations as thoroughly as 
did either of the men. Both Daniel and Clayton Dameron felt it per­
fectly natural to look to Krueger for assistance in the liquidation of 
their supermarket investment.
Burton Krueger’s Appraisal of the Situation
As Krueger viewed the proposal from Mr. Dameron, he realized im­
mediately that he had no “specific guides to go by.” He decided that 
his first step would necessarily have to be the formulation of some 
reasoned approach to the task at hand. He was also concerned about 
his inability to specify a basis for measuring the value of his services. 
The two problems were closely associated as he saw it, and he would 
have to deal with each very early in the engagement.
On the latter point, Krueger was confident that he and Dameron 
would come to a working agreement about the appropriate fee ar­
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rangement. Dameron had already indicated an awareness that he was 
asking for more than conventional CPA services. For his own benefit, 
Krueger attempted to summarize his potential involvement and he 
wondered how he should deal with such things as (a ) his provision of 
specific services, (b ) the formulation of “ideas”, (c ) the time involved 
in developing and implementing a plan of sale, and (d) his personal 
and professional involvement in the course of actual negotiations.
As an initial piece of work, Krueger studied his files on Dameron and 
the Economy Supermarkets. He believed that it was essential to clearly 
picture what was involved in the sale proposal. He surveyed the data 
at hand and listed the assets that would be involved. Krueger also 
noted other items that directly related to the sales transaction. (See 
Exhibit 1, page 105.)
Once he felt that he had a clear idea of the elements covered in the 
engagement, Krueger began to bring together financial information. 
Of course, he had extensive data on hand for this phase of the review. 
In short order he had compiled an analysis of operations for the past 
ten-year period, with some additional detail for the most recent five 
years. (See Exhibits 2 and 3, pages 106 and 108.) Also, from recent 
conversations with his client, Krueger had in his files all of the informa­
tion necessary to provide a basis for estimating the 1961 business year. 
( See Exhibit 4, page 109.)
Krueger knew that it would be important to remember that the busi­
ness was owned and operated in two different forms. The grocery 
operations at both locations were held as properties of the Daniel 
Dameron Corporation; the corporation also owned the land at West­
brook. Within each of the markets, the liquor department was owned 
separately (stock and fixtures) and was the property of Daniel Dam­
eron operating as a sole proprietor. While this distinction did not 
influence the handling of the initial analysis, Krueger knew that it 
would be important later in connection with tax planning.
At this point in his review, Burton Krueger paused. One question 
remained that was, to him, of such importance that it demanded im­
mediate consideration. His telephone conversation with Daniel Dam­
eron notwithstanding, Krueger knew that for all practical purposes 
he could choose to serve his client in one of two roles—that of “advo­
cate” or that of “advisor.” He was not certain which of the two roles 
would be most appropriate under the circumstances.
Krueger’s relations with Dameron had been informal in the past. 
No engagement letters had ever been used. His annual billings—on 
the basis of per diem rates—amounted to roughly two thousand dollars
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Exhibit 1
ECONOMY SUPERMARKETS 
Inventory of Assets, Equities, and Other Factors 
April, 1961
Physical Assets Being Sold:
Fixtures and equipm ent at both locations:
book value, approximately 
original cost, approximately
Liquor licenses, separate license for each location; no value 
on books; estimated current real value
Inventories, both liquor and groceries at both locations ap­
proximately
Other Equities Being Sold:
Present and future sales volume for both locations; currently 
in excess of
Advantageous locations; semi-captive market
Experienced managers as to store operation and class of
customers
Recognized, established store names
Existing lease at Maryvale; 8 years to run on present lease 
with renewal option; renewal terms subject to negotiation
Sale should be consummated before October; gives purchaser 
best quarter of year
Parking facilities adequate for full volume at each location
$ 65,000
240,000
14,000
200,000
$5,200,000
Competition:
At Westbrook—two established chain outlets
At Maryvale—one established chain now; one more expected
to come in
Sales Proposal Does Not Include:
Cash
Accounts receivable
Land (owned at W estbrook store)
Investment (deposit) in San Fernando Grocery Company 
Specified other assets (such as deposits, prepaid insurances,
etc.)
Accounts payable 
Accrued tax liabilities
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Comparative Operating Data 
For the Ten Years December 31, 1951 to 1960
1960 1959 1958 1957
1.
2.
Sales .........................
Cost of sales............
Gross profit ............
Operating
expense .................
General office ........
Operating
income ................
Other income ........
Total income ..........
Management
bonuses .....................
Profit, pre-tax ..........
Profit as percent of 
sales .......................
Gross profit as 
percent of sales ...
Inventory turnover 
per year ..............
Dollar sales per 
square foot of 
sales area ............
Dollar sales per dol­
lar of fixed assets
Rental costs as 
percent of sales ....
Number of
employees 12/31
Number of stores .... 
Number of partici­
pants in manage­
ment bonuses .....
$5,237,350
4,136,160
$4,895,470
3,870,770
$4,628,900
3,689,000
$4,194,800
3,324,400
3. $1,101,190 $1,024,700 $ 939,900 $ 870,400
4.
$ 800,330 $ 735,770 $ 699,900 $ 648,200
5. 74,100 55,920 56,500 48,900
$ 874,430 $ 791,690 $ 756,400 $ 697,100
6.
$ 226,760 $ 233,010 $ 183,500 $ 173,300
7. 11,670 10,970 15,900 19,300
8. $ 238,430 $ 243,980 $ 199,400 $ 192,600
9.
74,150 73,100 65,300 61,000
10. $ 164,280 $ 170,880 $ 134,100 $ 131,600
3.13% 3.49% 2.89% 3.14%
21.03% 20.93% 20.31% 20.75%
18.07 18.72 18.63 17.44
$ 246.91 $ 230.80 $ 218.23 $ 197.76
$ 22.17 $ 20.91 $ 18.35 $ 17.08
2.40% 2.46% 2.46% 2.54%
93 91 84 79
2 2 2 2
15 15 15 14
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Exhibit 2
1956
$3,132,400
2,540,900
$ 591,500
1955
$1,828,300
1,468,400
$ 359,900
1954
$1,662,100
1,332,600
$ 329,500
1953
$1,551,700
1,233,700
$ 318,000
1952
$1,414,100
1,156,300
$ 257,800
1951
$1,243,100
1,023,000
$ 220,100
$ 472,900 $ 236,600 $ 217,800 $ 205,900 $ 187,900 $ 159,300
28,100 23,400 15,000 14,700 13,800 14,300
$ 501,000 $ 260,000 $ 232,800 $ 220,600 $ 201,700 $ 173,600
$ 90,500 $ 99,900 $ 96,700 $ 97,400 $ 56,100 $ 46,500
10,400 19,300 2,600 1,700 700 600
$ 100,900 $ 119,200 $ 99,300 $ 99,100 $ 56,800 $ 47,100
36,100 38,100 33,100 33,500 18,300 15,000
$ 64,800 $ 81,100 $ 66,200 $ 65,600 $ 38,500 $ 32,100
2.07% 4.43% 3.98% 4.23% 2.72% 2.58%
18.88% 19.68% 19.83% 20.49% 18.23% 17.71%
14.41 14.44 12.20 12.50 13.56 12.39
$ 331.58 $ 303.33 $ 286.86 $ 265.60 $ 235.02
$ 22.46 $ 29.64 $ 28.06 $ 26.14 $ 23.88
2.33% 2.34% 1.96% 1.85% 1.82% 1.88%
74 46 45 42 35 34
2 1 1 1 1 1
9 7 7 6 5 5
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Exhibit 3
ECONOMY SUPERMARKETS
Summary of Comparative Operating D ata 
For the Five Years Ended December 31, 1956-1960
1960 1959 1958 1957 1956*
Sales $5,237,350 $4,895,470 $4,628,900 $4,194,800 $3,132,400
Percent increase in 
sales over the
previous year 6.98% 5.76% 10.35% 33.92%* —
Dollar increase in
sales over the
previous year $ 341,880 $ 266,570 $ 434,100 $1,062,400 —
Net income $ 164,280 $ 170,880 $ 134,100 $ 131,600 $ 65,000
Percent increase in
net income over
previous y e a r .........  3.86% 27.43% 1.89% 102.46% —
Dollar increase in 
net income over
previous year $ (6,600)$ 36,780 $ 2,500 $ 66,600 —
* Store # 2  open for only 6 months of 1956
per year. Krueger pondered whether a more formal arrangement was 
needed for this engagement. He decided to concentrate his thinking 
on these two important questions (i.e., his proper role, and the ap­
propriate degree of formality) before proceeding with further financial 
analysis or investigation.
Questions
1. Do you think Mr. Krueger should undertake the engagement to 
act as agent for Dameron in the sale of his supermarket properties, or 
should Krueger’s activities be limited strictly to that of an advisor 
to Mr. Dameron?
2. Assuming that Mr. Krueger agrees to accept an active role in the 
sale of Mr. Dameron’s properties, what type of fee arrangement do 
you believe would be professionally appropriate? How formal should 
the fee arrangement be between the two parties?
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3. Based on your analysis of the data available in the case, what 
would be a reasonable asking price for both of Daniel Dameron’s 
supermarkets?
4. Outline, as specifically as you can, a plan of action for this en­
gagement which Krueger might use in organizing his work. How 
might Krueger proceed to implement each of the steps involved in 
sale negotiations?
The Role Assumed by Krueger
Burton Krueger decided to operate much as he had done in the 
past. Thus, he assumed an active “agent” role, ready to represent the 
Dameron interests throughout the sale negotiations. He determined, 
however, that the informal relationship that had existed in the past 
was not desirable under the present circumstances. Together, he and 
Mr. Dameron drafted an engagement letter which spelled out, to the 
extent possible, Krueger’s responsibilities. As had been the case in all 
their prior dealings, the question of fees was resolved by simply extend­
ing their prior per diem arrangements, with an understanding by
Exhibit 4
ECONOMY SUPERMARKETS
Estimated Operating D ata 
For the Year Ended December 31, 1961
Projected 1961 sales (both stores) $5,500,000
Projected 1961 income (before federal 
income taxes):
Maryvale:
Liquor $ 82,100
Grocery 109,900 $192,000
Westbrook:
Liquor $ 32,000
Grocery 15,600 47,600
Total projected income $239,600
Less: estimated federal income taxes 119,100
Projected 1961 income (after federal
income taxes) ..........................................................................................  $120,500
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Dameron that it was impossible to predict how much of Krueger’s 
time might be required before a sale of the markets was consummated.
Based on his knowledge of the business, Krueger felt that the asking 
price should be somewhere between $500,000 and $1,500,000. To come 
up with valid support for a dollar proposal in an appropriate range, he 
studied the five- and ten-year analyses of performance that he had 
prepared and reviewed the projected data for 1961.
After he had analyzed the available data, Krueger calculated sales 
price proposals at varying capitalization rates and for varying combina­
tions of considerations. Dealing with the total package, he calculated 
selling price figures based on the average of the 1958-1960 operations; 
on 1960 operations; and on the 1961 projected operations. (See Ex­
hibits 5 and 6, pages 111 and 112.) Krueger also computed a sales 
price for each of the two locations separately on the basis of the 1961 
projected data. (See Exhibit 7, page 113.)
By the time he and the Damerons met in early May to review the 
situation, Krueger had summarized his analyses, deducing from them 
a range of proceeds that could be expected from the sale of the markets. 
Krueger was not disturbed at the possible range of prices resulting from 
the calculations. As he explained it to the Damerons, “Putting a price 
on a business is not an easy matter. Some of the calculations are ex­
tremes. Nevertheless, I think these figures do give you some feel for the 
range of possible prices.” The three men reviewed and discussed the 
projections and analyses. On the basis of their intuitive feel for the 
situation, and considering the range of selling prices suggested by 
Krueger’s analysis, the Damerons were generally in favor of an asking 
price of $750,000, and this became the figure around which their 
thinking revolved.
The Search for a Buyer
From the time of Daniel Dameron’s telephone call to Burton Krueger 
to the tim e that they were actually ready to look for a buyer, about 
three months had passed. During that period, Krueger estimated that 
he had been in contact with either Daniel or Clayton Dameron roughly 
twice a week. About half of the contacts were by telephone, and half 
were in person. Some were at Krueger’s office and some were at 
Dameron’s office; the visits lasted for as little as five minutes, although 
some lasted for as long as two hours. Much of the discussion had to do 
with the strategy to be employed in selecting likely prospects to whom 
an offer to sell the market property might be made.
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Exhibit 5
ECONOMY GROCERY & MARKET 
Calculation of Sales Price—# 1
Both Stores
Projected Actual Average
1961 1960 1958-1960
*Net income before 
federal income taxes
Less federal income tax:
30% X $25,000
52% balance .................................
Net income after taxes
Capitalization of earnings:
7½  X earnings ............................
8 X earnings ............................
8½  X earnings ............................
9 X earnings ............................
9½  X earnings ............................
10 X earnings ............................
12 X earnings ............................
15 X earnings ............................
$ 239,600 $ 214,000 $ 208,000
119,100 106,000 102,600
$ 120,500 $ 108,000 $ 105,400
$ 904,000 $ 810,000 $ 791,000
964,000 864,000 843,000
1,024,000 918,000 896,000
1,085,000 972,000 949,000
1,145,000 1,026,000 1,002,000
1,205,000 1,080,000 1,054,000
1,446,000 1,296,000 1,265,000
1,807,500 1,620,000 1,581,000
*The difference between the income figures in this exhibit and those in Exhibits 2 
and 3 arises from adjustments made by Burton Krueger to exclude management 
bonus payments made to the Damerons.
The men referred to information from trade sources and other avail­
able data in their search for clues of likely prospects. Together they 
studied lists of supermarket operators with an eye toward selecting 
purchase candidates. Their plan was to select not more than eight 
prospects and to keep their proposal “quiet and confidential.”
When the men had compiled their list of prospects, Burton Krueger 
prepared a letter of inquiry to be mailed to the selected operators. The 
letter, as mailed, appeared over Krueger’s signature on the letterhead 
of the CPA partnership. (See Exhibit 8, page 115).
Response to the letter was disappointing. Krueger received one 
acknowledgement by mail and one telephone response. The telephone 
call came when Krueger was not in the office and no follow-up call 
was received. It was at that point that the senior Dameron decided to 
establish direct contact with Mr. Paul Reich, president and a major
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stockholder of Universal Stores. Although Mr. Reich had received one 
of the letters of inquiry, he had not replied. When he found that 
Daniel Dameron’s markets were the subject of the letter, Reich ex­
pressed more than a casual interest and arranged for an interview.
Initial Sale Negotiations
Shortly after Dameron’s telephone discussion with Paul Reich, a Mr. 
Andy Jacobs called Krueger to arrange an appointment with the prin­
cipals. Jacobs was associated with another national chain and had
Exhibit 6
ECONOMY GROCERY & MARKET 
Calculation of Sales Price— # 2
Both Stores
Projected Actual Average
1961 1960 1958-1960
Sales ......................................... $5,500,000 $5,200,000 $4,920,000
Tangible assets consisting of:
Inventories:
Grocery $138,000
Liquor 83,000 $221,000
Fixed assets—net
San Fernando Grocery,
58,000
investment 14,000
Other assets
Increase in liquor
33,000
licenses 14,000
Total $340,000
Sales price based on:
8% X sales ......................... $ 440,000 $ 416,000 $ 393,000
2 X equity
5 X net income after
680,000 680,000 680,000
federal income taxes, 
per Exhibit 5 603,000 540,000 527,000
Total $1,723,000 $1,636,000 $1,600,000
Average $ 574,000 $ 545,000 $ 533,000
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Exhibit 7
ECONOMY GROCERY & MARKET 
Calculation of Sales Price— # 3
1961 Projected
Maryvale 
Liquor Grocery
Westbrook
Liquor Grocery Total
Net income,
before tax $82,100 $109,900 $32,000 $ 15,600 $ 239,600
Total income be-
fore tax for
each store $192,000 $ 47,600 $ 239,600
Less: Federal
income taxes
52% ............... 99,800
30%; 52% .......... 19,200
Net income
after taxes $ 92,200 $ 28,400
C apitalization:
5 X earnings and $461,000
8 x  earnings ........ $227,000 $ 688,000
6 X earnings and 553,000
8 X earnings 227,000 780,000
7 X earnings and 645,000
10 X earnings 284,000 929,000
8 X earnings and 738,000
10 X earnings 284,000 1,022,000
written the only letter received in response to Krueger’s initial, formal 
inquiry. Jacobs arrived for his appointment with two assistants and 
expressed a real interest in discussing the Dameron proposition. Both 
Damerons were at the meeting, as well as Burton Krueger.
After the initial formalities and casual conversation, the talk turned 
to Dameron’s proposal. When the question of price arose—early in the 
discussion—Daniel Dameron proposed a purchase price of $750,000. 
Jacobs, in a snide manner, said, “Well, sir, if you think you can get 
$750,000, you go right ahead. I’ll give you $400,000.”
Krueger, somewhat taken aback by Jacobs’ approach, answered, 
“Sir, if you can buy this kind of property for $400,000, you go right
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ahead.” Krueger’s response concluded the interview; Jacobs and his 
associates left at that point. Afterwards, Daniel Dameron said to 
Krueger, “That’s the way I like it, Burt.”
In the meantime, someone not privy to the information that Dam­
eron intended to sell his markets came up with a proposal to buy them. 
(See Exhibit 9, page 117.) Essentially, the proposal provided for a 
minimum downpayment, and for future payments related directly to 
future earnings.
Krueger discussed the proposal with the Damerons. He pointed out 
that an arrangement with future payments tied to earnings, coupled 
with an advisory role for Daniel Dameron, was, in a practical sense, a 
near-extension of the present situation. The Damerons rejected the 
offer.
It was at that point that Paul Reich of Universal acted upon his 
earlier expression of interest. He visited with Krueger and the Damer­
ons and reviewed the proposition. Krueger observed that Reich was 
not very much interested in the detailed operating analyses and projec­
tions that the CPA provided. Rather, Reich wanted to know: (a ) What 
is the current volume of each store?; (b) What are the lease arrange­
ments for each of the locations?; and (c) What are the parking char­
acteristics at each location? Reich was not concerned with Dameron’s 
methods of operation; he was interested solely in obtaining answers 
to the three questions enumerated.
Apparently satisfied with the general answers to his questions, Reich 
made Dameron an offer. He offered $375,000 for the existing lease on 
the Maryvale property, $14,000 for the two liquor licenses, $24,000 
minimum annual rental at the Westbrook location (subject to a 10-year 
lease, with 10-year renewal option; lessee responsible for insurance 
and real estate taxes), and cost value for the inventory.
On the basis of the estimated inventory value of $220,000, Krueger 
figured that Reich’s offer amounted to approximately $633,000 during 
the first year; Reich proposed to pay this with $300,000 worth of 
Universal Stores preferred stock and cash for the balance. Mr. Reich 
also proposed to pay directly to Daniel Dameron an annual “salary” 
of $12,000 a year for the next three years. Reich’s proposal was ac­
cepted for consideration and the conference was concluded.
Solicitation of a Competitive Deal
Although he was generally well pleased with the substance of Paul 
Reich’s proposal, Daniel Dameron wished to solicit at least one addi-
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Exhibit 8
Solicitation Letter 
August 23, 1961
Mr. Lipay
Food Chain Markets
2000 North W est Avenue
City
D ear Mr. Lipay:
This letter is being written at the request of a client who owns and oper­
ates two well-established supermarkets in the mid-city area and, who, for 
personal and non-financial reasons, has decided to dispose of them. He has 
chosen this approach to you because he knows that he has a valuable asset 
to sell and does not care to reveal pertinent facts about his operations to 
anyone except those who show a real interest in acquiring his markets and 
their potential. The purpose of this letter is to determine w hether or not 
your organization is interested in acquiring these markets.
A brief description of the markets and their operations follows:
a. Total sales 1960—$5,237,000 
Total sales 1959— 4,895,000 
Total sales 1958— 4,629,000
b. Net income before taxes:
I960—$164,000
1959— 171,000 
1958— 134,000
c. The total sales for the first seven months of 1961 has shown an increase 
of approximately 7% over the first seven months of 1960.
For the same period, net income has shown a higher percentage of 
increase than sales volume.
d. Location: W ell-established m iddle and upper class areas.
e. Leases: Favorable as to terms and length of lease.
f. Parking area: W ell above average.
g. Physical condition: Building m odern and in excellent condition. One 
building needs minor paint and floor repair.
Operating assets: All modern and in excellent condition.
h. Competition: Leading supermarket in each trading area.
You realize that in a letter such as this we cannot give you all of the 
necessary statistics to properly evaluate the real worth of these markets, bu t 
if you are interested we can and will furnish them promptly on a confiden­
tial basis.
Our reasons for contacting your organization are:
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Exhibit 8, continued
1. If you are interested in expanding your operations to this area, these 
two markets would be ideal since their location, volume, etc., would 
insure immediate success.
2. While my client is flexible as to financing the sale of his markets, we 
do not believe financing the project would be a problem to your 
organization.
Any negotiations and correspondence between your organization and my 
client will be treated as a confidential matter. If you are not interested in 
this proposal, we ask that you treat all information as completely con­
fidential.
If you are interested in acquiring these markets, please contact me and 
a conference with my client at a convenient time and place will be ar­
ranged. At that time we will be prepared to furnish any specific information 
requested.
A reply to this letter in the near future would be appreciated since we 
have contacted four other parties.
Sincerely yours,
SS: Burton Krueger
of Alexander, Krueger, W eiss & Weiss
BK:ck
tional proposal, if for no other reason than to bolster his bargaining 
position. Krueger discussed the possibility of calling the president of 
Metro Stores; Dameron agreed that this would be desirable and pro­
ceeded to arrange for a conference. (Daniel Dameron and Burton 
Krueger were casually acquainted with Harvey Rasmussen, president 
of Metro.) A meeting date was arranged, and Krueger and the Dam­
erons prepared to meet with Mr. Rasmussen.
When, several days later, Harvey Rasmussen arrived at Burton 
Krueger’s office, he w ent directly to the  m ajor issues. Just as Paul 
Reich had done, Rasmussen asked primarily for information about the 
sales volume and the lease provisions. He had, since Dameron’s initial 
phone call, personally surveyed the parking situation at both locations; 
he required no further information on that point.
After his questions had been answered, Rasmussen requested Dam­
eron’s asking price. Dameron responded that, while he had studied the 
situation carefully, he would prefer to receive an offer from Rasmussen, 
acknowledging his role as an expert in the field. Rasmussen then made
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Exhibit 9
Letter of Inquiry 
October 9, 1961
Mr. Daniel Dameron
Economy Supermarket
213 Spring Boulevard
City
Dear Mr. Dameron:
W e desire to make the following offer for the purchase of certain assets 
which you now own including those of the Daniel Dameron Corporation. 
Specifically, we desire to purchase the following:
1. Merchandise inventories at the Westbrook and Maryvale stores.
2. All fixtures and equipm ent at the W estbrook and Maryvale stores.
3. The Maryvale leasehold.
4. The right to use the Economy Supermarket name.
W e plan to form a new corporation to be jointly owned by the under­
signed and an associate. This corporation would propose to purchase the 
assets described above for the following p rices:
1. Book value for the merchandise inventories as of the date of purchase 
as counted and priced in accordance with your usual practices.
2. $200,000 for items 2, 3, and 4 above.
This offer would be contingent upon the following:
1. The execution of a lease to the new corporation covering the W est­
brook store for a period of fifteen (15) years at an annual rental of 
1 ½ % of sales.
2. The execution of a contract between the new corporation and your­
self whereby, for a period of ten (10) years you would be available 
for consultation in exchange for compensation at the rate of 7½ % of 
all net profits before taxes up to a maximum payment of $50,000 per 
year, payable to you or your estate, plus an additional 5% of net 
profits before taxes in excess of $666,667 per year as long as you 
furnish consultive services.
This means you would participate in all future profits from newly 
opened or otherwise acquired stores of the new corporation or its 
affiliates or subsidiaries. Also your continued advice and counsel in 
the future is something we consider vitally necessary.
3. It is the express intention of the undersigned to make no changes in 
present personnel because continuity of your management policies is 
essential to the future growth of the enterprise.
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Exhibit 9, continued
4. We propose the following terms of payment:
a. $100,000 on the date of purchase.
b. $100,000 payable ninety (90) days after date of purchase.
c. The balance payable in four (4) annual installments of $30,000 
commencing one (1) year after date of purchase.
d. Interest shall be paid on the unpaid balance from the date of 
purchase at the rate of 6% per annum.
We would be pleased to meet with you and discuss these points in greater 
detail.
Sincerely yours,
BJA:foh Barth J. Alexander
an offer that amounted to about $625,000 for the first year. He offered 
$375,000 for the lease at the Maryvale property, a $30,000 minimum 
annual rental at Westbrook (based on a 20-year lease; insurance and 
property taxes to be paid by the lessee), and cost value for the inven­
tory. Rasmussen proposed that the transaction would be an all-cash 
deal; his proposal was accepted for consideration, and the conference 
was concluded.
In the meantime, Paul Reich apparently surmised that Daniel Dam­
eron was bargaining and modified his original offer. Reich’s second 
proposal increased his first offer by $180,000, preferred stock of Uni­
versal accounting for the full additional value. Shortly after Dameron 
received Reich’s new proposal, Harvey Rasmussen called Burton Krue­
ger for information on the status of his offer.
Krueger advised Rasmussen that Mr. Dameron had received other 
offers, some a little better than his. The president of Metro Stores then 
modified his original offer; he proposed to pay $400,000 for the lease at 
Maryvale, increased the annual minimum rental from $30,000 to $36,­
000, and continued the cost-value offer for the inventory.
The Final Selection
With two firm offers in hand, Burton Krueger concluded that it 
was time to compare the proposals and to prepare a final report for the 
Damerons. He analyzed both offers, and summarized the major ele­
ments of each. ( See Exhibit 10, page 119.)
Krueger reviewed his notes, and his analysis of the offers. He recog­
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nized that the aggregate value of Universal’s offer was better than the 
offer from Metro. However, he believed that the Metro offer was 
better suited for his client because of the inclusion of a substantial 
amount of preferred stock in the Universal package. This element, 
Krueger concluded, was inconsistent with Dameron’s motives for 
liquidating his holdings in the first place. Burton Krueger advised 
Daniel Dameron of his feelings and Dameron ultimately accepted the 
purchase proposal from Metro Stores.
Once the Metro deal had been chosen, legal formalities and attendant
Exhibit 10
Burton Krueger’s Comparison 
of Universal and Metro Offers
Offer from 
Universal Stores
Offer from 
Metro Stores
Payment for fixtures and
Maryvale lease $ 375,000 $ 400,000
Payment for liquor licenses
Approximate cost value of 
inventory
14,000
220,000 220,000
Additional payment added to
basic offer .....
Sub-total: Offer for going concern
180,000
$ 789,000 $ 620,000
Three-year salary to
Daniel Dameron
Present value at 6% on 
$1,000 per month for 3 years
Annual rent, discounted to 
present value at 6%
Universal: $24,000
Metro: $36,000
Value of total offer
32,871
279,162
$1,101,033
418,743
$1,038,743
Terms of payment:
Cash at date of transfer $ 309,000 $ 620,000
Stock at date of transfer 480,000 0
Total $ 789,000 $ 620,000
(Plus salary and rental payments)
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arrangements were handled quite rapidly. Dameron called in his 
attorney who proceeded with the arrangement of legal formalities. 
Krueger was included in the consultations, but his role was far less 
dominant than it had been up to the time of legalizing the negotia­
tions.
The final conference between the interested parties was held on 
November 12th; Krueger attended, bringing with his other papers a 
“final checklist of points to be considered.” Agreement was reached 
that the inventory should be taken in time for an effective transfer date 
of December 3rd. (Krueger supervised the tax planning aspect of the 
negotiations; however, full consideration of the tax planning aspect is 
beyond the scope of this publication.)
Late Negotiations
During the period of legal consultation and final negotiations, Dam­
eron attempted to “keep Universal on the hook.” He did not wish to 
terminate the relationship between himself and Paul Reich (at Uni­
versal) until the Metro deal was concluded. One unanticipated diffi­
culty arose at the Maryvale store. The entire deal between Metro and 
Dameron was dependent on negotiating favorable lease transfer pro­
visions. At Maryvale a third-party landlord was involved; when Ras­
mussen insisted on an expansion of the parking facilities at Maryvale, 
acceptable lease provisions were difficult to negotiate. After some de­
lay, three-way agreement was reached and the final details were settled.
Partly arising from the difficulty in arranging the Maryvale lease, 
Metro was not afforded access to the markets until December 17th, 
two weeks after the agreed-upon date for transfer. Consequently, Ras­
mussen asked for credit against the contract price to compensate him 
for the delay. Largely because of the importance of the occupancy 
privilege during a prime selling season, Rasmussen felt that Metro 
should be indemnified. Dameron agreed to pay Metro $6,000 a week.
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Radionics, Inc.
On November 6, 1962, Jack Windsor, the owner of a large machine 
tool company, offered to invest $50,000 in Radionics, Inc., a California 
electronics company, in return for a 25 per cent equity in the company. 
After receiving his offer, Frank Stack, the president and sole owner of 
Radionics, was in a quandary as to how to evaluate the proposal.
Earlier in 1962, Mr. Stack had discussed Radionics’ financial situa­
tion with Peter Hall, the company’s CPA. That discussion led to an 
engagement wherein Mr. Hall developed a report indicating that the 
required amount of additional funds was $50,000. In addition, he 
suggested various sources for obtaining the funds and the advantages 
and disadvantages of each. Mr. Stack then tried unsuccessfully to bor­
row $50,000 from local banks on favorable terms. He also sought to 
negotiate several sale and lease-back agreements, but rejected all the 
proposals because he considered the interest rates too high. Mr. Stack 
rejected another alternative, that of factoring his accounts receivable; 
he believed that the proposed factoring costs were unreasonable.
As a result of his unsuccessful search for debt capital at a reasonable 
price, Stack concluded that what Radionics needed was to raise addi­
tional equity capital. Hall discussed at length with him the potential 
problems and added responsibilities of selling common stock to an out­
side investor and pointed out, “In a business this size, it’s almost like 
having a partner, and you’ll want to be sure that you can get along with 
him.” Stack had planned to discuss with Hall the number of shares an 
investor should receive for $50,000, but Windsor’s offer to invest in 
Radionics had come before he had had a chance to examine this aspect 
of the expansion program.
Looking for guidance, Stack phoned Hall and described his problem 
in the following terms:
“Jack Windsor has offered to invest $50,000 in Radionics and he
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wants a 25 per cent ownership interest for that amount. He has 
seen Radionics’ financial statements and I have discussed my 
expansion plans with him. He doesn’t want to be part of manage­
ment. He just wants to make an investment. He said that he al­
ready has a full-time job running his own machine tool company.
“Jack did not say that he doesn’t want a nonvoting stock deal; he 
wants straight stock without any restrictions. Should he ever wish 
to sell, however, he is willing to agree to give me the first oppor­
tunity on any equity in Radionics that he holds. This seems fair 
to me.
“Peter, you know that we need the $50,000, but how big a piece 
of the company do you think Jack should get for that amount?”
Peter Hall
Peter Hall, a certified public accountant, was an individual prac­
titioner. He had been the auditor and business advisor to Radionics 
ever since the company was founded in 1959. In addition to the Radi­
onics account, he acted as auditor for a variety of small privately- 
owned manufacturing companies, nearly all of which also retained 
him in a financial advisory capacity.
Hall’s personal relations with Stack had been very close. The men 
played golf together regularly and their wives visited frequently. With 
the exception of Radionics’ audited year-end statements, all of the 
business contacts between the two men were carried on in an informal 
way. Stack had retained Hall on a continuing basis since early 1960 
when he had felt the need for outside help in the day-to-day operations 
of his business. From that time on, Stack had consulted Hall on almost 
every major business decision he faced.
In answer to Stack’s question, Hall replied, “Frank, I’m tied up dur­
ing the next couple of days on an audit for another client. However, I 
will be happy to work on your problem. Why don’t we get together in, 
say, three days and discuss this matter over lunch. I’ll give you my 
opinion then as to how much equity Jack should get for $50,000.”
Stack agreed to this proposal and a luncheon date was set for 
November 9, 1962.
Immediately after talking with Stack, Hall instructed his secretary 
to get a copy of Moody’s Manual of Industrials so he could study that 
along with the additional materials that he had on file. Later he col­
lected the following information pertaining to Radionics and several 
of its publicly-owned competitors. Based on his analysis of this in­
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formation, Hall proposed to recommend to Stack the number of shares 
that should appropriately be issued to Windsor for $50,000.
Radionics, Inc.
Radionics, Inc., was incorporated in late 1959 by Frank Stack, a pro­
fessional engineer. The company’s 1962 sales volume of about $603,000 
was derived from manufacturing and consulting activities in the elec­
tronics field. Prior to forming Radionics, Stack had been a successful 
radio engineering consultant.
Radionics’ business was conducted through two divisions: the Con­
sulting Division and the Production Division. The Consulting Division 
was an extension of Stack’s consulting work prior to the time he created 
Radionics. Hence, the consulting aspect of Radionics’ business had op­
erated continuously since the company’s organization in 1959. Through 
the Consulting Division, the company performed a variety of engineer­
ing services for applicants and licensees in the commercial and short­
wave broadcast field, particularly in matters before the Federal Com­
munications Commission and other regulatory agencies. In addition, 
the division performed engineering consultation for industrial concerns 
on electronic questions, designed broadcasting equipment and made 
field adjustments to broadcasting equipment. Other consulting ac­
tivities included site selection studies for AM, FM and TV broadcast 
facilities and appraisals of existing broadcast facilities.
Since 1959 the Consulting Division had done work for approximately 
150 AM, FM and TV broadcast stations throughout the United States 
and foreign countries (there were approximately 5,000 AM, FM and 
TV stations in the United States). This work was primarily on an indi­
vidual case or project basis, but many of these clients had retained the 
company’s services for more than one job. Approximately 50 of these 
150 broadcast stations were currently considered active accounts.
The Production Division was created in early 1959 as an outgrowth 
of Radionics’ consulting work. The activity of this Division embraced 
the production and sale of individual electronic components as well as 
the design, production and installation of certain communications 
equipment which utilized various components produced by the com­
pany. Since its organization, the major objective of the Production 
Division had been the development of a line of proprietary components 
and communications equipment. Stack believed that substantial prog­
ress had been achieved by Radionics in the development of several 
proprietary products, such as coils, relays, switches and sampling loops.
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In the near future, he expected an increasing market acceptance of 
these products. The necessary research and development work re­
quired to create these improved products was conducted by Produc­
tion Division personnel. Such research was largely financed by Radi­
onics from its own resources, rather than by research and development 
contracts with the government or larger companies.
Beginning in late 1961, Radionics’ Production Division had played a 
major role in the activities of the space surveillance program of the 
Navy, especially in the procurement, modification, and installation of 
several powerful transmitters for missile tracking stations. The installa­
tion work on the Navy tracking station project was performed by the 
company’s field service section which had available to it the technical 
staff personnel of both the Consulting and Production Divisions. The 
total contract price for this Navy job was approximately $300,000, most 
of which had been received by Radionics during 1962.
Sales and Earnings. The net sales of the company, by division, for 
the last three years were:
Fiscal year
(October 31) Consulting division Production division Total sales
1962 $194,553 $408,039 $602,592
1961 208,979 110,310 319,289
1960 234,733 107,319 342,052
The net profits after taxes of the company for this same period were:
Year Net Profit
1962 $17,1401
1961 8,512
1960 1,197
More detailed income statements for the fiscal years 1960-62, in­
clusive, are shown in Exhibit 1, page 125. Detailed financial data for 
1959 is not included. Hall did not consider the financial reports for 
that period representative of the company’s long-run performance 
since they included only six-months’ consulting income. In 1959, con­
sulting revenues were some $90,000 with profits of about $2,000. A 
balance sheet for 1962 is presented in Exhibit 2, page 126.
Despite a substantial increase in Radionics’ 1962 profits over the
1 W ithout the Navy contract, Stack estimated Radionics’ 1961 earnings 
would have been about $10,000 after taxes. W indsor was not aware of this 
figure.
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Exhibit 1
RADIONICS, INC.
Statements of Income
For the Years Ended October 31, 1960, 1961 and 1962
1962 1961 1960
Net sales
Cost of sales:
$602,592.01 $319,289.09 $342,052.55
Materials purchased
Operating expenses (other than
$202,893.00 $ 71,767.97 $ 38,919.55
those listed below) 236,164.58 133,317.01 161,525.17
Repairs and maintenance 1,081.68 1,079.28 1,148.97
Provision for depreciation 12,451.55 5,837.38 4,672.47
Rent
Taxes, other than taxes on in-
16,873.70 12,985.00 12,291.00
come 10,459.81 4,535.36 2,927.84
Total $479,924.32 $229,522.00 $221,485.00
(Increase)/decrease in inventories 11,249.88 (28,585.18) (9,205.88)
Cost of sales $491,174.20 $200,936.82 $212,279.12
Gross profit on sales
Selling, general, and administra­
tive expenses (other than those
$111,417.81 $118,352.27 $129,773.43
listed below $ 76,881.21 $ 80,388.25 $102,893.70
Taxes, other than taxes on income 2,090.24 770.53 1,000.04
Total expenses $ 78,971.45 $ 81,158.78 $103,893.74
Operating profit
O ther incom e:
$ 32,446.36 $ 37,193.49 $ 25,879.69
Interest $ 337.05 $ 966.26 $ 67.66
Miscellaneous 385.00 112.06
Total $ 722.05 $ 966.26 $ 179.72
Other deductions:
$ 33,168.41 $ 38,159.75 $ 26,059.41
Interest expense
Loss on disposal of assets
$ 3,444.84 
3,426.90
$ 1,999.61 $ 348.93
Bonuses (officers & employees) 4,000.00 24,000.00 24,000.00
Total $ 10,871.74 $ 25,999.61 $ 24,348.93
Net income before taxes $ 22,296.67 $ 12,160.14 $ 1,710.48
Federal taxes 5,155.90 3,648.04 513.14
Net income $ 17,140.77 $ 8,512.10 $ 1,197.34
See notes to financial statements. Exhibit 2.
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Exhibit 2
RADIONICS, INC.
Statement of Financial Position 
October 31, 1962
ASSETS
Current assets:
Cash .......................................................................
Notes and accounts receivable:
Trade notes $ 3,113.88
Trade accounts ...............................................  88,199.29
$ 91,313.17
Less allowances 4,300.00
Unbilled costs and fees on contracts 
Inventories at lower of cost (first-in, first-out
m ethod) or market:
Finished goods $ 2,050.49
Work-in-process 14,021.84
Materials ..................................... 25,602.09
Prepaid expenses
Total current assets 
Equipment:
Technical equipment $ 65,681.83
Office furniture and fixtures 23,993.92
Factory equipm ent 11,201.19
Vehicles 6,465.00
Leasehold improvements 8,689.46
$116,031.40
Less allowances for depreciation 25,638.78
Other assets:
Deferred research and development expenses 
— (Note A) $ 59,374.07
Deferred financing expense 4,000.00
Other 1,940.74
Total assets
$ 1,845.12
87,013.17
4,120.63
41,674.42
1,763.18
$136,416.52
90,392.62
65,314.81
$292,123.95
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Exhibit 2, continued
LIABILITIES and NET WORTH
Current liabilities:
Notes payable:
Banks—unsecured— (Note B) $ 18,750.00
Trade creditors—unsecured— (Note B) 26,967.47
Officers—unsecured 14,976.32
Others— (Note B) 8,339.54
Total
Salaries and wages, payroll taxes, and taxes 
withheld from employees— (Note C)
Customer’s advance 
Accrued interest
Total current liabilities
Stockholders’ equity:
Common stock, no par value—
Authorized 1,000,000 shares, issued and
$ 69,033.33
33,523.99
19,114.70
5,490.31
$127,162.33
164,961.62
outstanding 200,000 shares $200,000.00
Deficit (Note D) (35,038.38)
$292,123.95
Notes to Financial Statements
Note A: During the period from April 1, 1962 to August 31, 1962, the company 
engaged in an extensive research and development program on a number of com­
mercial products and capitalized materials, labor and overhead applicable to this 
research and development totaling $59,374.07. This amount will be amortized 
over a five-year period beginning November 1, 1962. Other research and develop­
ment expenses prior to April 1, 1962, and subsequent to August 31, 1962, have 
been expensed as incurred.
Note B: Notes payable of $15,000.00 to a bank and of $22,991.91 to a trade 
creditor have been personally endorsed by officers of the company.
Subsequent to October 31, 1962, a bank loan of $3,750.00 was paid and an 
additional bank loan of $25,000.00 was obtained (personally endorsed by the 
president of the company and his wife).
Note C: Included in the amount ($33,523.99) shown on the statement of 
financial position for salaries and wages, payroll taxes, and taxes withheld from 
employees is $6,634.93 which is past due to the United States Government for 
federal withholding and Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes.
Note D: In 1961 the company sold certain fixed assets at a capital loss, which 
was written-off against retained earnings. Originally these assets had been ob­
tained from Mr. Frank Stack in return for common shares of Radionics.
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prior year, Stack believed his profits for 1962 should have been greater 
by about $7,000 after taxes. He based this belief on three facts:
1. During the year, half of the plant was shut down for one week 
due to a change in layout of the equipment.
2. Lack of capital to provide the greater inventories of materials 
and supplies necessary to process the increased volume of business had 
resulted in delays in production schedules and an inability to take ad­
vantage of other potential operating economies.
3. The expansion of the work force due to the Navy satellite track­
ing station contract resulted in temporary overstaffing.
As noted later, Stack anticipated that with additional capital he 
could quickly improve the company’s efficiency, permanently increase 
its sales volume and realize substantial operating economies.
Marketing. Radionics’ products and services were sold primarily in 
the United States. The company’s principal customers were commer­
cial enterprises; except for the Navy’s Space Surveillance Program, the 
company had not performed significant engineering design or installa­
tion services for the government. Nevertheless, Stack considered the 
government a major potential customer for certain Radionics products 
and engineering services.
The company’s principal customer was a large manufacturer of 
radios and TVs which over the years had been both a direct customer 
for Radionics’ products and services and a source of additional revenue 
through subcontracts. Sales to this customer during fiscal 1961 ac­
counted for approximately 70 per cent of the gross sales of the Produc­
tion Division and 15 per cent of the revenues of the Consulting Divi­
sion. However, Stack’s analysis of the current backlog of production 
orders indicated a broadening of his customer base, and he expected 
this trend to continue.
From its inception, Radionics had operated without a separate sales 
department; all sales were made through the personal efforts of the 
company’s top executives. By mid-1962, however, the satisfactory de­
velopment of the proprietary product line had led Stack to the con­
clusion that Radionics’ sales activity should be formalized and intensi­
fied. Accordingly, he planned to increase his sales effort with outside 
sales assistance supplemented by a small Radionics sales organization. 
Already, he had arranged to use the services of an international manu­
facturer’s representative in the electronics field for export sales. Also, 
within the past fiscal year, Stack had authorized a domestic manu-
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facturer’s representative to act as the exclusive agent for Radionics 
along the East Coast. In addition, as soon as he could raise some new 
long-term capital, Stack planned to set up his own two-man sales 
force to cover the West Coast. Later, he planned to service the re­
mainder of the country through selected manufacturer’s representa­
tives. This new sales organization, Stack believed, could be estab­
lished within three months after he acquired the capital to undertake 
the sales expansion program.
Plant and Facilities. Radionics’ plant and facilities were located in 
two cities: Los Angeles and Culver City, California. The offices of the 
Consulting Division were situated in a large office building in Los 
Angeles. These offices, at a rental of $820 per month, were occupied 
under a three-year lease expiring August 31, 1964.
The facilities of the Production Division were housed in a converted 
movie studio lot in Culver City. Radionics had a three-year lease on 
this plant expiring on November 30, 1964. Rent was payable at the 
rate of approximately $470 per month.
Finally, based on a recent study by Stack, the appraised resale value 
of Radionics’ fixed assets and equipment, excluding leasehold improve­
ments, was almost $150,000. The undepreciated book value of these 
same assets was about $90,000. The difference between these two 
figures resulted from many improvements Stack had built into his test­
ing and production equipment subsequent to its purchase. The costs 
of these improvements had been expensed as incurred, in that the bet­
terments did not enhance their useful life.
M anagement and Em ployees. In November, 1962, the company 
employed 34 persons including 14 engineers, 7 draftsmen, 7 production 
employees, and 6 administrative employees. Earlier during 1962, engi­
neers employed in both divisions had reached a total of 21. However, 
upon completion of the satellite tracking station for the Navy, the engi­
neering staff had been cut back.
The top management of the company consisted of three men— 
Frank Stack, president; Harold Patterson, manager, Production Divi­
sion; and Len Sims, manager, Consulting Division. All three were 
registered professional engineers in their late forties.
Stack, Patterson, and Sims were regarded as competent managers 
and engineers within the Los Angeles electronics manufacturing and 
consulting community. In particular, Stack was noted for his inventive 
skills which already had resulted in significant improvements in several 
radio broadcast equipment components.
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Expansion Plans
The $50,000 addition to equity capital was needed to support future 
business expansion by Radionics, particularly in the manufacturing 
and sales area. Stack planned to invest the $50,000 as follows:
Inventory of finished materials
and manufacturing supplies $30,000
Sales promotion 15,000
New production equipment 5,000
$50,000
With this amount of new equity capital in the business, Stack was 
quite confident that Radionics’ operations would grow over the next 
three years as follows:
Sales
Profits
Year Consulting Division Production Division After Taxes
1963 $200,000 $300,000 $15,000
1964 250,000 400,000 20,000
1965 250,000 500,000 30,000
Stack had discussed Radionics’ growth potential with Hall on many 
occasions, and in working out the rough estimates shown above, Stack 
had said, “There’s a real opportunity for increasing the Production 
Division’s sales volume from customers other than our prime customer. 
These estimates are just for the normal growth that I’m sure is possible, 
and reflect the decline in volume because our Navy contract is now 
finished. I’ve made no allowance in these sales estimates for other 
large one-shot contracts, such as the Navy tracking contract, because 
of the uncertainties associated with winning such jobs. Therefore, I 
really think that these sales and profit estimates are somewhat on the 
conservative side. On the other hand,” Stack pointed out, “we must 
have new capital to achieve these results. If additional capital is not 
obtained, I would expect that Radionics would continue to operate at 
about its 1961 level over the next few years.”
Hall had pointed out in reply that, “The value of your equity is really 
determined by the buyer’s expectations of the future performance of 
your company, and sales is a critical factor. I’m going to use your 
figures and focus my efforts on a method for determining a fair price.”
Competition. Radionics had a number of competitors. For instance,
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there were many small firms consisting of one or two engineers offering 
consulting and engineering services similar to those of Radionics’ Con­
sulting Division. Most of the company’s more significant competitors 
in this phase of its business were located in the Los Angeles area. 
However, of these firms, Radionics was perhaps the best known 
throughout the broadcasting industry. Consequently, Radionics was 
one of the more active firms rendering consulting services.
Many firms, both large and small, were engaged in the production 
and sale of components for the broadcast industry. Some of Radionics 
larger and more diversified competitors had substantially more ex­
tensive research and production facilities than Radionics. Rather than 
compete with these large firms in all areas of broadcast products, Radi­
onics sought to develop a specialized line of broadcasting products. 
Therefore with respect to its major products, such as coils, relays, 
switches, sampling loops and phase monitors, the company faced direct 
competition from only a limited number of other producers. The com­
pany’s chief competitors with respect to its major products were Audi­
onics, Inc.; Sound Age, Inc.; Stevenson Associates; Hightone, Inc.; 
Masters, Inc.; and Foster & Cohen, Inc. Each of these companies made 
one or all of the products Radionics produced. In addition, a number 
of them also offered consulting services.
Three of the companies Radionics competed directly with in the 
manufacturing and consulting areas were publicly owned: Audionics, 
Inc., Hightone, Inc., and Masters, Inc. Each of these companies is 
briefly described below. Selected financial data which Hall gathered 
concerning these companies is summarized in Exhibit 3, page 132.
Audionics, Inc. This company produced high quality loops, relays, 
and phase monitors. Its president, Peter Watkins, was a prominent 
consultant in the broadcast industry. His firm had won two large con­
tracts ($100,000 each) associated with the same Navy missile track­
ing program Radionics had just completed. Over the last three years, 
this company’s sales had risen from $600,000 to $1,000,000, principally 
because of additional government contracts. Audionics’ stock was 
traded infrequently in the over-the-counter market.
Hightone, Inc. A manufacturer of sampling loops and phase moni­
tors exclusively. Hightone offered limited consulting services. Like 
Radionics, about 60 per cent of its production was sold to one company. 
Between 1958 and 1962, Hightone’s sales rose steadily from $1,000,000 
to $1,300,000. A “thin” over-the-counter market was maintained in 
Hightone’s stock.
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Masters, Inc. This company’s consulting activities rivaled Radionics 
in size and scope. Masters manufactured coils, relays, and phase moni­
tors (for which it was best known). From 1959 when it was founded 
to 1962, Masters’ sales rose to $700,000. In contrast to Radionics and 
most of the other small companies in this field, Masters maintained a
Exhibit 3
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Comparative Stock Prices and Financial D ata on Selected Competitors
Audionics, Inc. 
7/31/61
Hightone, Inc. 
7/31/61
Masters, Inc. 
6/30/61
Sales (000 omitted) $1,000 $1,300 $700
Net income (000 om itted)1
after federal taxes (40) 60 19
Return on net w o rth 2 negative 
net worth
20% 10%
Earnings per share:
1962 $ (.40) $ .30 $ .19
1961..................................... ( .52) .16 .13
1960 .................................... .10 .08 .04
1959 ..................................... .20 .10 founded 1959
Market price (bid 9 /1 /6 2 ) .80 9.00 4.75
Price earnings ratio:3
1962 (9 /1 /62 ) ( - ) 30x 25x
1961 (7 /31/61) .............. ( - ) 25x 23x
1960 (7 /31/60) 21x 22x 16x
1959 (7 /31 /59) .......... 15x 20x —
Current dividend rate - 0 - - 0 - - 0 -
1962 book value share negative $ 1.50 $ 1.50
Common shares outstanding
(000 omitted) 100 200 100
1 All three companies had deferred substantial research and development costs 
during the last four years.
2 Income  X 100%Net Worth 
3 Market price at date shown
Earnings for period ending on date shown
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small sales force of its own. The market for this company’s stock 
was “thin.”
On June 1, 1962, a leading financial journal published the following 
comments in an article on the broadcast component industry:
. . .  In the highly specialized production of coils, relays, and 
switches, three small firms (Radionics, Audionics and Stevenson 
Associates) are competing successfully with the larger more 
diversified firms. This specialized end of the business requires 
expert “know-how” which only a few people, such as Frank Stack 
of Radionics, possess. . . . Likewise, in the manufacture of sampling 
loops and phase monitors four small firms ( Hightone, Sound Age, 
Radionics and Masters) can hold their own with the industry 
giants. . . . Nobody within the industry anticipates that these 
small firms will lose their grip on the specialty markets, which in­
dustry experts expect will continue to expand by some five per 
cent each year. . . .
The public demand for the stocks of such companies as High­
tone far exceeds the supply, with the result that these stocks sell 
at price earnings ratios of about 30. . . . Investment analysts spe­
cializing in this segment of the radio industry are “bullish” in their 
investment recommendations. . . .
Questions
1. What portion of the equity of Radionics, Inc. should Frank Stack 
offer to Jack Windsor for $50,000?
2. What strategy should Stack follow in his negotiations with 
Windsor?
3. What alternative sources of equity capital might be available to 
Stack, besides the Windsor offer?
4. Should Hall bill Stack separately for this project? How many 
man-hours do you think are involved?
Peter Hall’s Analysis
Jack Windsor, the owner of a large machine tool company had 
offered to invest $50,000 in Radionics, Inc., in return for a 25 per cent 
equity in the company. Several days after receiving the offer, Frank
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Stack, the president of Radionics, met with his certified public ac­
countant, Peter Hall to discuss how large a share of Radionics’ equity 
Windsor should expect to receive for $50,000. Excerpts from their 
meeting are presented below:
Stack: Peter, I have checked with my lawyer and he will take care of 
all the legal aspects of any issuance of new securities. What I 
thought we ought to discuss is the number of shares I should 
offer to Jack. Do you think I should accept his offer?
Hall: No. I think from what I have found, that you ought to be able 
to get a much better offer, if not from Jack Windsor, then per­
haps from somebody else.
Stack: How did you come to that conclusion?
Hall: Well, first let me say that to value a potential minority interest 
in a small company which depends on the genius of one man is 
not an easy matter. I want to make this very clear to you at the 
start so that you will not over-rate the reliability of my recom­
mendation.
Stack: Thinks for the warning.
Hall: The first thing I did in my analysis was to place a value on 
Radionics under the going concern concept. In fact, by using 
different valuation techniques, I arrived at several values.
Stack: How did you arrive at these valuations?
Hall: I used three methods. First, I calculated the book value, using 
your 1962 balance sheet figures. Second, I determined a market 
price for the company, using the price-earnings ratios of several 
similar companies whose stock is publicly traded. Finally, I 
hypothesized a stream of dividends that Radionics would be 
able to pay based on its anticipated future earnings, and 
capitalized the dividends at several different yield percentages. 
Now, let’s look at each one of these individually.
The book value of Radionics is $164,000. This figure is simply 
the difference between your total assets and liabilities. On a 
book value basis, if Windor put in $50,000 the total equity 
would be $214,000 and his pro rata share, that is, 50 out of 214, 
would be 23.4%. Since he has suggested a 25% piece, we can 
surmise that he’s either just establishing a starting point for 
further negotiations, or perhaps he’s making some adjustment for
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your deferred research and development expenses. In terms of 
tangible net worth, eliminating both the research and develop­
ment and deferred financing expense, we show just over $100,­
000. On that basis, Windsor’s $50,000 cash would give him a 
one-third interest, so he is apparently accepting most of your 
intangibles if he’s using book value to arrive at a price.
The next method I applied, called the market value approach, 
gives us another set of values for Radionics. The market value 
approach is based upon the following assumption: If Radionics’ 
stock were publicly traded it would be selling at about the same 
price-earnings ratios as that of similar companies.
Of course, Radionics’ stock is not traded publicly, but the 
stock of two similar companies, Hightone and Masters, is traded 
over-the-counter. Here are some brief comparative statistics of 
these two companies and Radionics (see Table 1, page 137).
As you can see from these figures, Radionics and Masters are 
very similar. Masters, of course, has only 100,000 shares out­
standing against Radionics’ 200,000, so Masters’ per share figures 
are all about twice those of Radionics’. Radionics has a slightly 
higher return on net worth than Masters. Also, Radionics has a 
better profit trend than Masters. Both companies were founded 
in 1959, and Masters did better during its first year, but between 
1961 and 1962 Radionics doubled its earnings while Masters’ 
earnings rose only 46 per cent.
Obviously, Hightone is a larger and more successful company 
than Radionics. Nevertheless, I have included Hightone on the 
table because its earnings have grown during the last couple of 
years at about the same rate as Radionics’ earnings. Also, I 
think as you get more and more into the manufacturing busi­
ness, your company’s operations will come closer to resembling 
Hightone’s operations than they currently do.
Stack: I ’ve always thought of Radionics being somewhat similar to 
Audionics. Why did you exclude Audionics from the table?
Hall: Primarily because Audionics has reported losses during the last 
two years. In that important respect it is different from Radi­
onics. And what I was after was a price-earnings multiple that 
I could apply to our stock; a company like Audionics that shows 
a loss doesn’t have any price-earnings ratio.
Using the multiples that Hightone and Masters have had over 
the last three years, and applying them to Radionics’ earnings,
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I came up with market values of $516,000 and $430,000, re­
spectively. Here are my calculations (see Tables 2 and 3, page 
137).
On the basis of these two stock prices, Jack Windsor’s $50,000 
would buy 19,380 or 23,256 shares. Since we already have 
200,000 shares out, he would end up with about 10% ownership 
in Radionics.
Finally, as a third approach, which in my opinion is really the 
most realistic one, I tried to recognize that what an investor is 
buying is a stream of future earnings and dividends. Now, we 
can’t see very far ahead in this business, but from my analysis, 
it appears that $50,000 in new capital will permit your company 
to develop a business that will earn approximately $30,000 per 
year. The question is, what happens then? If you don’t grow 
any further, the $30,000 could be paid out in dividends, so you 
may wish to look at the dividend yield. More likely, some or all 
of the profits will be plowed-back so that the company can con­
tinue to grow. If you try to put a value on that you can really 
get into some “wild blue yonder” projections, and besides, that’s 
what the market prices for Hightone and Masters are reflecting. 
The only justification for earnings multiples of 25 or 30 is the 
expectation that earnings will continue to increase rapidly.
The dividend yield approach, on the other hand, is really not 
as theoretical as it might first appear. For example, if you earn 
$30,000 in 1965, that money will belong to the stockholders, you 
and Windsor. Hopefully, you two will be able to agree on how 
to use that money. If the potential for further profitable growth 
looks good, you’ll probably leave it in the business, but you’ll 
really be making a new investment in the company because you 
could have paid it out in dividends if you wish. It’s even pos­
sible to do both, that is, pay $30,000 in dividends to the existing 
stockholders and find a new investor to buy $30,000 of stock to 
finance the continued growth. The point is that the profits are 
there, and Windsor is really buying a piece of these profits.
Looking at the valuation problem this way, the question then 
is: How much of those profits should belong to Windsor? For 
analytical purposes, suppose Windsor might accept a dividend 
yield of 8% to 12% on his investment. Given that assumption, 
here are some calculations which show what that means (Table 
4, page 138.)
On this basis, Windsor would get 13 to 20% of the ownership
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Table 1
Comparative Statistics—Radionics, Hightone 
and Masters, 1959— 1962
Radionics Hightone Masters
Sales—1962 .............................. $600 $1,300 $700
Net income after federal taxes
(000)-1962 .............................. $ 17 $ 60 $ 19
Return on net worth— 1962 11% 20% 10%
Earnings per share:
1962 ......................................... $ 0.086 $ 0.30 $ 0.19
1961......................................... 0.043 0.16 0.13
1960 0.006 0.08 0.04
1959 ........................................ founded 1959 0.10 founded 1959
Current dividend rate -0- - 0 - - 0 -
Book value—1962 $ 0.83 $ 1.50 $ 1.50
Common shares outstanding
(000 om itted) .................... 200 200 100
Table 2
M arket Price of Radionics
Year Earnings
Using Hightone’s Price-Earnings Ratio
Price-Earnings
Ratio
Shares
Price/Share Outstanding
Total
M arket Value
1962 $0,086 30 X $2.58 X 200,000 = $516,000
1961 0.043 25 1.06 X 200,000 = 212,000
1960 0.006 22 0.13 X 200,000 = 26,000
Table 3
Year Earnings
M arket Price of Radionics
Using Masters’ Price-Earnings Ratio
Total
M arket Value
Price-Earnings
Ratio Price/Share
Shares
Outstanding
1962 $0.086 25 x $2.15 x 200,000 = $430,000
1961 0.043 23 0.99 x 200,000 = 198,000
1960 0.006 16 0.10 x 200,000 = 20,000
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for his $50,000. In terms of the number of shares, at a 10% 
yield for example, he would get 40,000 and would own one-sixth 
of the 240,000 shares that would then be outstanding.
Here is a summary of my different valuation calculations ( see 
below).
In my opinion, the book value figures don’t really mean much; 
after all, Windsor is not interested in buying a collection of 
assets. He is interested in your management of those assets. 
That’s why you should look at this problem in terms of earning 
power. I included book value in my analysis for purposes of 
comparison with Hightone and Masters to show that you are 
not out of line on that score.
The other five values in the table all reflect earning power in
Table 4
Ownership Percentage Attributable to a $50,000 Investment 
at Various Hypothetical “Dividend Yields”
“Dividend
Yield”
Dividends Required 
on $50,000
Total “Dividends Paid” 
(Profits Available in 1965)
Ownership
Percentage * 
for $50,000
8% $4,000 $30,000
10% 5,000 30,000
12% 6,000 30,000
* Total “dividends paid” divided into dividends required.
13.3%
16.7
20.0
Hall’s Valuation Calculations
Percentage Ownership Number of Shares Price Per 
Valuation method For $50,000 Investment for $50,000 Share
Book value:
All assets 23.4% 61,097 $ .82
Tangible assets
only 33.3 100,000 .50
Price-earnings ratio:
25 times earnings 10.4 23,256 2.15
30 times earnings 8.8 19,380 2.58
Dividend yield:
8% yield 13.3 30,769 1.63
10% yield 16.7 40,000 1.25
12% yield 20.0 50,000 1.00
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some way. I really feel that I would prefer the price-earnings 
ratio approach because it reflects an appraisal of companies 
similar to Radionics by the impersonal market place.
If I read the market place correctly, I think the value of Radi­
onics lies somewhere between the market value of Masters and 
Hightone. In my opinion, the market place is willing to pay a 
premium for the stock of a company that can double its earnings 
in a year, as demonstrated in the case of Hightone. Thus, I 
would place the value of Radionics at between $2.15 and $2.58 
per share.
Stack: Why would you reject the values derived from the method em­
ploying dividend yield?
Hall: I do not feel that these values reflect the supply and demand 
forces at work in the market place. This is an important factor 
since the demand for stocks of companies such as Radionics far 
exceeds the supply. What the dividend approach really tells us 
is that investors in companies such as these have very high ex­
pectations that earnings will continue to grow in the future. 
Windsor—or any investor for that matter—probably wouldn’t 
pay more than $1.25 per share for a small, young company such 
as this unless he thinks that earnings will continue to grow.
Stack: Well, now that we have a range of possible values between 
$2.15 and $2.58, which one do I pick?
Hall: Well, even though I said that I thought your market value would 
be in that range, the fact is your stock is not traded at all. This 
means that you will probably have to allow some discount to 
your first outside investor. My feeling is that you can expect 
offers of about $2.00 per share, or about 15% less than what 
your market value would normally be. At that price an investor 
can, even if earnings level off at $30,000 per year, get a dividend 
yield of better than 6½ %. That should be an incentive in this 
kind of a situation.
Stack: Well, if I settle on $2.00 that means that Jack Windsor, for 
example, would buy 25,000 shares and would own a little better 
than 10% of the company. Boy, that’s a long way from his 
original offer!
Hall: Windsor will probably present some reasons why his offer is a 
reasonable one, but I feel that you should not take it until you
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have had an opportunity to look around. If I’m right about the 
market being a seller’s market, you should get better offers.
Stack: What reasons do you think Windsor might give to support his 
offer?
Hall: There could be many, but I can cite a few that he may give.
He could say the risk of investing in Radionics is very high,
so he should get a substantial discount for assuming the risk. 
Here are two risks he might mention: first, the absence of a 
good secondary market for the stock; and, second, his lack of 
control over management. These risks exist, but they are his 
problems—not yours.
He may say the market value approach is unreliable because 
the market for stocks such as Hightone and Masters is “thin.” 
I would agree the market for these stocks is “thin,” but in the 
absence of better measures of values, who is to say the market 
prices are unreliable? There are plenty of seasoned, blue-chip, 
listed stocks that he could buy, but apparently he feels that 
there is great potential in a small company like Radionics.
Another point he might make is that Radionics’ earnings are 
overstated because of the deferral of research and development 
costs during 1962. My audit opinion covered that, but you 
might reiterate that the deferral was necessary to get a proper 
matching of costs and revenues.
Following this meeting, Stack refused Windsor’s initial offer. Within 
the next few weeks, the “gossip mill” among local investors spread the 
word that Stack was looking for equity money and he received six 
“firm” offers to purchase $50,000 worth of stock in his company. These 
offers ranged from $1.00 to $1.80 per share, including an offer at $1.50 
per share from Jack Windsor. Subsequently, Stack accepted the 
highest of these six offers.
Peter Hall considered this project to be outside of Radionics day-to- 
day business; therefore this service was not covered by his retainer. 
His separate bill to Radionics for these services included, in addition 
to the analytical work, the time spent in contact with Stack during the 
latter’s negotiations with the prospective investors. He normally billed 
$30 per hour for this type of service. The adjusted bill as submitted to 
Mr. Stack was in the amount of $500.
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Rack Service Corporation
In July 1965 William T. Booth, a partner in the Philadelphia CPA 
firm of Skene, Home, Booth & Co., was studying the preliminary ma­
terial he had collected in connection with the prospective acquisition 
by a client, Rack Service Corporation, of a controlling interest in 
Housewares Unlimited, Inc. He had been informed of the prospective 
deal the previous week by Preston Lewis, president of Rack Service, 
who had requested Booth’s assistance in the negotiations, particularly 
with respect to the financial aspects of the transaction. Preston Lewis 
considered himself to be uninformed and without any particular skills 
in the financial area. His specialty was in merchandising. Lewis’ 
brother-in-law, Charles Richards, was the chief financial officer, but 
day-to-day duties kept him so fully occupied that he welcomed Booth’s 
assistance whenever a major non-routine project arose.
Rack Service Corporation had been an audit and tax client of Skene, 
Horne & Booth since its formation by Preston Lewis and some family 
associates, including Mr. Richards, in 1958. In its seven years of exist­
ence, the corporate group of which Rack Service was the central mem­
ber had grown rapidly, in part as the result of some significant acqui­
sitions either by Rack Service Corporation or directly by Preston Lewis 
and his associates. During this time Lewis had come to value Mr. 
Booth’s advice highly, and readily sought his counsel on many of the 
major financial transactions that he was considering. Booth considered 
such advice as being part of the total package of services his firm pro­
vided for their clients. He normally billed separately for time spent on 
this type of activity only when there was a specific engagement or a
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clearly defined project or problem such as an acquisition; failing this, 
his regular bill would simply include the cost of whatever time was 
spent in this way, without separate itemization. Over the years Mr. 
Booth found an increasing number of clients (many similar to Rack 
Service in size or management organization) requesting financial ad­
vice. He felt that the ability to assist them was an important extension 
of the traditional audit-and-tax relationship, and filled a real need. His 
wide experience with the problems of different companies gave him a 
useful perspective whenever he was called upon for advice on financial 
questions.
Rack Service Corporation
In 1965 Rack Service Corporation was the center of a group of inter­
related companies conducting various types of rack-jobbing in the tri- 
city region of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Wilmington, Delaware; and 
Trenton, New Jersey, and surrounding areas. (See Exhibit 1, page 143 
for corporate organization chart.)
The geographic and business specializations of the various com­
panies were as follows:
Rack Service Corporation
(Philadelphia & 
local area) :
Supermarket rack-jobbers in health and 
beauty aids, toiletries, shaving supplies 
and toothpaste, etc. Also, centralized 
services to entire group, including pur­
chasing, warehousing, accounting, ad­
ministration, etc.
Merchandise Service Corpo­
ration (Philadelphia, Tren­
ton and local areas):
Dela-Wares, Inc. (Wilming­
ton and surrounding areas):
Discount store rack-jobbers (conces­
sionaires ), same lines as Rack Service, 
plus cosmetics.
Small free-standing stores devoted ex­
clusively to health and beauty aids, 
etc. (more complete lines, and dis­
count pricing if compared to Rack 
Service in supermarkets).
Rack Service had been started by Preston Lewis in 1958, with 
financial backing from the members of his family, including Charles 
Richards, who joined the company as chief financial officer. The con-
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cept of supermarkets carrying non-food items was relatively new and 
untried at that time. Preston Lewis, who had held a variety of mer­
chandising and managerial posts with large retail chains in the East, 
felt that the growth of convenience shopping made it a logical develop­
ment for supermarkets to carry a limited range of non-food items. He 
knew that some supermarket chains which had tested this idea had 
found severe difficulties in putting it into practice, primarily because of 
their unfamiliarity with the merchandising of non-food items. Also, 
their physical facilities and personnel were geared solely to the 
handling of food items. While non-foods seemed to represent an un­
tapped market, the potential in individual supermarkets seemed to be 
small, thus making separate attention by in-store personnel pro­
hibitively expensive.
The solution that many of the supermarket chains were turning to 
was to “subcontract” the non-food operation by having independent 
contractors responsible for it in all of its phases, similar to leased de­
partments in department stores, with the exception that the mer­
chandise was paid for by the customer in the normal way, together 
with his or her food purchases at the checkout counter. An identifying 
key would often be used on the cash registers to enable the stores to 
accumulate sales volume figures for non-foods, but any such figure 
would not affect the non-food subcontractor’s revenue. The subcon­
tractor was paid for all merchandise he placed in the store at retail 
price less an agreed markup for the supermarket. These subcontractors 
became known as “rack-jobbers” because in many cases the merchan­
dise items that they serviced were placed on racks in various locations 
throughout the supermarkets. The name persisted even when their 
operation grew beyond the concept of servicing “racks.”
Preston Lewis felt that rack-jobbing in supermarkets offered a sub­
stantial business opportunity, particularly because his background in 
retailing provided an element of “know-how” that the supermarket 
operators lacked. Acting on this premise, Rack Service Corporation 
was founded in 1958 in Philadelphia, with Lewis and various members 
of his family as sole owners.
By 1960, after two years of expected difficulties, the corporation was 
operating quite successfully, and expanding rapidly. In reviewing the 
initial operating results, Lewis decided that the key to continued suc­
cess and profit growth in the rack-jobbing business was through in­
creased volume. This was because great economies were available 
through centralized administration, purchasing, warehousing, distribu­
tion, accounting and billing. A central “core” of these services was an
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integral part of any rack-jobbing operation. However, once such a 
properly managed core was in existence, it could cope with substantial 
increases in volume at very little additional cost, because the costs as­
sociated with greater volume were, in Lewis’ opinion, for the most 
part fixed. For example, warehousing and order-picking required a 
fairly major investment in facilities and materials handling equipment. 
Subject only to the physical limits of the warehouse and equipment, 
an increase in the volume of goods warehoused and in the number of 
orders filled resulted only in minor additional expenses for labor, in­
surance and power. In other words, the increased use of such facilities 
resulted in a substantial increase in the productivity of these facilities. 
Also, increased volume made the costs of more sophisticated overhead 
services justifiable, e.g., computer installations for inventory control 
and billing.
Preston Lewis felt that in time the natural growth of the company 
would permit it to take advantage of the cost savings just mentioned. 
He also felt, however, that substantial additional profit could be made 
by filling up the spare capacity sooner than normal growth would pro­
vide by adding large increments of existing volume to Rack Service 
Corporation’s operations. Accordingly, with the help of their local 
commercial bankers and occasionally drawing on investment bankers 
in Philadelphia and New York, Rack Service began exploring the possi­
bilities of acquiring other companies already in the rack-jobbing busi­
ness. An essential criterion for any acquisition candidate was that its 
operations could be consolidated into the corporation’s facilities.
Acquisition of Beauty Products Distributors, Inc.
The first acquisition, made in late 1960, proved to be doubly fortu­
nate from Rack Service Corporation’s point of view. The company 
acquired was Beauty Products Distributors, Inc. of Trenton, New 
Jersey, also a supermarket rack-jobber and carrying substantially the 
same lines of merchandise as Rack Service. Beauty Products Distribu­
tors was owned and managed by Mr. N. A. Brandon, whom Preston 
Lewis recognized as an individual with a rare merchandising sense, 
and who, although successful on the small scale which his limited 
resources permitted, was clearly capable of assuming wider responsi­
bilities. As part of the transaction, therefore, Mr. Brandon became 
sales manager of Rack Service, while continuing to act in the same 
capacity for Beauty Products Distributors.
Mr. Brandon was most sympathetic with Rack Service’s desire to
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achieve greater economies through its service facilities because he had 
felt somewhat irked by the increasing administrative problems of his 
company as it had grown. At the same time, however, Mr. Brandon 
felt a strong sense of personal identification with his company, and had 
considerable faith in its future under his direction. Therefore, during 
the course of the negotiations with Lewis, he suggested that he retain 
a substantial minority stock interest in Beauty Products Distributors. 
On the other hand, Lewis wanted to create a strong tie between 
Brandon and Rack Service Corporation, because he believed that as 
sales manager, Brandon could make a considerable contribution to 
Rack Service’s future growth.
These objectives were finally satisfied when the investment banker 
who had introduced Brandon to Lewis suggested that the two ex­
change stock in each other’s companies. This proposal, which seemed 
attractive to the parties, required some negotiating before an appropri­
ate exchange ratio was found. It was finally decided that Lewis and 
his associates would acquire 60 per cent of the stock of Beauty Products 
Distributors in exchange for 40 per cent of their Rack Service stock, 
thus leaving them with majority ownership of both companies, and 
leaving Brandon with a substantial minority position in both com­
panies. (When Mr. Booth heard of this arrangement he asked why 
Rack Service Corporation had not simply acquired Beauty Products 
Distributors in exchange for new stock equivalent to 66⅔ per cent of 
the stock already outstanding [100:66% =  60:40]. Lewis’ answer was 
that Brandon wanted to maintain the separate identity of his company 
—an answer which Mr. Booth did not find completely illuminating.)
Booth was apprised of the terms of the Lewis-Brandon deal when 
the two men called on him for assistance in devising a formula by 
which Rack Service’s charges to Beauty Products for service functions 
were to be computed. This was regarded as an important issue by 
both men, even though they each had an unchanging interest in every 
dollar of profit, regardless of the company to which it was attributed. 
In the end, a fairly simple formula was worked out whereby Rack 
Service Corporation’s costs applicable to shared services would be 
prorated between the two companies based on a number of factors, in­
cluding sales volume, number of transactions and average transaction 
size. The result of the formula was that Rack Service in effect shared 
some of its fixed costs of providing centralized services, while Beauty 
Products, in addition to being relieved of its administrative problems, 
also obtained these services at a lower cost than before the joint ar­
rangement was established.
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Acquisition of Dela-Wares, Inc.
The next addition to the group came in April 1962, when Preston 
Lewis and associates acquired 60 per cent of the stock of Dela-Wares, 
Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware, a corporation operating a chain of small 
free-standing stores selling only health and beauty aids, toiletries, and 
similar items. The Dela-Wares stores maintained a broader line of 
merchandise than did Rack Service Corporation and Beauty Products 
Distributors, but there was substantial overlap. Further, the operation 
was run in substantially the same manner as the other two companies. 
Dela-Wares, Inc. had been very successful, building its volume on the 
basis of convenience; a wide variety of fairly standardized merchan­
dise; and in “discount” prices which were below the manufacturers’ 
suggested prices and usually below the prices charged by other stores 
in the immediate neighborhood. There was also some overlap in 
trading area between existing Dela-Wares units and Rack Service and 
Beauty Products customers. Customers usually entered a Dela-Wares 
store to purchase a specific item (e.g., toothpaste, vitamins, aspirin, 
etc.) and then bought not only that item, but also numerous other 
items that were displayed in the store. Preston Lewis believed that 
there was substantial room for expansion by Dela-Wares, Inc., both in 
its own general area (Wilmington, Delaware) and in the areas in 
which Rack Service and Beauty Products served their customers.
Dela-Wares, Inc. had been brought to Preston Lewis’ attention 
through the offices of his commercial bank, a correspondent of Dela- 
Wares’ bank in Wilmington. Dela-Wares, Inc. was looking for an 
opportunity of combining operations with a larger firm in roughly the 
same line of business within easy distance of their existing operations. 
It fitted very well into Rack Service’s merchandising and distribution 
pattern, and also gave the group the nucleus for an expansion effort 
in a new field. Dela-Wares’ management, headed by L. S. Jurgens, 
remained with the company. Mr. Jurgens and his associates retained a 
40 per cent interest in Dela-Wares, Inc., a fact which Preston Lewis 
felt would supply them with the sense of financial involvement that 
would continue to motivate them in continuing to increase Dela-Wares’ 
growth and profitability. The Jurgens group had no difficulty in reach­
ing an agreement with Rack Service Corporation for the provision by 
the latter of centralized services, on a basis identical to that of the Rack 
Service-Beauty Products arrangement. Both parties expected to realize 
economies from this arrangement; Dela-Wares because it was obtain­
ing the advantage of spreading overhead cost over a sales volume sev­
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eral times larger than its own, and Rack Service Corporation because 
the additional volume meant better utilization of its service capacity. 
Despite a slight increase in Rack Service’s total operating costs, “unit” 
costs were reduced because the proportionate increase in volume ex­
ceeded the proportionate increase in costs.
Acquisition of Merchandise Service Corporation
About a year after the Dela-Wares deal, Mr. Jurgens, the president, 
approached Preston Lewis with the suggestion that they jointly acquire 
a discount-store rack-jobbing company headquartered in Philadelphia, 
the Merchandise Service Corporation. This company’s activities were 
described by the owners as the operation of department store con­
cessions rather than “rack-jobbing,” but Jurgens felt that essentially 
their business was in rack-jobbing, and as such, was compatible with 
the rest of the Rack Service Corporation group. The departments 
operated by Merchandise Service Corporation in numerous discount 
stores in the Philadelphia area carried approximately the same lines as 
Rack Service, plus a wide selection of cosmetics.
The proposed acquisition seemed to fit in with Lewis’ plans for ex­
pansion of the Rack Service group for a number of reasons. As he saw 
it, the new company:
1. Would expand the group’s coverage in the Philadelphia area as 
presently served, but would not compete with the existing installations 
in supermarkets
2. Depended on the same type of inventory as existing operations 
except for cosmetics, and required similar merchandising and logistical 
skills
3. Provided a nucleus for further expansion in its own particular 
line of endeavor
4. Provided a further opportunity for cost-sharing and saving on 
centralized administrative functions.
Preston Lewis thought that Merchandise Service Corporation would 
make a valuable addition to the Rack Service group, but found himself 
in the middle of a controversy when he agreed to negotiate with the 
prospective sellers. Jurgens, the president of Dela-Wares, who had 
brought the company to Lewis’ attention, claimed that he and his asso­
ciates were “entitled” to acquire a share in the new company, not only
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by virtue of their role as finders but also because they wished to par­
ticipate in its management and were veiling to back this desire with a 
personal investment in the company. Because it had always been 
Lewis’ desire to integrate “divisional” executives into the broader man­
agement of the whole group, and to give them the widest possible 
scope for the exercise of their talents, and because he had a high regard 
for Jurgens’ capabilities (demonstrated by the success of Dela-Wares), 
Lewis felt that he had no option but to accede to Jurgens’ request for 
an interest in Merchandise Service Corporation. On the other hand, 
Lewis was also under pressure from N. A. Brandon, sales manager of 
Rack Service Corporation and minority stockholder in both Beauty 
Products Distributors and Rack Service Corporation, for an interest to 
be made available to him as well.
The solution that finally evolved to meet the clamor from all sides for 
“a piece of the action,” was for the stock of Merchandise Service to be 
purchased 60 per cent by Rack Service and 40 per cent by the Jurgens 
group, Brandon’s claim for an interest being satisfied via his 40 per cent 
interest in Rack Service Corporation. The 40 per cent interest allocated 
to the Jurgens group was influenced partly by the fact that their hold­
ings in Dela-Wares, Inc. also amounted to 40 per cent thus providing 
some sort of uniformity and partly by the fact that an “outside invest­
ment of this size would provide a substantial part of the capital re­
quired while still leaving Rack Service Corporation (and thus Preston 
Lewis) with voting control.”
After the acquisition negotiations were completed, and Merchandise 
Service Corporation had taken its place as a member of the Rack Serv­
ice Corporation group, however, Preston Lewis remarked to his certi­
fied public accountant, Mr. Booth, that the organizational structure of 
the group seemed to be getting “unnecessarily” complicated. Oper­
ationally all the executives in the group worked well together and 
coordinated their activities quite harmoniously. None of them dis­
puted the methods used to allocate joint costs to the various operating 
units. It was only when it came to actual ownership that there seemed 
to be forces pulling in opposite directions. Preston Lewis remarked to 
Booth that sooner or later it might be necessary to simplify the owner­
ship problem by combining the various companies in the group, per­
haps by merging all the others into Rack Service. He had no set views 
on what exactly should be done, or when, but he did feel that in due 
course some action along those lines would be necessary. “I can’t have 
a wrangle like this with the boys every time we want to add a company 
to the group,” he said to Booth, “and you can be sure that we’re still on
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the lookout for acquisitions, so sooner or later this thing will have to 
come to a head. I’ll call you when we decide to do something.”
Lewis’ promised call to Booth never came, however. Instead, the 
matter was next raised, indirectly, when Preston Lewis called Booth 
in July, 1965 to request his assistance on yet another acquisition, this 
time a company known as Housewares Unlimited. Booth suggested 
that Lewis come into his office to discuss it later that same day.
Housewares Unlimited, Inc.
Preston Lewis began his discussion with Booth by recounting the 
now familiar and well-tried philosophy of the advantage of expanding 
the Rack Service Corporation group by acquisition, in addition to the 
normal processes of internal growth. He added that in reviewing the 
make-up of the group, as he and his fellow executives had done re­
cently, he had come to the conclusion that there were very few ap­
proaches to the rack-jobbing of health-and-beauty aids in which the 
group was not represented as a result of the series of acquisitions made 
through the years. Thus, apart from normal internal growth, future 
expansion could only come from acquisitions of:
1. Competing companies in geographic areas presently served
2. Companies engaged in other forms of rack-jobbing within geo­
graphic areas presently served
3. Companies operating outside the areas presently served, in either 
health-and-beauty aids or other lines of rack-jobbing.
Lewis said that alternative (1) seemed the “safest” to him, while 
(2) seemed to be “the most interesting.” Alternative (3) was not too 
attractive until all opportunities available under (1) and (2) were 
exhausted, because (3) would involve logistic strains or the operation 
of a separate organization, neither of which seemed to fit logically 
with the successful pattern of development on which the group’s 
growth had been based so far. Lewis went on to say that after further 
consideration he had found considerable merit in the acquisition of 
companies engaged in other forms of rack-jobbing within Rack Service 
Corporation’s geographic area. The primary reason for this was that 
such acquisitions would enable the Rack Service Corporation group to 
offer a more complete service to their existing customers and thus pro­
vide the means for even further utilization of its centralized facilities.
According to Lewis, the obvious answer to the question, “What else 
is rack-jobbed in supermarkets?” was housewares. Housewares con­
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sisted of items such as kitchen utensils, brooms and other cleaning 
equipment, pots and pans, plastic household articles, low-priced glass­
ware, and many others. Housewares were rack-jobbed for the same 
reasons as health-and-beauty aids, but there had been very little ac­
tivity in this field until the early 1960’s when the success of the rack­
jobbing concept in health-and-beauty aids had given the spur to the 
rack-jobbing of other articles. This need had been met by specialist 
firms, rather than by existing rack-jobbers, primarily because the basic 
concept of rack-jobbing was that success depended on specific mer­
chandising skills in specific lines of merchandise. Logistics were also 
important, and on this score the existing rack-jobbers had an advantage 
even though it would have meant handling other lines of merchandise, 
but logistics skills were secondary to the need for merchandising skills 
which the existing firms handling other lines did not have. Lewis had 
concluded, therefore, that the Rack Service Corporation group should 
only acquire a houseware rack-jobber if it acquired skilled management 
as well. The contribution which Rack Service would bring to the 
marriage would be its logistic services, entree to its existing customers, 
its low cost overhead service, and, of course, its capital resources.
Preston Lewis said that the last benefit seemed to be quite im­
portant, because his investigations had indicated that the typical house- 
wares rack-jobber was small and undercapitalized, much the same as 
Rack Service Corporation had been in its early years. He went on to 
say that in the course of his investigation of housewares rack-jobbers, 
he had come across a company that seemed to be an excellent acquisi­
tion prospect, namely Housewares Unlimited, Inc., of Philadelphia. 
The president of Housewares was Mr. Charles Fulford, who owned 
100 per cent of the stock of the company. Mr. Fulford was only 31 
years old, and had founded his company late in 1963 after having 
worked for some years for a Philadelphia five-and-ten-cent chain. 
Lewis told Booth that he had approached Fulford to sound him out 
on a possible deal, and had received a positive response. Fulford’s 
company had been quite successful in its year and a half of existence, 
but it was in need of capital for further growth. Furthermore, Fulford 
was quite intrigued with the possibilities for expansion which associa­
tion with the Rack Service group could provide.
Lewis told Booth that he wanted to acquire 80 per cent of the stock 
of Housewares Unlimited, Inc., leaving 20 per cent in the hands of Ful­
ford in order to provide him with an incentive, because Fulford would 
continue to play a major role in Housewares Unlimited’s management. 
Lewis said that he was not sure, however, whether he and his asso­
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ciates ought to acquire the 80 per cent directly, or through one of the 
companies in the group, perhaps Rack Service Corporation. He said 
that this was one point on which he would like to have Booth’s opinion.
Booth had been trying to break into the conversation for some 
time, and at this point he interrupted Lewis. “Preston, in your eager­
ness to buy this company, I think you’re making the same old mistake 
all over again—or, at least, you’re heading that way. When you ac­
quired Merchandise Service Corporation you said something to me 
about the increasingly complicated corporate structure of the Rack 
Service Corporation group, with ‘outside’ interests owning a piece of 
everything and an organization chart that’s beginning to look like a 
labyrinth. In fact, at the time, you said that you thought something 
ought to be done about simplifying the structure, but you didn’t want 
me to come up with anything specific, and you never came up with 
anything yourself that I know of. Now you’re getting ready to add 
another head to this monster. Do you really think it’s wise to let Ful­
ford keep 20 per cent of his company? I am certain that there are 
alternative ways of achieving the incentive you want for him. Isn’t it 
time you did something about tidying up the group’s organizational 
structure?”
“Hmm, you may have a point there,” Lewis replied. “In the excite­
ment I guess I had forgotten about that conversation we had. But 
Bill, I can’t wait to acquire Fulford until we sort the rest of the group 
out. That could take years, and obviously I still don’t know, exactly, 
what form the tidying-up should take. I’ve got the feeling that it will 
take a tremendous selling job to get the rest of the boys to give up 
anything they now have regardless of what we offer in exchange. Yet 
it’s got to be done. In the back of my mind I’ve had the idea of going 
public some time in the future, and we’d obviously have to have the 
group in shape long before that happens. But that of itself is not the 
immediate problem. I’ve got this fellow Fulford ready to come in with 
my group, and I’ve got to come up with something within a week or 
two. I’d like to make him an offer that’s good enough for him to accept, 
because I’m quite keen on having him join us. This could be a major 
breakthrough for our organization, to be able to provide a combination 
that no one else in the business has. I don’t want to gum up the corpo­
rate works with another little company floating in mid-air, and I don’t 
want to lose this one either. What do I do?”
“Don’t get me wrong, Preston. I’m not suggesting that you not enter 
into this deal, and I know that consolidation of the group will be a
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lengthy process. But being aware of the problem is an advantage by 
itself. At least maybe you can try to consummate this acquisition in 
such a way that it doesn’t make the eventual consolidation any more 
difficult than it already is.”
“What do you mean?”
"I’m not quite sure in terms of specifics, at this point. But I think 
the principle is important enough that you might want to consider the 
possibility of a future consolidation into the structure of this acquisi­
tion. I can offer to do some thinking on this matter and see if I can 
come up with an idea or two.”
“Excellent. But please get those ideas fast, because I’ve got to get 
back to Fulford pretty soon.”
“Is there anything else I can do for you?”
“Well, if we get to the agreement stage, of course I’ll want you to do 
a balance sheet audit of Housewares Unlimited so that we know what 
we re getting. I don’t think I need you to audit the financial statements 
for his first year; they were certified by Fulford’s auditor, and in any 
event the assets involved are so small that the financial statements are 
almost irrelevant. However, you might take a look at them and let me 
know if you see anything that looks unusual. Also, if you can get a 
handle on a fair price to pay Fulford, that will be useful—although, 
frankly, as I said before, I doubt if the financial statements will help 
you on this. My discussions with Fulford so far have skirted around 
the price issue; I think it’s going to be a matter of horse-trading when 
we get down to it. Here are the financial statements that Fulford gave 
me; why don’t you give me a call as soon as you’ve come to any 
conclusions.”
The financial statements for Housewares Unlimited, Inc. that Lewis 
left with Booth are summarized in Exhibits 2 and 3, pages 155 and 156.
Questions
1. Suggest an approach that Preston Lewis might follow in his 
negotiations with Charles Fulford, and indicate how it conforms to the 
need of eventually combining all the companies in the Rack Service 
Corporation Group. Do you think that this “need” is a valid objective 
for Lewis to be following at this point? ( State your reasons, whether 
pro or con.)
2. Suggest a price range for Housewares Unlimited, Inc. If addi-
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tional data is required, state what, where and how you would obtain it.
3. Are there any important factors or considerations relevant to the 
proposed acquisition that apparently have not been considered by 
Lewis?
4. If Lewis were to request you to develop plans for the eventual 
consolidation of the Rack Service Corporation group into one company, 
what steps would you suggest?
Booth’s Analysis
As William Booth began his analysis of the Housewares Unlimited 
acquisition problem, he recognized that he didn’t have very much data 
to go on. His files, of course, contained the Rack Service Corporation 
group’s financial statements since its beginning, but he didn’t believe 
that the statements prior to the 1964 fiscal year (the latest; see Ex­
hibits 4, 5, and 6, pages 158, 161, and 162, respectively) would tell him 
anything more useful than the 1964 statements themselves. However, 
he naturally was familiar with the group’s background and history. 
Further, while Booth also had Housewares Unlimited’s financial state­
ments for almost the whole period of its existence (Exhibits 2 and 3), 
he didn’t think that these told him very much that was useful either.
Booth decided to look first at the question of acquisition per se, 
since this was the most urgent and also the most tangible part of his 
assignment. He decided to treat the questions of relating Housewares 
Unlimited to the Rack Service group and of the ultimate structure 
toward which the group might begin to move as secondary matters 
because the “answers” here, if any, were very much a matter of con­
jecture and the personal preference of the parties involved.
Booth began his study of the acquisition problem by carefully 
analyzing Housewares’ financial statements. He noted the following 
main points of interest:
•  Tangible net worth approximately $30,000.
•  Sales approximately $250,000. (Note: need to get comparative data, 
if available, for four months to May 31, 1964 to determine possible 
growth rate.)
•  Gross margin 21-22%. (Note: Rack Service Corporation’s gross 
margin is about 20%.)
•  Profit before taxes $14,000—$22,000. (The latter number is de­
pendent on a seasonal factor, if any, and after paying Fulford a
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Exhibit 2
HOUSEWARES UNLIM ITED, INC.—BALANCE SHEETS
Statements of Financial Position 
January 31, 1965 and May 31, 1965
ASSETS
May 31,1965
Current assets:
Cash $ 6,300
Accounts receivable 23,300
Loans receivable 4,400
Inventory 25,400
Total current assets $ 59,400
Fixed assets:
Land & buildings .......................  28,400
Automobiles & trucks 9,500
Fixtures & fittings 4,200
Total fixed assets 42,100
Less: Accumulated depreciation 5,100
Fixed assets, book value 37,000
Other assets:
Deposits 3,200
Prepayments 2,200
Total other assets 5,400
Total assets ............................... $101,800
January 3 1 , 1965
$12,000
14,800
3,800
14,400
$45,000
28,400
9,500
4,000
41,900
4,100
37,800
3,200
2,500
5,700
$88,500
LIABILITIES and EQUITY
Current liabilities:
Accounts payable $28,000 $27,500
Notes payable-bank 10,600 5,000
Taxes payable 3,400 5,100
Total current liabilities $ 42,000 $37,600
Long term liabilities:
Notes payable-bank (over 1 yr.) 3,200 3,800
Notes payable-officers 4,500 —
First mortgage 19,500 20,000
Total long term liabilities 27,200 23,800
Stockholders’ equity:
Common stock 13,400 13,400
Retained earnings 19,200 13,700
Total stockholders’ equity 32,600 27,100
Total liabilities & equity $101,800 $88,500
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Exhibit 3
HOUSEWARES UNLIM ITED, INC.
Statements of Income 
For the Year Ended January 31, 1965 and 
The Four Month Period Ending 
May 31, 1965
Four Months Ended Year Ended
May 3 1 , 1965 January 3 1 , 1965
Sales $90,100 $233,700
Cost of sales:
Inventory—beginning $ 14,400 $ 10,900
Purchases 73,500 162,900
Wages 8,800 22,600
Inventory—ending (25,400) (14,400)
Cost of sales 71,300 182,000
Gross profit 18,800 51,700
General & administrative
expenses:
Accounting & legal 100 700
Auto & truck expense 1,000 2,600
Blue Cross 300 600
City taxes — 300
Depreciation 400 2,200
Electricity 400 500
Executive salaries 5,100 16,300
Fuel 200 400
Insurance 500 2,300
Interest 400 2,000
Licenses 100 200
Maintenance 100 1,100
Payroll taxes 800 1,900
Postage 100 300
Property expense &
depreciation 700 2,600
Stationery & printing 100 400
Telephone ................................. 400 900
Travel ........................................  500 700
Trade gifts — 300
Casual labor — 700
Miscellaneous 100 400
Total 11,300 37,400
Profit before taxes 7,500 14,300
Federal and state income taxes 2,000 3,600
Net income $ 5,500 $ 10,700
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$16,000 salary. (Note: Rack Service’s 1964 fiscal year profit $26,000 
before taxes.)
•  On Housewares’ existing business, the most likely cost savings after 
amalgamation into the Rack Service group are the following 
expenses:
1/31/65 Total
Wages $22,600
Blue Cross and payroll tax 2,500
Electricity and fuel 900
Insurance and maintenance 3,400
Property expense 2,600
$32,000
In that it is unlikely that all of the amounts above can be saved; an 
assumption of 50% or $16,000 is made.
Booth also noted the following additional factors which he felt were 
relevant:
•  Housewares was probably at the same critical stage where further 
expansion would add substantially to overhead, as had happened 
when Rack Service grew (pre-tax profit margin for the 1964 fiscal 
year is 6% and annualized it is 1% for fiscal 1965).
•  Housewares’ past success and profitability is undoubtedly attribu­
table for the most part to Fulford’s own personal efforts. The same 
will undoubtedly hold for the future.
•  For Rack Service Corporation, the real attraction in Housewares is 
the potential profit from substantially increasing Housewares’ vol­
ume by introducing its products to other Rack Service customers 
(this profit includes the overhead and administrative cost “saving” 
from adding the Housewares operation to Rack Service’s). This 
really represents a leverage on Fulford’s abilities, which presumably 
are being under-utilized at present. Question: should Rack Service 
Corporation pay Fulford anything for this leverage, i.e., should this 
be a factor in setting the price? Isn’t much of this potential brought 
to the deal by Rack Service?
•  Housewares’ own, independent natural growth could require addi­
tional financing, which Rack Service could obtain much more easily 
than could Fulford.
•  From Fulford’s point of view it is probably appropriate to view
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Housewares as a salary-and-profit producer. Thus, salary may be a 
bargaining point, or one way of conveying to Fulford the total 
package of values he desires.
Mr. Booth then drew the following conclusions, which he clearly 
labeled as being subjective since he felt that objectivity as such would 
give him no guide to the required answers.
•  Housewares is probably worth something in excess of book value
(book value =  2 to 1½  X pre-tax income).
•  Maintaining Fulford’s interest and participation in the company is 
critical.
•  Housewares is in a poor bargaining position because continued inde­
pendence offers little prospect of a substantial growth in income.
•  Fulford’s salary is probably about right. An increase would repre­
sent a premium over his personal market value.
Mr. Booth then calculated a range of possible purchase prices for 
Housewares, as follows:
Pre-tax earnings base (subject 
to verification of current year 
increase from $14,000 to
$22,000) $18,000 Average
Valuation of company at stated 
multiple
80% of above ...........................
Valuation of company if earn­
ings were $5,000 less (i.e., if 
Fulford’s salary increased by
$5,000)
80% of above
2½  X
$45,000
36,000
32,500
26,000
3X
$54,000
43,200
39,000
31,200
4 X
$72,000
57,600
52,000
41,600
5 X
$90,000
72,000
65,000
52,000
Mr. Booth believed that it was in Rack Service Corporation’s interest 
to keep the purchase price for Housewares as close to tangible book 
value as possible. He reasoned that this would protect his client in the 
event, however unlikely, that Housewares were ever liquidated. He 
reasoned that this was important where a business was so highly de­
pendent on the efforts of one man. It followed from this approach that 
any goodwill or premium over book value required by the seller should
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be recognized by increasing his annual income. This had two ad­
vantages:
•  Such payments were annually contingent upon the continued exist­
ence of the company being acquired and upon the critical indi­
vidual’s employment.
•  Such payments were 100% tax-deductible whereas the amortization 
of goodwill would not be. (The tangible assets of Housewares 
seemed to offer little opportunity for revaluation.)
The disadvantage of this type of payment was that the salary might 
well continue long enough to exceed the cash value that the seller 
would accept including goodwill, if the company acquired remained 
successful. Mr. Booth felt that this was not a significant factor, and 
that the “insurance” was worth the possible future cost. He would 
point this out to Lewis at their meeting.
Booth recalled that Lewis had suggested leaving Fulford with a 20
Exhibit 5
RACK SERVICE CORPORATION
Income Statement
For the Year Ended January 31, 1965
Sales ............................................................................... $1,878,000
Less cost of goods sold:
Inventory—beginning $ 444,000
Purchases .................................................................. 1,464,000
Inventory—ending (414,000)
Cost of goods sold 1,494,000
Gross profit $ 384,000
Less expenses (detail per Exhibit 6):
W arehouse .............................................................. $ 208,000
Selling & delivery 129,000
Administrative and general 210,000 
$ 547,000
L ess: Expenses apportioned to other group
companies 189,000
Net expenses 358,000
Net profit from operations $ 26,000
Federal and state income taxes 9,000
Net income ................................................................... $ 17,000
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Exhibit 6
RACK SERVICE CORPORATION
Schedule of Operating Expenses 
For the Year Ended January 31, 1965
W arehouse expenses:
Payroll $135,000
Rent .................................................................................  36,000
Heat, light and power 7,000
W arehouse supplies 13,000
Insurance 10,000
Depreciation ................................................................  4,000
Miscellaneous 3,000
Total warehouse expenses $208,000
Delivery and selling expenses:
Payroll .............................................................................  $ 60,000
Automobile and truck expenses 8,000
Depreciation 34,000
Travel and selling expenses 17,000
Taxes (vehicles) 3,000
Insurance ....................................................................... 7,000
Total delivery and selling expenses $129,000
Administration and general expenses:
Executive salaries $ 50,000
Payroll taxes
(including warehouse & salesmen) 18,000
Depreciation ................................................................  3,000
Professional services 5,000
Office salaries ..............................................................  55,000
Office supplies and expense 9,000
D ata processing rentals 22,000
Telephone 7,000
Bad Debts 5,000
Interest ...........................................................................  35,000
Miscellaneous 1,000
Total administrative & general expenses .........  $210,000
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per cent equity interest in Housewares. Subject to later review in con­
nection with the consolidation question, he decided to accept this as 
a working premise because it would achieve the important objective of 
providing Fulford with a financial incentive geared to Housewares’ 
future success. It then occurred to Booth that permitting Fulford to 
retain this interest need not necessarily “dilute” his client’s interest in 
Housewares’ net assets in the event of liquidation. This could be 
achieved by converting Housewares’ stock into two classes, “A” and 
“B”, with “A” entitled to a preference on liquidation, but with both 
classes sharing in profits on a share-for-share basis. The ratio of A to 
B would be 80:20. The liquidation preference of the “A” class would 
be set at a per share figure calculated by dividing the total book value 
of the company on acquisition by the number of “A” shares. Booth 
recognized that this feature might not be attractive to Fulford, but he 
thought that if the purchase price of the “A” stock were set at the same 
value as the liquidation preference then Fulford should not object be­
cause he would have been paid the full book value of the company 
when selling his stock. In effect, his “B” stock would represent a one­
way option on 20 per cent of any increase in book value, and on 20 per 
cent of Housewares’ earning power.
Reviewing the calculations he had made previously, Booth noted 
that a multiple of slightly more than 3 X the adjusted average pre-tax 
earnings would produce what might be considered a satisfactory price 
(3 X $13,000 =  $39,000; $39,000 X 80% =  $31,200; $31,200 =  ap­
proximate book value [$32,600]). In other words, a purchase of 80 
per cent of Housewares’ stock by Rack Service Corporation at 3 X 
pre-tax earnings would not represent a cost in excess of 100 per cent of 
tangible book value. Although he had in reality “backed into” this 
figure, Mr. Booth felt that 3 X pre-tax earnings was quite an appropri­
ate multiple for a company like Housewares. He therefore summarized 
his thoughts about the terms of the possible acquisition into the follow­
ing three steps:
1. Housewares would classify its common stock as “A”, capitalizing
its retained earnings by declaring a stock dividend in “A” and “B” shares 
—“B” shares to amount to 20% of the total stock outstanding after 
the stock dividend. The “A” shares would be given a liquidation pref­
erence of 125% of par value (100% ÷  80% =  125% ).
2. Fulford would be offered a price for the “A” shares equivalent to 
total tangible net worth of the company. This price is equivalent to
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slightly over 3 X adjusted pre-tax earnings (adjusted as per item (3) 
below). [Booth noted that he thought that Lewis could go up to 3½  
X earnings, or a premium of approximately 10%, if he absolutely had 
to. This could perhaps be countered by an increase in the liquidation 
preference in the “A” stock.]
3. Fulford’s salary would be raised by $5,000 to $21,300 per year.
Having established a recommendation on the terms of the offer to be 
made for Housewares, Booth turned next to consideration of the wider 
question of the structure of the whole Rack Service Corporation group, 
and Housewares’ relationship to it. As he did so, Booth wondered 
whether he had perhaps prejudged the issue when he had placed this 
major question second in order of attention. As he began to think about 
the question, he realized that he was now trying to rationalize the 
proposal on Housewares that he had already come up with, rather 
than look at the structure question in an objective manner. Regardless 
of the rights or wrongs of his approach, however, he realized that the 
damage, if any, had already been done by tackling the price-and-terms 
question first. (After the whole problem was resolved, Booth con­
tinued to wonder how much his recommendation on the structure 
question had been affected by the order in which he tackled the two 
parts of his assignment for Lewis.)
Booth spent some time considering where in the group the 80 per 
cent holding of Housewares’ stock should be located. He found no 
easy solution, starting with the assumption that all of the stockholders 
and companies in the group had the resources to make the purchase. 
His first inclination was that the Housewares’ stock should be pur­
chased by Rack Service Corporation as it was the central company in 
the group. He realized, however, that this suggestion might not be 
well received by the Jurgens group who had no investment in Rack 
Service itself. Thus, the logical contender to make the investment 
might be Merchandise Service Corporation, since all three investor 
groups had some interest, direct or indirect, in that company. He 
wasn’t sure, however, that the proportionate ownership of Merchandise 
Service was what Preston Lewis wanted for the new investment. Per­
haps Lewis in conjunction with his family associates should make the 
investment, since this would avoid the problems represented by the 
percentage ownerships of the other investor groups in the various com­
panies within the group. But this would not provide interest for either 
Mr. Brandon or the Jurgens group.
At this point Booth realized that his reasoning was going around in
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circles. There were advantages and disadvantages in putting the 
Housewares investment in any of the group companies. Further, he 
did not consider it desirable to divide the Housewares stock among two 
or more companies within the group. He felt that a different approach 
was needed and decided to take a fresh look at the question the follow­
ing day.
When he returned to the problem, Booth’s first reaction was that he 
had been focusing too narrowly on the issue in an attempt to solve the 
specific problem of finding a “home” in the Rack Service group for 
Housewares. He believed that a more fruitful approach would be to 
first develop some ideas about the future consolidation of the group, 
and then see where that left the Housewares problem.
Booth therefore listed the following reasons which he felt justified 
consolidation of the group:
•  Greater financial power of a larger company, particularly to raise 
capital for expansion.
•  Possibility of a public offering of stock, providing (a) enhanced 
ability to acquire other companies, and (b) estate planning advan­
tages for existing stockholders.
•  Consolidation would emphasize the “group” nature of the Rack Serv­
ice Corporation organization, in contrast to the present fragmented 
structure. Executive-stockholders’ financial incentives would depend 
more on the success of the group as a whole than on the success of 
the individual companies within the group.
•  Problem of citing new acquisitions, e.g., Housewares Unlimited, Inc. 
would be obviated.
The problem of specifying which of the companies in the group 
should become the eventual survivor in the consolidation process was 
almost as complicated as the problem of where to put Housewares. It 
occurred to him, however, that in consolidating the group it could be 
quite feasible to set up a new company and merge all the existing com­
panies into it. This, of course, would mean determining a value for 
each company, in order to establish the terms for the mergers. Booth 
reasoned that this was the key to the problem.
If a value could be assigned to each company in the group, Booth 
reasoned that there would be no need (except for possible legal compli­
cations) to set up a new company into which the existing companies 
could be merged. Once values were set, the companies in the group 
could be merged into any group company with the identical result in
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terms of ownership; selecting the surviving company would then be a 
matter for the various founders to decide, recognizing the inevitable 
desire that each might have to see his company survive. The analytical 
problem, however, resolved itself into one of determining relative or 
absolute values, after which consolidation could take place at will. If 
a value could be established for Housewares Unlimited, Inc. on compa­
rable terms, it too could become part of the consolidated group without 
any difficulty.
Taking his reasoning a step further, Booth realized that if the various 
investors in the Rack Service group agreed that the investment in 
Housewares would be valued at cost for purposes of consolidation, this 
would mean that any increase in Housewares’ value between acquisi­
tion and the time the group was consolidated would accrue to the vari­
ous investors in proportion to the values of their holdings in the entire 
group at the time of consolidation. If it were assumed that these pro­
portions would not change substantially from the present time, then it 
would not matter which group company was chosen as the temporary 
home for Housewares. That problem therefore was conditionally 
solved; and Booth decided to recommend that the Housewares stock 
be purchased by Lewis personally, or alternatively by Merchandise 
Service Corporation, assuming in either case that Lewis was able to 
satisfy the various owners that this reasoning was sound. In the event 
that Brandon or the Jurgens group refused to contemplate Lewis’ ac­
quiring the Housewares stock directly, Merchandise Service was the 
only group company in which all the investor groups had an interest. 
Therefore, Merchandise Service would be the alternative.
Booth noted that “cost”, or current value at time of acquisition would 
not be the value to use if Fulford’s 20 per cent interest in Housewares 
were taken over at the consolidation. This interest should be valued by 
first placing a value on Housewares’ stock, using whatever method was 
agreed upon by all concerned for use in valuing all group companies, 
and then calculating the appropriate amount due Fulford for his shares. 
Thus, Fulford would receive any appreciation in value of Housewares 
between acquisition and consolidation. As he noted this point, Booth 
realized that the approach he was developing would not require all the 
group companies to be consolidated simultaneously. Each could be 
brought in individually, at whatever time the parties deemed appropri­
ate. For example, it might be considered preferable not to consolidate 
Housewares until it had become a fully-fledged member of the group. 
Fulford’s incentive might best be kept at the Housewares level until 
such time as his activities had become so integrated with the group
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that it was desirable for his financial interest to become group-oriented 
also. This was just an example, Booth thought, but the same idea might 
be applicable to other existing group companies and, of course, to 
future acquisitions as well. Further down the road, he realized, a fully 
integrated company might operate more efficiently with a substantially 
different organizational structure for top management; at this time, 
however, he felt it premature to predict how the organization might 
evolve in the future.
Booth decided that the terms of this engagement precluded his going 
ahead and setting tentative values on individual companies in the 
group. He did decide, however, that he would recommend that this 
be undertaken as early as possible. He felt that the assistance of one or 
more investment bankers would probably be required in this project, 
because the most important and difficult part of the problem would be 
to develop a theoretical basis, or formula, to use in deriving values. As 
he thought about this, Booth made a mental note that he felt that Rack 
Service Corporation’s value should include some kind of premium over 
a formula value, to take into account the value of its name, its long 
existence and reputation, and the administrative and service structure 
it had built up for the benefit of the group. He had no idea how large 
this premium should be, but he resolved to bring this point up for 
discussion at the appropriate time.
Feeling that he had come up with answers to all the questions that 
Lewis had raised, Booth telephoned him and hold him that he was 
ready to talk specifics on a possible price for Housewares Unlimited, 
Inc. and that he had formulated an approach that could ultimately be 
used to consolidate the Rack Service Corporation group into one 
company.
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